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A Student’s Take on Canada’s Legal 
Pasts
Nick Austin
In July 2017, I immersed myself in the Canada’s Legal Past conference at 
the University of Calgary. This was my first introduction to Canadian legal 
history, a field that I came to see as central to my own interests, learning, 
and understanding as a law student. The pieces in this collection are a 
marker of what students in multiple fields can learn through attention to 
the legal histories of Canada’s past.
Both at the conference and in reading the volume, I have been most 
taken with what one might call the “mythology building.” As a young na-
tion, we are still searching for the moments and individuals that define 
our collective Canadian “mythos.” Where will Canadian legal historians 
find their totemic figures—their heroes and villains? Should we reject the 
totemic figures of previous generations—the John Beverley Robinsons 
and William Osgoodes—in favour of unknown figures? Could these be 
the mounted police recruits brought to life by Shelley Gavigan? The en-
terprising legal professionals examined by Alexandra Havrylyshyn, who 
challenges the myth that there were no lawyers in New France? Or perhaps, 
like me, one may be struck by the detail and charm of “The Last Voyage 
of the Frederick Gerring, Jr.,” by Christopher Shorey, an exploration of a 
possible Canadian Pierson v. Post analogue with enough narrative finesse 
to tap into the latent maritime nostalgia that I did not suspect I had. If I 
were unafraid of writing in hackneyed grade-school clichés, I might say 
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that it “makes history come alive.” Or, perhaps Albertans like myself will 
find it enlightening to peek behind our cultivated sense of identity and 
unravel the mythology with Louis A. Knafla’s examination of the writ-
ing of prairie history. Speaking of ingrained social praxis, Dominique 
Clément and Jean-Philippe Garneau’s explorations of gender may help 
readers better understand the unique place of women in our legal past and 
present: Clément examines the incremental and imperfect development of 
sex discrimination law in Canada, while Garneau analyses 250 civil cases 
of married women asking for a séparation de biens in Montreal judicial 
district between 1795–1827.  
I am also struck by the great variety of methodological approach-
es (the “how” as opposed to the “what”). Eric Reiter looks to Quebec’s 
civil court archives (gleaning unpublished details, litigation strategies, 
and allegations from case files) in his writing on early defamation cases. 
Catharine MacMillan describes untapped archival resources about the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, England, resources 
that may help enhance our understanding of how this body influenced the 
development of Canadian law beyond the constitutional sphere. Lyndsay 
Campbell discusses her use of newspaper accounts and pamphlets in her 
work on mid-nineteenth century libel cases and the controversies they re-
veal. Ted McCoy addresses historiographical concerns when approaching 
the vast Kingston Penitentiary archives, and by extension the lives of the 
workers and the women prisoners who resided there. Angela Fernandez 
examines the role of legal publishing in determining which text a judge 
had at hand. Regardless of the specific approaches taken by the authors, 
embedded in these pieces are countless moments of hard-fought discov-
ery, understanding and, undoubtedly, gratification. Mélanie Méthot, for 
example, acknowledges the visceral thrill of leafing through time-worn 
paper ephemera in her work on bigamy cases. Most importantly, this col-
lection is both inspired and inspiring, and I am excited to consider where 
the field may go next.
1
Canada’s Legal Pasts: Looking 
Forward, Looking Back
Ted McCoy, Lyndsay Campbell, and Mélanie Méthot
In 1977 a group of historians met at Laval University to consider the emer-
gence of Canadian legal history as a distinct and worthy field of study. 
Although legal history in Britain and the United States enjoyed a longer 
and more established tradition, in Canada it was in its formative stages in 
the 1970s. It emerged alongside a growing interest in fields of Canadian 
studies, gender studies, and social history—all fields that the study of law 
would eventually touch upon and incorporate into its own development. 
Over forty years have passed since that first conference, eventful decades 
in which the field has matured and absorbed theoretical and methodo-
logical developments in scholarship, while profiting from the tremendous 
improvement in the availability of sources that has come with digitiza-
tion projects now widely accessible on the internet. In this introduction to 
Canada’s Legal Pasts: Looking Forward, Looking Back, we outline some key 
moments. By foregrounding Canadian legal history’s rich array of sources, 
methodologies, and questions, this book not only marks the maturity of 
the field but also aims to welcome new scholars and new contributions.1 
The 1977 Laval conference led to a collection of essays edited by 
Louis A. Knafla. Each chapter in the Laval proceedings was loosely ori-
ented around topics relating to crime in Canadian society. This in itself 
was methodologically different, providing evidence that the proceedings 
at Laval sought to reorient views of Canadian history into new areas of 
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research involving the law. In his preface, Knafla described how the pa-
pers illustrated the potential for seeing our society through an appreci-
ation of legal problems in their social, cultural, and economic settings.2 
What these first papers indicate is the intertwining of legal and social 
history as a route forward for understanding not just crime, but all areas 
of Canadian society. 
Shortly after the meeting at Laval, the field’s momentum increased 
with the founding of the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. 
Two years later, the Osgoode Society published the first volume of its 
Essays in the History of Canadian Law series, edited by David H. Flaherty. 
Flaherty proposed a model for legal history in Canada that would explore 
the relationship between law and society in terms roughly connected 
to those of the “Wisconsin School,” employing the method of Willard 
Hurst.3 Knafla noted in a subsequent review that this approach, with 
its focus on the state’s intervention in the industrializing economy, was 
simultaneously rather too Ontarian and too American to serve as a model 
for the young field. Furthermore, its instrumentalism largely sidelined im-
portant methodologies that might incorporate histories of crime, among 
other topics, in an understanding of the law,4 methodologies that were 
actually anticipated in R.C.B. Risk’s prospectus for Canadian legal history, 
which Flaherty commended as “Hurstian in the best sense of the term.” 
For Risk, legal history could be considered “the study of the history of 
legal processes in three overlapping elements: the influences of societal 
values on the law, the effect of law itself on the minds and events of the 
society, and the structures, procedures, and functions of such institutions 
as the legislature, the courts, and the legal profession.”5 Risk’s agenda in-
cluded the analysis of French and American, as well as English influences 
on Canadian law and explorations of crime, the family, and law’s role in 
contributing to a sense of Canadian identity. Subsequent scholarship has 
wrestled to come to grips with the ways in which Hurst’s approach, as well 
as approaches advanced by Risk, E.P. Thompson, Douglas Hay, and others, 
have by turns opened and limited lines of analysis in Canadian legal-his-
torical scholarship.6 Indeed, Knafla’s own scholarship on Western Canada 
has contributed greatly to one vital element of Canadian legal history that 
escaped Flaherty and Risk: the colonial violence imposed through law, 
among other forces, on Indigenous people. 
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The field of Canadian legal history got another push in 1985 with the 
creation of a multidisciplinary scholarly association devoted to the study 
of law and society. Law professor John McLaren was elected the first presi-
dent of the Association canadienne droit et société / Canadian Law and 
Society Association. A year later, the Association published the first vol-
ume of the Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue Canadienne Droit 
et Société, edited by Rainer Knopff.7 Knafla, McLaren, Knopff, and others 
applied their western Canadian energies to the field. 
A decade after the first meeting at Laval, Canadian legal history 
could claim that the project initiated there was firmly underway. In 1987 
Canadian legal historians met again, this time at Carleton University, 
where nearly fifty papers were presented. The social history of law was 
the predominant theme. This was social history broadly conceived, ad-
dressing—among many other topics—histories of sex crime, “common 
sense” in railway regulation, political and legal culture, debt, obscenity, 
and morality. The multitude of research interests was evidence of an ex-
panding rigour in the field. It represented not only the growing number of 
researchers using legal history to understand Canadian society, but a wid-
ening conception of what the contours of that society included. Perhaps 
the biggest development signaled by the 1987 conference was the theor-
etical and political enrichment of Canadian legal history through the 
addition of the broader theoretical perspectives added by Marxism and 
feminism. The influence of E.P. Thompson’s and Douglas Hay’s work on 
the ideological basis of law was apparent in essays that considered Marxist 
theorizations of punishment, and Greg Marquis addressed the place of 
“British justice” in Canadian history. Marquis’s work, in particular, added 
insight into the possibilities of cultural history in our understanding of 
the Canadian legal culture and disrupted, as Thompson did in England, 
older notions of how the nineteenth-century working-class understood, 
responded to, and used the law to their own purposes.8 
The introduction of feminist perspectives to Canadian legal history 
was a welcome consequence of the changing gender balance of Canadian 
academe and the growing influence of gendered analysis in all areas of 
social history. Eight different papers illustrated the possibilities of feminist 
analysis in Canadian legal history, among them considerations of patri-
archy and the state by Jane Ursel, who theorized about production and 
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reproduction in the sexual division of labour in Canadian society. Ursel 
sought to theorize the place of law in the organization of power and author-
ity in nineteenth-century Canadian society in a paper that joined together 
the possibilities of Marxist and feminist analysis. As David Flaherty had 
anticipated in 1981, “major interpreters of the Canadian past” had ceased 
to assume the legal system to be “secondary and passive rather than an 
instrumental and dynamic aspect of historical development.”9 
Other papers at the Carleton conference hinted at the changing land-
scape of Canadian scholarship about the law. Among them were two es-
says that began to consider Indigenous rights in Canada. D.R. Williams 
discussed land claims litigation in a piece that presciently asked ques-
tions about the rule of law, legal history, and reconciliation, though not 
in the language that defines our contemporary debate on these issues.10 
A second essay, by Tom Flanagan, questioned the meaning of Indigenous 
rights—a relatively new topic in 1987—by considering the long history of 
international law on these questions.11 Although post-colonial scholarship 
swiftly moved past both of these interpretations, they represent early at-
tempts to grapple with the legal implications of Canadian colonial hist-
ory. In the larger sense, these essays hinted, too, at the influence of social 
history in our field, revealing the dawn of anti-colonial scholarship and 
race theory that would come to influence all areas of scholarship about 
Indigenous people in Canada. 
Post-colonial scholarship and legal history in Canada were signifi-
cantly strengthened by the founding of UBC Press’s Law and Society book 
series, edited by W. Wesley Pue, which published its first title in 2002.12 
Processes of colonization, expropriation, and other uses and abuses of 
power have been central preoccupations of that series. Legal history now 
shows its merits both as a topic of study and as a historical methodology 
in unpacking these processes. The essays in this volume reflect both long-
standing concerns and newer ones, well-known kind of sources and some 
that have only really become available with digitization and the internet. 
In addition to the UBC Law and Society book series and Osgoode Society 
for Canadian Legal History, legal historians have presented their research 
at the annual ACDS/CLSA conferences and published their work in the 
scholarly journal of the association. Perhaps because scholars found so 
many venues for their research, it took another thirty years before a third 
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Canadian legal history conference was held. In July 2017, the University of 
Calgary, under the leadership of Lyndsay Campbell and Ted McCoy, host-
ed sixty-five scholars identifying as legal historians. The papers reflected 
both continuities and discontinuities with past scholarship. The effects of 
colonization on Indigenous peoples in northern North America was a ma-
jor thread, with papers by Jean-François Lozier, Nicole O’Byrne, Jacqueline 
Briggs, Robert Hamilton, David G. Bell, Genevieve Painter, Sarah P. Pike, 
and Shaunnagh Dorsett (providing a point of Māori comparison) all con-
tributing to the conversation. Still, the absence of Indigenous historians 
themselves from this debate is in itself evidence of a field that must expand 
its efforts to incorporate voices from beyond the traditional power struc-
tures of the academy. Just as legal history expanded to include class and 
gender in its understanding of the law, the challenge ahead will be to move 
beyond Indigenous people as a topic of study and welcome Indigenous 
perspectives. 
At the 2017 conference, the legal history of Quebec was well repre-
sented, especially by a number of scholars exploring the ways in which 
women navigated family issues in civil courts in the nineteenth century.13 
Other papers explored aspects of Canadian constitutionalism, the law’s re-
lation to ethnicity and race, judicial biography and histories of lawyering, 
legal ideologies and geographies, dimensions of the history of tort, prop-
erty, municipal, administrative and human rights law, gender and sexual-
ity, transboundary legal problems, the institutions of colonialism, and the 
challenges of writing about crime and punishment.14 
The papers presented in Calgary provide evidence of a field that has 
outgrown its traditional definitions. Legal history is not only a topic of 
study, but the basis of an expansive historical methodology that enriches 
multiple areas of historical analysis. Just as social history explores more 
than merely society, as though it could be separated from everything it 
encompasses, legal history in Canada has become a method of inquiry and 
research that incorporates the law into understandings of historical pro-
cesses and change of every kind. This moment did not arrive overnight. 
The methodological maturity of legal history in Canada is the product 
of four decades of historical research and writing on every aspect of the 
law and how it affects Canadian society. It also speaks to the deepening 
political commitment of scholars who seek to challenge the structures of 
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inequality in Canadian society by investigating legal history as one avenue 
toward change.
The essays in this volume explore a variety of topics with a particular 
eye to methodology, on the one hand because we wish to emphasize the 
possibilities inherent in thinking about legal history as a methodology 
and, on the other, because we hope to welcome to the field scholars who 
may be unfamiliar with legal sources and arguments. The book has three 
parts: the first focuses on writing about specific cases; the second interro-
gates the workings of legal systems and their participants; and the third 
offers historiographical scope, looking forward and back. We include five 
short pieces about particular kinds of sources and how they can be used in 
legal history research: Mélanie Méthot’s chapter on finding bigamy cases 
using archival and non-archival sources; Ted McCoy’s essay on the rich 
offerings of prison records; Catharine MacMillan’s chapter on the largely 
unexplored treasure-trove of the records of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council; Angela Fernandez’s chapter on the history of a particular, 
low-cost law book used in the Gerring case, which Christopher Shorey 
discusses in his chapter; and Lyndsay Campbell’s essay on finding and in-
terpreting the accounts of trials contained in pamphlets and newspapers. 
The chapter by Christopher Shorey is a case study of the interplay of 
legal and political pressures on the fate of an American fishing schooner 
whose crew were caught packing up fish on the wrong side of the inter-
national boundary off Nova Scotia. In writing about a “hard case”—the 
kind that lawyers know make “bad law”—Shorey offers a novel contri-
bution to Canadian legal history by venturing into admiralty law, a 
much-neglected area for a country with so much coastline. Consistent with 
Risk’s and Flaherty’s calls for research on the profession itself,15 we include 
Alexandra Havrylyshyn’s chapter on lawyering in New France, where the 
professional hierarchy and social status of those who represented others 
in court were markedly different from those of France. Also exploring 
aspects of legal systems is Shelley Gavigan’s chapter on the strangely hy-
brid disciplinary and criminal proceedings brought against mostly young 
North-West Mounted Police officers before Alberta and Saskatchewan 
became provinces. Gavigan shows the vulnerability of these young men 
who went West in the name of a colonial vision of social order, but whose 
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troubling encounters with the justice system demonstrated its highly per-
sonal, fluid lines of authority. 
Canadian legal historians have long been interested in the relationship 
between gender and law. Jean-Philippe Garneau’s chapter on how married 
women navigated civil law before the Court of King’s Bench in Quebec 
between 1795 and 1830 takes up this historiographical thread. To describe 
the history of women’s activism in Canada and its contribution to the 
dramatic changes in equality law, Dominique Clément, in his essay, pulls 
together a vast amount of secondary scholarship amassed by historians of 
women’s history and connects it with his own research on legal reform. 
We begin the book with Eric Reiter’s “Family Defamation in the 
Quebec Civil Courts: The View from the Archives,” an essay that puts 
methodology at its centre and masterfully demonstrates how the actual 
physicality of the archive can inform us about how real people used law. 
We conclude with a forward-looking historiography of the prairies pre-
sented by Lou Knafla, the editor of the 1977 conference proceedings, now 
Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Calgary. Knafla’s essay 
underlines both what we know and what we have yet to learn, as schol-
ars—perhaps including some of the newcomers we hope to welcome to 
our field through this volume—bring new insights into the histories of 
Indigenous peoples and settlers in Canada. Lou has for decades been a 
driving force in Canadian legal history; his career was once described as 
“charted by a restless mind driven forward by a genuine curiosity about 
the world in which he lives.”16 Lou remains an inspiring, gently towering 
figure in our field, and it is to him that we dedicate this book.
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Family Defamation in the Quebec 




In October 1912 in Montreal, Joseph Robert started defamation proceed-
ings against Jean-Baptiste Barbeau, the brother of his deceased first wife. 
Robert alleged that a month earlier, Barbeau had come into his home, ac-
companied by one of Robert’s sons from the first marriage, and said to 
his current wife, “I dare say there’s a sore throat here, syphilis if you really 
want to know. . . . There wasn’t anything like that in the house when my 
sister was alive.”1 Robert claimed the exorbitant sum of $5,000 in damages 
on behalf of both himself and his second wife, Hélène Brunet. About a 
month and a half later, in December, Barbeau filed his defence, in which 
he admitted going to Robert’s home out of concern for his nieces still liv-
ing there, but denied everything else. He also added, among other things, 
that if he had said anything (which he denied), it was strictly within the 
family, and outsiders had heard nothing of it.2 There the matter stood 
until five months later, in May, when the next documents were added to 
the case file: a notice by Robert that he was discontinuing his case, and a 
judgment formally dismissing the action with costs.3
1
Eric H. Reiter12
The case of Robert v. Barbeau—ordinary in many respects, unusual 
in others—illustrates some of the ways in which judicial archives provide 
a particular picture of the workings of a legal system, different from what 
published case reports provide. By shedding light on the procedural side 
of litigation, the materials contained in the judicial archives complement 
the substantive issues on which legal historians usually focus. They rec-
ord hints about strategy and motivation, nuances that show litigants using 
the courts in instrumental ways. We cannot say for sure what motivated 
Joseph Robert to drop his case and pay the costs six months after he initi-
ated it. But the exaggerated damages claim (in similar cases at the time the 
high end of the scale was between $500 and $1,000, while many plaintiffs 
demanded far less), the unenthusiastic pursuit of the case, and the rela-
tionship between the parties all suggest that sending a message was more 
important than receiving a final judicial resolution.
The case files and registers that make up the Quebec judicial archives 
can be read as texts in their own right, texts that shed light on the motiva-
tions and strategies of litigants. Reading archives of various kinds as texts 
has been the subject of numerous influential studies, and legal archives 
are no exception.4 Legal archives, however, present distinct problems and 
promises due to the nature of the legal process that produced them. As 
Carolyn Strange has noted about a particular legal archive, the capital case 
files compiled by the Canadian government in order to determine wheth-
er or not to commute a death sentence, the archive and the files that make 
it up can be analyzed “not only as material artefacts but as a discursive 
means of organizing knowledge and producing meaning.”5 My focus is 
not on how the judicial archive itself structured knowledge and meaning 
(an interesting question outside the scope of this chapter), but instead on 
how the submission, recording, and archiving of documents, the literal 
archival remains, actualized litigants’ strategies and choices within devel-
oping litigation. To this end, I will look at the case files and court registers 
not as completed and closed records of litigation, but rather as narratives 
of the development of legal actions over time. The documents in the files 
and the dated entries in the registers record the progress of a case: the long 
pauses and periodic flurries of activity reveal the ebb and flow of litigation 
as it proceeded. This diachronic picture of cases offers historians valuable, 
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and oftentimes the only evidence of the parties’ commitment to the case 
and their reasons for pursuing it as they did.
This chapter is based on a subset of cases drawn from a larger project 
that sampled the Quebec judicial archives between 1840 and 1920 for cases 
relating to family matters. Overall, our team identified, photographed, 
and compiled into a database some 1,836 civil and criminal cases from 
the judicial districts of Montreal, Quebec City, and Trois-Rivières, at both 
the Superior Court (civil matters) and the Court of Queen’s (King’s) Bench 
(criminal matters).6 Broadly speaking, the identified cases cover sexual in-
fractions, intra-familial violence, matrimonial and parental difficulties, 
and conflicts concerning the patrimonial or moral status of the family. 
My focus here will be on the last group: cases of family defamation, that is 
slander, insult, and libel (Quebec law did not distinguish as the common 
law did) in which the victim or the defamer was a member of the plain-
tiff’s family or in which the nature of the insult was family-related.7 I will 
begin with a brief discussion of the compilation and content of the Quebec 
judicial archives, and then present an overview of the family defamation 
cases found in our sample, before offering some conclusions about the in-
sights gained by the view from the archives.
Litigation’s Archival Traces
Quebec’s civil court archives—much more voluminous than the criminal 
side, in mass of paper produced, if not in number of cases—have been rela-
tively underutilized by historians despite the riches they preserve.8 The ar-
chives comprise a series of registers of all cases, along with case files con-
taining the documents submitted to and produced by the judicial process. 
Compared to the published reports of decided cases, the archives present 
a strikingly different view of litigation, particularly with respect to defam-
ation actions. Unlike the reports, the archives preserve the fine grain of 
litigation: the arguments the parties raised, factual allegations—whether 
or not the court accepted them in the end— and, in many cases, the words 
of witnesses recorded in their depositions. The archives are also much 
wider in scope than the fraction of cases included in the published reports 
of the period, which were produced for the profession, and so their editors 
selected for inclusion those cases that illustrated important legal points.9 
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The Quebec reports published in the period of our study unsurprisingly 
presented almost exclusively cases that reached formal and final judicial 
resolution, and more particularly those cases that made novel legal points. 
Incidentally, of course, the published reports also provide a wealth of in-
formation about the conflicts that drove litigants to court and the ways in 
which those social conflicts were legalized and resolved by the courts. The 
archives, however, while structured by the state and reflecting its govern-
ance priorities, were left unfiltered by the assessments of editors, by the 
criterion of final resolution, or even, for the most part, by the needs of the 
legal profession. They thus provide at least a modicum of information on 
every case for which proceedings were instituted, not just those that made 
it to judgment. Viewed from the perspective of the users of the system, the 
archives preserve an overview of the triggers that pushed plaintiffs over 
the brink of tolerance, sending them to a lawyer to get things rolling.
A case entered the archive as soon as the plaintiff instituted proceed-
ings by asking (and paying) for the issuance of a writ summoning the de-
fendant. (The cost was not trivial: in 1912, for example, Joseph Robert’s 
writ and declaration cost him $10.60, which included the bailiff’s fees to 
serve it on the defendant.) The first administrative steps in constructing 
the archive involved assigning the case a number, inscribing it in certain 
registers, and opening a file for it. This file expanded according to two 
forces: the requirements and deadlines imposed by law and court practice 
on the one hand, and the strategic decisions of the parties and their law-
yers on the other. The latter is my subject here, but a brief outline of the 
former will be useful.
Compiling and organizing the judicial archive was the responsibility 
of the prothonotary (clerk of the court) of the district in question, who 
issued writs and received documents from the parties.10 The prothono-
tary was also required to keep four registers of proceedings: a register of 
writs of summons (excepting subpoenas); a register of writs of execution; 
a register of orders, decisions, and judgments; and a plumitif in which was 
entered “a concise note of all that shall have been done in each cause.”11 
The case file itself, linked by number to the registers, was to contain all 
procedural documents filed in the case, put into chronological order, and 
consecutively numbered by the prothonotary (although these last steps 
were not always carried out).12
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Typically, a case that went to trial would produce at least the follow-
ing documents, supported by summonses, appearances, notices, and affi-
davits: a writ instituting proceedings by summoning the defendant, with 
an attached declaration stating the plaintiff’s case; a defence or plea; the 
plaintiff’s answer to the defence; the defendant’s reply to the plaintiff’s 
answer (and sometimes further back-and-forth); any exhibits (evidence) 
mentioned in the parties’ submissions; and an inscription for proof and 
hearing, indicating that all issues had been joined between the parties and 
the case was ready to go to trial. Alongside these basic elements, various 
other documents could of course be added, particularly motions that 
could range from simple requests for continuance to interlocutory matters 
raising complex legal issues. Not all cases went this far, however, as we 
will see. Finally, many, though not all, files included transcribed witness 
depositions, an invaluable resource for historians. As a general rule, wit-
ness testimony at trial was taken stenographically and, as the Code of Civil 
Procedure put it, those transcripts “constitute and shall be considered as 
the evidence of the witness.”13 Witnesses could also be deposed on discov-
ery before trial, and those depositions, too, formed part of the case file.14
In theory, then, the registers plus the original case files gave a com-
prehensive chronological overview of the proceedings, and assuming they 
are intact, they still do. Lacunae crept into the archive, however, and cre-
ated gaps. The most significant gap in many cases involved the judgment. 
Draft final judgments were sometimes filed, but not always. The judges 
submitted their drafts to the prothonotary who was responsible for tran-
scribing them into the register of judgments,15 but the register contained 
the dispositif only—the formal terms of judgment of the court, usually in 
the form “Considering that . . . ; For these reasons, the Court . . . ,” and so 
forth. The discursive reasons for judgment that in many cases the judge 
read out in court were not entered into the register, and did not always 
make it into the case file. Printed case reports (and, for big cases, occasion-
ally newspapers) sometimes included both, sometimes only the discursive 
reasons, and sometimes only the dispositif.16 A good example is the case 
of Mell v. Middleton, which is discussed below. The case file includes a 
two-page dispositif of the trial judgment, which would have been entered 
into the register. The case was appealed, however, and by chance the re-
spondent’s factum (the document containing their arguments and other 
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submissions to the appellate court) transcribed in its entirety the judge’s 
detailed eleven-page discursive reasons, which would otherwise have been 
absent from the file. The working of time, of course, also resulted in gaps 
that compromised the integrity of some case files. Parts or even whole files 
could be misfiled, lawyers preparing cases sometimes borrowed the ori-
ginals and failed to return them, and the predations of dampness, insects, 
rodents, and other destructive forces led to losses as well. Occasionally the 
files preserve indications of the alarmingly haphazard state of contem-
porary archival practices, such as a voluminous 1889 Montreal Superior 
Court case file, which contains a slip of paper with the handwritten note 
“the Couillard file is on the other side at the foot of the armoire.”17
In this way, the archive provides both an overview of the procedural 
steps of each case and a sense of strategic give-and-take and human de-
cision-making that shaped the litigation over time. The files show that 
once the plaintiff had initiated an action and the duly-summoned defend-
ant had formally filed an appearance, various progressions could ensue, 
which can be roughly grouped as follows:
• Some actions were filed, but little else was done. These 
cases seem to have been fairly quickly abandoned: the 
case file typically contains the plaintiff’s declaration, the 
returned writ, and usually the defendant’s appearance, 
but nothing further.
• Some actions stalled further into the process: after the 
defence was filed, after the plaintiff replied to the defence, 
or after a motion raised an interlocutory matter. Again, 
these cases seem to have been informally abandoned.
• Some actions were formally discontinued by the plaintiff 
or perempted by the defendant (which was possible after 
two years of inaction on the part of the plaintiff).18
• Some actions settled out of court, with the settlement 
ratified by the judge.
• Some actions went to final judgment on the merits or 
beyond, to appeal.19
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The archives thus turn a flat, teleological outcome into a textured narra-
tive that unfolded over time. Tracing the proceedings as they developed 
is a way to uncover the strategic choices and responses litigants made—
in short, to see how plaintiffs used the court system when they felt their 
family name and honour were threatened. If we abandon the assumption 
that a final judgment was the norm—or even the goal—rather than the 
relatively small tip of a large litigation iceberg, we can start asking what 
it means that certain cases stalled, discontinued, or settled out of court. 
What we find is that litigation was being used for instrumental purposes, 
in many cases without any real expectation that the matter would reach a 
final judgment. Family defamation cases form a revealing subset in which 
to explore these issues.
Family Defamation—Intra and Extra
Among the sampled cases are sixty-eight family defamation actions (as 
defined above). Some cases touching defamation more obliquely were left 
aside, which calls for a brief explanation. First, since my focus is on how 
litigants responded to insults to their family, I limited the analysis to cases 
in which defamation was the main action, rather than an incidental or 
supplemental part of a more general complaint. This meant excluding 
cases of separation from bed and board in which “grievous insult” was one 
of the grounds alleged, as well as cases of alienation of affection, in which 
a husband sued his wife’s lover and alleged injury to his honour as part of 
the damage claimed. In both of those types of cases, defamation was one 
part of a broader slate of complaints, and so it is impossible to determine 
the extent to which the alleged reputational injury drove the litigation 
or affected whatever resolution resulted from it. Second, I also excluded 
those defamation cases in which a wife sued for non-family-related insults 
directed at her personally, and in which the only family element was the 
participation of the husband to authorize his wife to institute the action. 
The defamation in those cases was individual rather than collective, and 
was distinct from others in which the husband sued to avenge both his 
own and his wife’s honour.
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The cases included in the analysis illustrate a range of situations. Most 
were actions taken by the male head of household against insults to family 
members, mostly to his wife, but also his children, deceased relatives, or 
the family name generally. Some were actions by widows on behalf of 
their children; one involved children suing over defamation of their elder-
ly mother. In these cases, the plaintiff claimed damages for more than 
his or her personal violated honour. Typical are cases in which a husband 
sued for violation of both his own and his wife’s honour and reputation, 
or in which the husband stated that he was suing on his wife’s behalf since 
he was the guardian of her honour. Of particular interest are a group of 
cases in which the defamation came from within the family rather than 
from outside. Thirteen such cases, which I call intra-family defamation, 
appear among the files, a subset wholly absent from the published case 
reports.20 In those cases, while the substance of the alleged defamation was 
not necessarily family-related, the family relationship between the parties 
calls for their inclusion.21 The thirteen intra-family defamation cases are 
likely an undercounting, since family relationships between the parties 
are not always evident on the face of the record.22 What are we to make, for 
example, of cases such as one in which insults were alleged to have been 
expressed while the defendant was visiting the plaintiff’s home on New 
Year’s Day? Was the defendant a relative? A close friend? A neighbour? 
Since it is impossible to specify a relationship without further digging in 
other sources, such cases have been classed as extra-family defamation 
for the time being. The idea of family is also fluid, as social historians well 
know, and the boundaries of “family” would differ according to whether 
we focus on legal, affective, or economic ties between kin—and indeed 
others—within a household.23 Acknowledging that this research is a start-
ing point only, what can we say about the litigational dynamics of family 
defamation cases? We can start with some statistics, with the caveat that 
our numbers are small (Table 1.1).
Among the sixty-eight family defamation files under study, thirteen 
were intra-family cases, including the Robert v. Barbeau case that intro-
duced this chapter.24 Of those thirteen cases, only one went to judgment 
(it was dismissed), and interestingly it featured the most tenuous family 
connection (tutorship rather than blood or marriage relationships). Of 
the others, five settled out of court, one was formally discontinued, and 
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Table 1.1 Outcomes of intra- and extra-family defamation cases  
(percentages rounded)
INTRA-FAMILY CASES EXTRA-FAMILY CASES
Stalled: 6 46% 20 36%
Discontinued: 1 8% 2 4%
Settled: 5 38% 4 7%
Total of stalled, 
discontinued, settled: 12 92% 26 47%
Judgment for 
plaintiff: 0 0% 13 24%
Judgment for 
defendant: 1 8% 16 29%
Total of judgments: 1 8% 29 53%
Total cases: 13 55
the others stalled, all of them early in the process (an average of thirty-
nine days after the action was instituted). Two of the stalled files contain 
nothing after the plaintiff’s declaration and the writ, two nothing after 
the defendant’s appearance, and two nothing after the defence. In other 
words, only 8 percent of the small sample went to judgment, while about 
92 percent were settled, discontinued, or stalled.
While the intra- and extra-family defamation cases as I have defined 
them are not strictly comparable, the contrast between the two groups 
is intriguing in several respects. I will develop some of these contrasts 
further below. Of the fifty-five extra-family cases, more than half went 
to judgment (slightly favouring defendants25), while less than half settled, 
were discontinued, or stalled. Among those that stalled, moreover, the 
extra-family cases stalled further along in the process. In terms of proced-
ural stage, more than half of the extra-family cases stalled at some point 
after the defence was filed, while only one-third of the intra-family cases 
stalled at that stage. In duration, the extra-family cases stalled an average 
of 183 days after they were instituted, compared to thirty-nine days for the 
intra-family cases. 
The contrast in settlement rates between the two groups of cases is 
particularly striking, a point I will develop below. Even if the adage “most 
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cases settle” is more characteristic of the contemporary Canadian legal 
system than the comparatively more accessible courts of this earlier per-
iod, it is noteworthy that 38 percent of the intra-family cases settled, while 
only 7 percent of the extra-family cases did. The case files are mostly silent 
on the terms of the settlements, though a few of the intra-family cases 
offer some information. A 1906 Quebec City case, for example, in which 
the plaintiff sued his brother-in-law for $150 for allegedly calling him a 
drunkard, a good-for-nothing, and a coward, settled for $10 six weeks after 
the action was instituted.26 In an 1890 case from Yamachiche, in which the 
parties were the respective parents of a young couple, the plaintiffs sued 
for $195 over various insults, but claimed that their purpose was not to 
fleece the defendant but only to have their “violated reputation, character, 
and honour” avenged in a public way.27 To this end, they made clear that 
while monetary damages would do the trick, “if the defendant preferred 
to make an honourable retraction to the plaintiffs at the door of the parish 
church of Yamachiche, after mass ended on a Sunday to be determined 
by the court,” the plaintiffs would drop the damages claim and take costs 
only.28 This was presumably what happened, since the case settled, though 
the final terms were left undisclosed.
Two Family Defamation Actions
Two other family defamation cases—one extra-family, the other intra-
family—are worth looking at more closely. While they should not be taken 
as representative of a diverse set of cases, they do serve to illustrate the 
points about strategy and motivation that I have so far outlined in general 
terms only.
The first is an extra-family case from Montreal in 1902.29 The plain-
tiff was Alfred Mell, whose daughter Helen was engaged to be married 
to Charles Arnold. The alleged defamation arose during an altercation 
between Arnold and his former employer, Thomas Middleton, who ran a 
burglar alarm and messenger service. Middleton said he had been angry 
after receiving an anonymous letter, which he believed to be from Arnold 
and the plaintiff’s wife (details of the letter are sketchy, since Middleton 
never produced it in evidence). Laying into Arnold, with whom he already 
had a strained relationship, he said “he would show Mrs. Mell who she 
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was to talk about anybody; he said she had a different man for each of 
her children and that she had sold her own daughter [the aforementioned 
Helen] to her father.”30 Alfred Mell, as head of household, sued Middleton 
for $500 for the injury to the reputation, feelings, and honour of himself 
and his family.
Mell instituted his action right away—eleven days after the incident, 
one of the shortest intervals among the family defamation cases. This 
in itself is a strong indication of the effects of the slander on the family. 
Moreover, since Mell and Middleton had no prior relationship, Mell would 
have had little to gain and potentially much to lose in seeking to resolve the 
matter extra-judicially. Middleton seems to have had other ideas. At some 
point after the action was instituted, Arnold, his mother, and Helen had 
an apparently chance encounter with Middleton at a restaurant. Though 
details of the meeting were contested, Middleton was, according to the 
trial judge, “all sweetness and honey, cajolery and enticement” in trying to 
get the Mells to settle the case, offering to pay their costs if they dropped 
the suit. The offer—if indeed it had ever been made—was rejected, and 
Alfred Mell pursued his action expeditiously through to trial, where he 
produced twelve witnesses and key documentary evidence. Judgment 
came eight months after the action was instituted, and Justice Siméon 
Pagnuelo awarded Mell $200 and costs. In his judgment, Justice Pagnuelo 
also confirmed the Mells’ honour and strongly reproached Middleton’s 
“abominable” conduct, which he saw as gratuitously attacking the Mells, 
Helen in particular, in order to settle a score with Arnold. The judge con-
demned the slander as “most atrocious when used against honest people 
and altogether unprovoked.” Middleton’s appeal to the Court of Review, 
alleging excessive damages, was dismissed.31 The damages—40 percent of 
the demand—were rather steep, though not unusually so, and were ex-
plained by the defendant’s evident malice and mendacity.
The second example comes from Montreal in 1893 and involved two 
siblings squabbling over their mother’s future succession (she was at the 
time still very much alive and residing with the plaintiff). The plaintiff, 
Alexandre Andegrave dit Champagne, claimed that his sister Octavie 
Andegrave dit Champagne and her husband Séraphin Taillefer had ac-
cused him of taking some of their mother’s things. He alleged that his 
sister had said, before an audience of other family members, “The dishes, 
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where are they? The knives, where are they? The hand towels, where are 
they? The soap, where is it? They used to be here, now you’ve taken them 
away and kept them hidden.”32 In monetary terms this was hardly a high-
stakes (pre-)succession battle, though on an emotional level nerves were 
plainly raw. The plaintiff also claimed the defendants had accused him of 
starving his mother in violation of the terms of a donation entre vifs by 
which he had undertaken to provide her with room and board. Finally, 
he pointed to a gratuitous insult, stating that one of them had called him 
“a happy cuckold” (un cocu content). The defendants denied making the 
comments about starving the mother, but admitted they might have sug-
gested the brother was not taking the best care of her. They also denied the 
accusation of theft of the housewares, but said they might have casually 
wondered where things were. The sister countered with her own claim 
that the plaintiff had levelled at her a list of many of the usual insults 
against women during this period, calling her a bitch, sharp-tongued, a 
thief, a sow, and a good-for-nothing.33 The respective allegations suggest a 
family spat, though we should never discount the feelings involved.
The plaintiff sued for $1,000 for having been wounded and humiliated 
by the defendants’ words, one of the highest demands among the intra-
family defamation cases. Despite the large amount of money ostensibly 
in play, the action meandered along in a leisurely fashion—this was no 
scorched-earth flurry of motions and counter-motions. The better part 
of a year elapsed between the alleged insult and the filing of the action. 
The time limit for bringing a defamation case was one year counting from 
knowledge of the insult, so the plaintiff was well within that deadline, but 
many other plaintiffs hustled to a lawyer and fired off an action within 
weeks, sometimes even days like Alfred Mell did, so the slow pace here 
is noteworthy. Once instituted, the action itself lasted more than 500 
days—almost a year and a half. This included close to six months before 
the plaintiff responded to the defence, and almost a year before he had the 
case inscribed on the roll for hearing. At the hearing, after the plaintiff 
had deposed eight witnesses (the last of whom was the defendant hus-
band), but before the defendants began presenting their case, the plaintiff 
withdrew his action and the case settled, even later than on the proverbial 
courthouse steps. The file includes the terms whereby the parties would 
pay their own costs, but “upon declaration by the defendants that they 
231 | Family Defamation in the Quebec Civil Courts
never intended to violate the honour of the plaintiff or his spouse . . . , hav-
ing always considered them to be honest and respectable.”34 And with that 
the file closed, a conciliatory ending indeed, if the terms of the settlement 
were in fact carried out.35
Conclusions
What conclusions does this view from the archives allow us to draw about 
family defamation litigation? What can we learn about litigants’ motiva-
tions, strategies, and goals as they went to court to protect or avenge their 
family honour? The two groups of family defamation cases each involved 
threats to the honour of the family and its members, some originating 
from outside the family, others from inside. In some ways they reveal sim-
ilar concerns at work, but in other ways they are strikingly different from 
one another.
The extra-family defamation cases show clear urgency about repelling 
the threat to the family. Plaintiffs tended to resort relatively promptly to 
formal law, with the time between the incident and institution of proceed-
ings being on average about half that of the intra-family cases. This was 
followed in most cases, as we have seen, by vigorous pursuit of the action, 
carrying it to judgment or, if not that far, then at least deep into proceed-
ings. Several factors might explain this general profile of extra-family 
defamation litigation. First, the absence of close affective relationships 
in most cases would make plaintiffs less hesitant to adopt impersonal 
means of dealing with the threat to honour, by taking the conflict to the 
courts rather than trying face-to-face negotiation. In most cases we do 
not know what went on before institution of proceedings, but the short 
delay in many extra-family cases would have left little time for serious 
informal dispute resolution. Second, as in all moral injury cases, while the 
monetary demands were effectively punitive rather than compensatory, 
plaintiffs were generally realistic in their punitive expectations. Amounts 
demanded were high, but not excessively so (despite what defendants like 
Thomas Middleton said). Judges in successful actions rarely awarded the 
whole claim, but they did often award a quarter or a third of it, provided 
that the initial demand was not outrageous. This degree of restraint by 
many plaintiffs, coupled with their commitment to pursue the case to the 
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end, suggests that plaintiffs in the extra-family cases were actually look-
ing to make the defendant pay. Third, alongside the punitive goals, moral 
redress was also a factor. Without a relationship to heal, public vindication 
became more important to counter slander or injurious falsehoods from 
neighbours, employers, or the press. Judges at the time had a keen sense 
of honour and the boundaries of propriety, and they tended to see it as 
self-evident that it was a compensable injury to call someone’s spouse “a 
damned disgusting streetwalker, a cow, a sow, a bitch” (to cite just one ex-
ample from a successful action).36 Plaintiffs who could make a reasonable 
case without exaggeration stood to receive a judgment that was a public 
acknowledgement of the family’s honour and the defendant’s transgres-
sion. All this suggests that in the extra-family cases, family honour was a 
vital asset to be protected vigorously.
Turning to the intra-family cases, we find some of these same char-
acteristics but some important differences as well. In those cases, public 
vindication was again evidently a key goal, as we see for example in the 
terms of settlement in the Andegrave dit Champagne affair and in the 
case of the insulting in-laws from Yamachiche. But public vindication had 
its limits—the desultory pursuit of many of these cases suggests that the 
point was less the outcome than the process, and public vindication seems 
often to have taken a back seat to private pressure within an ongoing re-
lationship. Other differences reflect similar concerns. First, the amounts 
demanded in some of these cases were outlandishly excessive, far more 
than any court would ever award, and the parties’ lawyers would certainly 
have made known to them the unlikelihood of receiving more than a tiny 
fraction of such huge amounts. The average demand in the intra-family 
cases was more than twice that of the extra-family cases ($1,107 compared 
to $490), while the medians were closer ($450 and $275 respectively). This 
difference is explained by the presence of a number of astronomical claims 
at the top end of the intra-family cases, such as Joseph Robert’s $5,000 de-
mand or several others over $1,000, amounts more akin to what defamed 
politicians demanded from newspapers at the time. Rather than a realistic 
claim for compensation, these amounts were rhetorical (and emotional) 
positions designed to underscore the severity of the situation. Second, 
the actions within families took about twice as long as extra-family cases 
to come to court, suggesting less urgency to proceed and perhaps the 
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exploration of informal means of redress before resorting to the courts 
when those failed. Finally, as already mentioned, the much higher rate 
of settled, stalled, and discontinued cases, as well as the failure in any 
of those cases to proceed much beyond the initial salvo commencing the 
litigation, further indicate that instituting proceedings was the point, not 
bringing them to a prompt and public formal resolution. As mentioned, 
judges tended to be sympathetic to reasonable plaintiffs, making it even 
more striking that almost none of the intra-family cases were pursued to 
judgment. In most of those cases, however, judgment was likely never the 
point. Intra-family defamation litigation was symbolic: it was less about 
mulcting relatives for their intemperate remarks, than about rhetorical-
ly chastising people with whom one would usually have to resume some 
kind of ongoing relationship. Plaintiffs, fed up with their relatives’ con-
duct, sought the threat of judicial authority to bring them into line and 
restore some semblance of family harmony. Rather than repelling a threat 
to family honour from outside, those cases were about making a point to 
difficult relatives, or about escalating private internal family conflicts that 
had crossed lines of tolerance. Dragging one’s insulting sister or uncle or 
nephew into court, forcing them to retain counsel and to address allega-
tions made against them, and in general making them suffer the financial 
and emotional toll of litigation, at least for a short while, was a powerful 
way to express displeasure, presumably after more personal means had 
gone nowhere. This was often enough to make one’s point, and indeed 
settling a case or declining to carry it forward might have salvaged a rela-
tionship (if that was desired), when pursuing the case to judgment and a 
damages award would have destroyed it irreparably.
This picture of the procedural life of litigation has little to do with the 
substantive legal arguments raised and adjudicated in the cases; it comes 
from reading the registers and case files that make up the judicial archives 
as texts in their own right, rather than simply as repositories of informa-
tion. As Mariana Valverde has argued, legal case files are different from 
those produced in other disciplines such as psychiatry: “legal cases are 
specific problems or conflicts, as documented and presented by author-
ized parties in very specific formats. Legal formats are designed not to 
build up knowledge for the sake of knowing . . . but rather to generate a 
highly formatted resolution.”37 The material in legal case files, as we have 
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seen, was compiled and archived for purposes mandated by the legal pro-
cess, but it was also in large part produced with explicitly argumentative 
and strategic aims in mind. In other words, it reflected not reality but 
rather opposed argumentative positions about a highly contested reality. 
The archival case file is more than an encapsulation of a conflict, however. 
It is also a record of the development of a litigation over time, a diachronic 
picture of a developing process rather than a static product. As such, the 
documents a case file preserves provide valuable insights into the parties’ 
motivations, degree of commitment, and emotional engagement with 
their conflict. 
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* This chapter draws on a project entitled “Familles, droit et justice au Québec, 1840–
1920,” undertaken by Peter Gossage (principal investigator), Donald Fyson, Thierry 
Nootens, and myself, and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
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Wierda as well as of Julie Perrone, my research assistant for an earlier project funded by 
the Fonds de recherche du Québec – société et culture
1 Robert et ux v Barbeau, [1912] no. 2500 (Sup. Ct. Montreal), cont. 1987–10–014/1126, 
SSS1, SS2, S2, TP11, Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec—Vieux-Montréal 
(BAnQ, V-M), Bref et déclaration (filed 25 October 1912), 1: “J’oserais dire qu’il y a ici-
dedans . . . un mal de gorge, la syphilis, si vous voulez le savoir. . . . Il n’y a jamais eu de 
ça dans la maison du temps de ma défunte sœur.” 
2 Robert et ux v Barbeau, Défense du défendeur (filed 5 December 1912), 1–2.
3 Robert et ux v Barbeau, Désistement (15 May 1913); Jugement renvoyant action du 
demandeur avec dépens suivant désistement (16 May 1913, Justice Charles Archer).
4 Important works include Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales 
and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1977); Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural History (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002); Antoinette Burton, ed., Archive Stories: Facts, 
Fictions and the Writing of History (Durham, NC; Duke University Press, 2005); Ann 
Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common 
Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). On legal case files in particular, 
see Carolyn Strange, “Stories of Their Lives: The Historian and the Capital Case 
File,” in On the Case: Explorations in Social History, ed. Franca Iacovetta and Wendy 
Mitchinson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) and Mariana Valverde’s 
contributions to “On the Case: Explorations in Social History: A Roundtable 
Discussion,” Canadian Historical Review 81 (2000): 272–78.
271 | Family Defamation in the Quebec Civil Courts
5 Strange, “Stories of Their Lives,” 33.
6 Among the civil cases, the sampling rate varied according to the volume of cases in 
each district. At Trois-Rivières and Quebec City, one year in ten during the period 
was sampled, and five percent of files were selected within those years. At Montreal, 
the much larger volume, particularly in the twentieth century, necessitated a reduced 
sampling rate of 2.5 percent of files. This information is provided by Peter Gossage, 
“Familles, droit et justice au Québec, 1840–1920: aperçu global et bilan provisoire,” 
paper presented at the Séminaire CIÉQ-CERHIO, Angers, France, 19–20 May 2016.
7 Surprisingly little has been published on defamation in Quebec. See André Lachance, 
“Une étude de mentalité: les injures verbales au Canada au XVIIIe siècle (1712–1748),” 
Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 31 (1977): 229–38; Joseph Kary, “The 
Constitutionalization of Quebec Libel Law, 1848–2004,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 42 
(2004): 229–70; Ollivier Hubert, “Injures verbales et langage de l’honneur en Nouvelle-
France,” in Une histoire de la politesse au Québec: normes et déviances, XVIIe–XXe 
siècles, ed. Laurent Turcot and Thierry Nootens (Quebec City: Septentrion, 2015). For 
our period outside Quebec, see Rosemary J. Coombe, “Contesting the Self: Negotiating 
Subjectivities in Nineteenth-Century Ontario Defamation Trials,” Studies in Law, 
Politics and Society 11 (1991): 3–40; Andrew King, “Constructing Gender: Sexual 
Slander in Nineteenth-Century America,” Law and History Review 13 (1995): 63–110; 
S.M. Waddams, Sexual Slander in Nineteenth-Century England: Defamation in the 
Ecclesiastical Courts, 1815–1855 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Lisa R. 
Pruitt, “‘On the Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends’: Injury from 
Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century,” Indiana Law Journal 78 (2003): 965–1018.
8 For most of the period covered by this project (after the earliest years), Quebec’s civil 
courts comprised principally the Circuit Court (the lowest level of trial court), the 
Superior Court, and, for appeals, the Court of Queen’s (King’s) Bench. This chapter 
focuses on the Superior Court, the main trial court of general civil jurisdiction.
9 Raymonde Crête, Sylvio Normand, and Thomas Copeland, “Law Reporting in 
Nineteenth-Century Quebec,” Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 147–71.
10 What follows draws on the applicable laws and regulations, in particular the Code of 
Civil Procedure (CCP) and the Rules of Practice of the Superior Court (Sup. Ct. Rules). 
The period of this project, 1840 to 1920, saw significant changes to this legislative 
framework, especially the initial codification of civil procedure in 1867 and several 
fundamental revisions of the CCP subsequently. This overview is based on the state of 
the rules circa 1900, as set out in R. Stanley Weir, ed., The Code of Civil Procedure of the 
Province of Quebec (Montreal: C. Théoret, 1900), which includes the Sup. Ct. Rules. See 
also Jean-Maurice Brisson, La formation d’un droit mixte: l’évolution de la procédure 
civile de 1774–1867 (Montreal: Thémis, 1986) and Evelyn Kolish, Guide des archives 
judiciaires (Quebec City: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales, rev. ed. and online 2017), 
27–28.
11 Sup. Ct. Rules, rules 18–20.
12 Sup. Ct. Rules, rule 22.
13 CCP, arts. 345 and 350 (quotation). This had been introduced as an option for the 
parties in 1871 (SQ 1871, c 6, ss 10–11): the rule was strengthened in 1884, so that in the 
Eric H. Reiter28
main judicial districts the judge or either party could require it (SQ 1884, c 8, s 4), and 
broadened further in 1890 to include most courts in the province (SQ 1890, c 46).
14 CCP, art. 288.
15 CCP, art. 544.
16 Crête, Normand, and Copeland, “Law Reporting,” 161–62.
17 Couillard v Jeannotte, [1889] no. 1912 (Sup. Ct. Montreal), BAnQ-VM, TP11, S2, 
SS2, SSS1, cont. 1987–05–007/2301, “Le dossier de Couillard est vis-à-vis au pied de 
l’armoire.”
18 CCP, arts. 275–78 (discontinuance) and 279–85 (peremption). 
19 Until 1920, a first level of review was available before three judges of the Superior Court 
sitting as a Court of Review (CCP, arts. 1189ff). For those who were still unsatisfied 
with the review judgment and who had the means to pursue the matter, a further appeal 
could be brought to the Court of Queen’s (King’s) Bench (CCP, arts. 1209ff).
20 An exhaustive search of published case reports turned up, unsurprisingly, large 
numbers of defamation cases, many of which involved insults directed at family 
members, but none in which it was clear that the defendant was a relative of the 
plaintiff. I thank Julie Perrone for undertaking most of this search.
21 An example is Théoret v Letang, [1896] no. 1400 (Sup. Ct. Montreal), BAnQ-VM, TP11, 
S2, SS2, SSS1, cont. 1987–05–007/2988, in which a notary sued his uncle for allegedly 
casting aspersions on his practice and professional abilities. “Ordinary” defamation 
cases like this were excluded from the extra-family list, since those cases had nothing to 
do with family.
22 Not all of the case files include depositions, which sometimes reveal relationships 
between the parties that are otherwise hidden. Genealogical research might shed 
further light on relationships, but is beyond the scope of this chapter.
23 On the “elasticity” of Quebec families and households, see Sherry Olson and Patricia A. 
Thornton, Peopling the North American City: Montreal 1840–1900 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2011), 214–42. 
24 Two of the cases are tentatively included because the parties have the same surname, 
though the file does not permit further precision about their relationship. I have also 
included one case involving a tutorship relationship (akin to guardianship in the 
common law) and five cases involving in-laws. 
25 Judgments for defendants include one case of peremption by the defendant under CCP 
279, the effect of which was to enter a judgment dismissing the suit.
26 Hamel v Buteau, [1906] no. 1700 (Sup. Ct. Quebec City), BAnQ-Québec [BAnQ-Q], 
TP11, S1, SS2, SSS1, cont. 1960–01–353/1016, Bref d’assignation et déclaration (filed 6 
November 1906), 1: “d’ivrogne, de vaurien, de lâche et autres appellations semblables.”
27 Bellemare et ux v Bellemare, [1890] no. 216 (Sup. Ct. Trois-Rivières), BAnQ-Trois-
Rivières [BAnQ-TR], TP11, S3, SS2, SSS1, cont. 1983–11–001/120, Bref et déclaration 
(filed 27 August 1890), 2: “venger leur réputation, leur caractère et leur honneur 
outragés par une réparation publique.” 
291 | Family Defamation in the Quebec Civil Courts
28 Bellemare et ux v Bellemare, Bref et déclaration, 2–3: “si mieux n’aime le dit Défendeur 
faire réparation d’honneur au dit Demandeur et à la dite Demanderesse, à la porte de 
l’Eglise de la Paroisse de Yamachiche, le dimanche, à l’issue du service divin du matin, 
à la date fixée par cette Honorable Cour, et dans ce cas à ne payer que les frais des 
présentes.” 
29 Mell v Middleton, [1902] no. 1880 (Sup. Ct. and Sup. Ct. Rev. Montreal), BAnQ-VM, 
TP11, S2, SS2, SSS1, cont. 1987–05–007/2172. 
30 The plaintiff’s factum in review consists mostly of a transcription of the judge’s 
discursive reasons for judgment, from which this and the following quotations are 
taken. Mell v Middleton, Factum du demandeur (filed 11 December 1902). 
31 The review judgment was simply a printed form dismissing the appeal: Mell v 
Middleton, Jugement rendu en révision (Sup. Ct. Rev., 31 March 1903, Loranger, 
Archibald, St-Pierre JJ.). Unusually, however, the file contains the draft rough notes 
of one of the review judges (likely Justice Archibald since they are in English), which 
indicate that this one justice at least strongly agreed with the findings of the trial judge.
32 Andegrave dit Champagne v Andegrave dit Champagne et vir, [1893] no. 600 (Sup. Ct. 
Montreal), BAnQ-VM, TP11, S2, SS2, SSS1, cont. 1987–05–007/2761, Bref et déclaration 
(filed 21 April 1893), 2: “‘La vaisselle, où est-elle? les couteaux, où sont-ils? les essuie-
mains, où sont-ils? le savon, où est-il? il y en avait, vous l’avez soustrait, caché, gardé’.”
33 Andegrave dit Champagne v Andegrave dit Champagne et vir, Défenses de la 
défenderesse (filed 5 May 1893), 3: “la traitant de salope, de mauvaise langue, de 
voleuse, de truie, de vaut-rien etc.”
34 Andegrave dit Champagne v Andegrave dit Champagne et vir, Procédés à l’enquête et 
mérite (filed 5 October 1894), 1: “Le demandeur retire son action, chaque partie payant 
ses frais sur déclaration des défendeurs qu’ils n’ont jamais entendus [sic] attenter à 
l’honneur du demandeur et de son épouse Dame Philomine Gohier, les ayant toujours 
considéré[s] pour honnêtes et respectables. Parties mise[s] hors de cour.”
35 It is worth pointing out that while this action closed, there may have been other actions 
between these same parties, a far from rare occurrence, but something we have not yet 
been able to trace.
36 Thomas v Robinson, [1904] no. 2540 (Sup. Ct. Montreal), BAnQ-VM, TP11, S2, SS2, 
SSS1, cont. 1987–05–007/1829, Bref et déclaration (filed 1 August 1904), 1: “maudite 
écœurante, traîneuse de rue, vache, truie, salope.”





In 2013, Kingston Penitentiary shut down as a maximum security federal 
prison after 178 years of operation. The prison is now a historical site and 
has become part of the heritage industry celebrating old Upper Canadian 
attractions. Aside from touring the structures of the penitentiary, legal 
researchers will find a vast archive of historical material connected to the 
first century of penitentiary history in Canada.1 It is not an easy repository 
of records to navigate or understand, which may speak in part to the rela-
tive scarcity of legal history that incorporates the historical penitentiary 
into its narrative. But the records connected to Canada’s penitentiaries 
represent a relatively untapped resource for legal historians to understand 
criminal justice, in addition to intersecting histories of poverty, class for-
mation, gender, and race. New researchers will also want to confront ques-
tions about what they hope to uncover in penitentiary records. What is 
visible and obscured in records created by institutions like penitentiaries? 
Can we see prisoners as well as prisons?  
A brief note on historiography will add to an exploration of peni-
tentiary sources in Canada. Scholars should locate two fundamental 
sources as a shortcut through the maze of primary material stemming 
from Canadian penitentiary history. The first is J.M. Beattie’s Attitudes 
Towards Crime and Punishment in Upper Canada, 1830–1850.2 This is a 
documentary study published in 1977 by the Centre of Criminology at the 
University of Toronto. In this extraordinary working paper, Beattie not 
2
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only writes one of the clearest explanations for the rise of the Canadian 
penitentiary, but he also provides future scholars with a roadmap to the es-
sential documents for understanding his narrative. This includes excerpts 
from legislative reports that detail the ongoing debates over incarceration 
in Upper Canada between 1835 and 1845. Beattie offers samples of some 
records from the penitentiary itself, so that scholars can get a sense of 
what is important in the massive volume of records connected to Kingston 
Penitentiary. These include wardens’ reports, penitentiary regulations, 
and the essential documents connected to the 1849 Brown Commission 
that brought an end to the first brutal years of Kingston Penitentiary. 
The second key historical work is Peter Oliver’s 1998 “Terror to 
Evil-Doers”: Prisons and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century Ontario.3 If 
Beattie’s documentary study is an elementary overview of the available 
source material, Oliver’s book is a master’s class on navigating the ar-
chive of prison records, and the depth of his research into the workings of 
Kingston Penitentiary history is invaluable. One of Oliver’s great talents 
was working out the precise mechanisms by which power and influence 
operated in the penitentiary and tracking these through the archival re-
cord. Beattie and Oliver together provide a rich resource for any study of 
punishment in Canada. 
New prison historians will want to sort out some methodological 
questions as they embark on this research. What kind of prison history 
do you want to write? Government records about the penitentiary—in the 
form of the Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada (a source Shelley 
Gavigan also relies on in her essay in this volume), Department of Justice 
annual reports, Royal Commission reports, and legislation—are abundant 
and easy to access. These will help you to reconstruct an “official” history 
of the penitentiary, the institution as it was seen by its political masters 
and makers. Of course, there are analytical possibilities in the scores of 
pages written about penitentiaries in Canada by these figures, and they 
reveal much about how officialdom viewed this institution in its formative 
stages. But the official record is imperfect when it comes to understanding 
the experience of imprisonment. Who lived and breathed in penal spaces, 
as wardens, guards, and prisoners? To delve deeper into this story, records 
that are closer to the penitentiary itself are essential and can be found in 
the archival collections connected to the Department of Justice in Canada. 
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Until recently, these records were only accessible on reels housed at 
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), necessitating long hours in the dark 
scanning barely legible microfiche reproductions of the original records. 
The LAC is Canada’s national repository of historical documents. It is lo-
cated in Ottawa and houses original documents and reproductions con-
nected to most activities of the federal government of Canada, including 
penitentiaries. It is the historian’s lab—the spot where new discoveries are 
made and new interpretations initiated. Fortunately for prison researchers, 
the entire collection of penitentiary reels is now digitized and available on-
line, which should allow for researchers to make both more extensive and 
more careful examinations of this tremendous resource.4 The collection 
contains a fairly complete record of the operation of Kingston Penitentiary 
between 1835 and 1900. The reels include inmate history description ledg-
ers, wardens’ letter books and daily journals, inspectors’ minute books 
and letter books, punishment ledgers, and medical registers. Researchers 
should also note that the Kingston Penitentiary reels are not the sum total 
of penitentiary records held at LAC. Record Group 73 (Penitentiaries) is a 
repository with a vast number of penitentiary files related to penitentiary 
governance in Canada. Finally, a strange archival anomaly is that records 
for other federal penitentiaries from the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century are spread across the country and housed in various federal re-
cords centres. These are more difficult to access. Some records centres 
have no public reading rooms or staff resources to provide archival ser-
vices. Still, researchers who can trek to Winnipeg or Burnaby will find 
their way to viewing original records from Manitoba Penitentiary and 
the New Westminster Penitentiary, both dating to the 1880s. Some of 
these records are mundane papers, and some are remarkable relics of the 
nineteenth century. For example, the Federal Record Centre in Winnipeg 
holds original registry, punishment, and medical books from Manitoba 
Penitentiary. To view these enormous registers is to physically trace the 
pencil and pen strokes of the subjects of your research. These marks record 
the rhythms of prison life. They are recorded in ways that will convey to 
researchers the numbing routines that characterized these institutions as 
well as the punctuation of violence, tragedy, and pain. 
Some brief examples will illustrate the value of seeing these records in 
their original form. In 1849 Liberal newspaper publisher George Brown 
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investigated abuse and misconduct occurring at Kingston Penitentiary 
under its original warden, Henry Smith. One of the central issues re-
volved around the excessive use of corporal punishment. Under investi-
gation, Warden Smith claimed that he routinely “ordered” punishment 
but subsequently “cancelled” such punishments. Several staff members 
corroborated this practice, while other members of the staff testified to 
the punishments taking place. How were investigators to know whether 
punishments were ever truly delivered? How can legal historians work out 
their own version of the truth? Commissioners in 1849 carefully exam-
ined Warden Smith’s punishment registers and determined that he falsi-
fied the records by “cancelling” the punishments after they had already 
taken place. This they concluded on the basis of the style of writing and 
the fact that the punishments were ordered in pen and cancelled in pencil. 
Researchers can support this finding by examining the same records and 
noting the different styles of handwriting. Similar notes of emphasis are 
possible for legal historians to locate throughout different historical pris-
on records, illustrating that the historical data itself can live and breathe 
in the same way that the past did. 
On questions of tragedy, pain, living, and breathing, researchers will 
want to get closer still. How can we understand the men and women who 
are not prominently featured in archival records, and yet are still inexor-
ably the subject of much that they record? Seeing prisoners is a difficult 
task for the legal historian who will be confronted with two extremes. At 
one end are those prisoners who make a very large mark in the archival 
record. These are the offenders who stood out for the wrong reasons. Some 
crimes were extreme and resulted in notoriety which persisted behind pris-
on walls. The best example of this visibility is found in the case of Grace 
Marks, the convicted murderer imprisoned in 1843 who became the subject 
of Margaret Atwood’s Alias Grace. Atwood brought Grace Marks to life, 
but she first constructed a skeleton of her real prison life by researching her 
years at Kingston Penitentiary in records at LAC.5 At the other end, some 
prisoners stood out for their notoriety or involvement in extreme political 
turmoil. In the aftermath of the North-West Rebellion in 1885, Canada in-
carcerated forty-four First Nations men at Manitoba Penitentiary. Among 
them were Cree Chiefs Poundmaker and Big Bear. Their incarceration was 
the source of political debate in the penitentiary, the Department of Justice, 
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and the Parliament of Canada. Researchers will find documents detailing 
these men’s imprisonment that reveal the sensitive political negotiations 
that underlay these prison sentences as well as the chiefs’ eventual release. 
As with many Indigenous prisoners, pardon did not signal victory as both 
Cree leaders would die of tuberculosis shortly after their release. 
Other prisoners appear disproportionately in prison records for fail-
ing to conform to the demands of prison life. They were punished more 
often and their behaviour generated disciplinary reports and commen-
tary. Such examples give researchers an opportunity to understand penal 
responses to incorrigibility and nonconformity, and also ideas about 
criminality and moral reform as they operated in penitentiaries and pris-
on reform debates. The ways the penitentiary responded to some prisoners 
will also force legal researchers to stretch beyond the legal realm if they are 
to understand the totality of the prison experience. Within prison walls 
a complex network of power and class relations unfolded on terrains of 
moral regulation, evangelical and educational reform, and medicine. This 
requires a different reading of archival records that are explicitly non-
legal, yet necessary to understanding the larger question of punishment. 
The disproportionate examples can also distort. Many prisoners ex-
perienced the penitentiary in ways that generated nothing beyond the 
barest biographical or administrative detail. Their stories are more difficult 
to tell and require a legal history that seeks answers from areas of absence 
or obscurity. For example, the long history of women’s incarceration in 
Canada remains relatively unexplored, particularly in the realm of federal 
penitentiaries. For more than a century after 1835, women were incarcerat-
ed alongside men in federal prisons but remained marginal figures within 
those institutions. A deep and palpable silence about how women lived is 
evident in official records, their experiences often obscured by euphemisms 
or endless optimism. Similar absences characterize records about people 
of colour or Indigenous prisoners: they both experienced imprisonment in 
different ways than the predominantly white, male, working-class popu-
lation of inmates. The answer to the original question of this short essay 
is that researchers can certainly see prisoners, but some are harder to see 
than others. Thus, to counter the marginalization of the penitentiary some 
experienced, researchers can employ methods that combine legal history 
with distinctly non-legal approaches such as microhistory or biography. 
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Both raise the possibility that understanding one life, or a small group of 
prisoners, can help speak to the composite whole. In those cases where an 
individual appears in the mist of obscurity—for instance, one woman who 
appears far more prominently in records than others—the example can 
speak to larger structural or social elements that might constrain many 
prisoners who cannot be seen.6 
Finally, the penitentiary provides an opportunity for a research sub-
ject with great intersectional potential. Researchers approaching it from 
the perspective of legal history can look forward to using the broad canvas 
of penitentiary history to talk to multiple analytical concerns about the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The penitentiary is a legal institu-
tion, but it also touches on multiple areas of Canadian society. It links 
local histories of crime and poverty together with federal justice policies 
and bears the influence of international currents of ideological reform, 
republicanism, and liberalism. The potential for writing compelling hist-
ory based in penitentiary research is vast, yet ultimately accessible to the 
newest legal history researcher. 
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Documentary Study (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre of Criminology, 1977). 
3 Peter Oliver, “Terror to Evil-Doers”: Prisons and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century 
Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
4 See Kingston Penitentiary records, Héritage website, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/
oocihm.lac_mikan_134807.
5 Atwood discusses her research process in Margaret Atwood, “In Search of Alias Grace: 
On Writing Canadian Historical Fiction,” American Historical Review 103, no. 5 
(December 1998): 1503–16.
6 This approach is drawn from the notion of the “exceptional typical” introduced by 
Italian historian Edoardo Grendi, “Micro-analisi e storia sociale,” Quaderni storici 35 
(1977): 506–20. 
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Analyzing Bigamy Cases without 
Going to the Archives: It is Possible
Mélanie Méthot
After nearly thirty years in the field, I still feel my heart racing when my 
fingers touch old yellowed court documents. Sometimes filled with spi-
dery scrawls, these documents often reveal the waved-like calligraphy of a 
person who spent his life (for most of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early 
twentieth centuries, court employees were men) transcribing countless 
items of precious information. And what to say about the times I realize I 
am the first researcher to peruse those centennial documents, not yet un-
folded or unstapled, requiring the delicate touch of the historian? Leafing 
through archival material is definitively exhilarating. I am thankful, how-
ever, for the technological advances of the twenty-first century. It took 
me years to read through microfilmed newspapers during my doctoral 
research: I can only wonder how many times my tired eyes skipped over 
valuable information. Now researching the prosecution of bigamy in both 
Canada and in Australia, I again use archival data and newspapers but I 
retrieve the data differently.
Digitalization has revolutionized the way we conduct research. One 
can now read from the comfort of one’s home any issue of The Globe 
(from 1844) or the Toronto Star (from 1894), to name only two import-
ant Canadian newspapers. Historians can sometimes search historical 
newspapers databases by keywords, such as Peel’s Prairie Provinces which 
has a modest holding of newspapers from the region (http://peel.library.
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ualberta.ca/newspapers/), while Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du 
Québec [BAnQ], which holds a substantial number of magazines and 
newspapers searchable online, cannot always be investigated by keywords 
(http://numerique.banq.qc.ca/ressources/details/RJQ). As for Library and 
Archives Canada, it will perhaps follow the Australian path and digitize 
every newspaper in its possession.1 Until our public institutions invest in 
this technology, we can check diverse online archives to access freely rich 
historical data. Institutions constantly add to their holdings and refine 
their digital tools, although, as Donald Fyson pointed out many years ago 
about Early Canadiana Online (now canadiana.ca), a digital historical li-
brary holds “ultimately (a) selective collection of the primary sources.”2 
Carolyn Strange made the same argument even earlier about archival 
court documents, warning legal historians that it was the keepers of court 
records who decided what each case file3 would contain.4 Regardless of 
the kind of research we do, we have to remind ourselves constantly how 
we often have access to only some of the information, something easily 
forgotten when a new piece of the puzzle emerges. 
The slenderness of the case files produced in bigamy prosecutions—
when these files exist at all—often leads to frustration. For instance, when 
I encountered on the pages of a Montreal prison’s ledger Philomène Déry 
who was serving a term of five months of hard labour for bigamy,5 I did not 
locate any corresponding court documents related to her case. I remember 
my excitement when I came across newspaper articles providing some of 
the missing information. At least three Montreal newspapers mentioned 
the case. I even found out who informed the authorities: a priest, as the 
Montreal Star reported.6 I chose the Déry case to introduce one of my 
recent publications on “Marriage Norms and Bigamy in Canada.”7 Too 
happy to have found more details on the case, I had forgotten to take into 
account the nature of the source disclosing the information. In 1870, the 
Montreal Star was a very sensationalist paper. The four historians working 
on the “Famille, Droit et Justice au Québec, 1840–1920” project discov-
ered the Déry court file.8 According to their documents, Déry’s illegitim-
ate husband was the one who lodged the complaint. This example serves 
as a good reminder to always place the sources we use in their historical 
context. Considering today’s concerns about “fake news,” one may ask if 
historians should rely on newspaper accounts to get accurate facts. My 
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research on bigamy in Australia reveals that Australian newspapers have 
had a real appetite for everything that deals with the offence; specific cases 
could easily be mentioned in dozens of articles, even more. For instance, 
the Lily May Strike case was reported in forty-three articles. However, de-
tails about the case vary greatly from one article to the other, sometimes 
contradicting each other. As Lyndsay Campbell discusses in her piece on 
pamphlets in this volume, “learning to sift the facts from the slant” is “[o]ne 
of the great challenges and joys of history.” Campbell also mentions how 
one can glean the discourses of the time on specific issues. Historical 
newspapers are definitely worth turning to in order to find some details on 
criminal cases, which can then be verified through other types of sources 
such as civil records and court files. Analyzing the articles as narratives, 
not only for what they include or leave out, but for their tone also serves to 
shed light on society.
Let me turn to a specific example to illustrate how one can go about 
doing legal history research without spending much time at the archives 
(although I highly recommend going to any archives!). Just as with 
Philomène Déry, I first encountered Julie Morin on the pages of a pris-
on ledger. I leafed through the massive, red Quebec City gaol register,9 
although one can search some of the registries online, in the database 
of the BAnQ, between 1813–1866 for men and up to 1899 for women. It 
is possible to search by family or given name, country or ethnic origin, 
date of imprisonment, offence, sentence or grounds for discharge (http://
www.banq.qc.ca/archives/genealogie_histoire_familiale/ressources/bd/
instr_prisons/prisonniers/index.html). Morin was jailed briefly twice: on 
12 November 1879, before she pleaded not guilty, and on 28 April 1880, the 
night before her trial. I was able to locate a very slim case file containing 
four documents related to her preliminary inquiry: (1) the testimony of 
Édouard Robitaille confirming he was the legal husband of Julie Morin, 
(2) the testimony of Reverend James Sexton who celebrated the union be-
tween the Widow Morin and William Russell in 1877, (3), papers provid-
ing information about the two individuals who posted her bail, and (4) a 
writ of assignment. In sum, beyond the names of the two husbands, the 
names of two witnesses confirming Morin was Robitaille’s legal wife, the 
identity of the two men who posted bail, the dates of the two marriages, 
and the dates of the court proceedings, the file disclosed nothing on any 
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informant, motivations, or outcome. Fortunately, dates mentioned in 
these documents and those from the prison ledger allowed me to narrow 
further my research to Quebec City newspapers, which yielded a total of 
twenty-four articles from six different papers. Some papers followed every 
step of the legal procedure, from the first accusation, through the post-
ponement of trial, to the actual trial and verdict, while others chimed in 
at intervals. All six papers covered the April 1880 trial, a few reporting the 
examinations, cross- and re-cross examinations of some of the fourteen 
witnesses. No single paper covered the trial exhaustively. From these ac-
counts, I could somewhat reconstruct the trial—at the very least establish 
who participated in it—and ascertain the defense’s strategy and the news-
papers’ different outlooks. 
The Morning Chronicle devoted space to the judge’s explanation of the 
nature of the offence: 
That crime is committed by those who being married con-
tract another marriage while their first wife or their first 
husband is still living. To constitute this offence, proof must 
be adduced of the first marriage, and that, at the time of 
the celebration of the second marriage, of which also proof 
must be produced, the first wife, or the first husband, as the 
case may be, was still alive.10
The inclusion of the judge’s explanation in the newspaper cited above sug-
gests that the common citizen would not have known much about the 
nature of the offence. It also seems that the Crown assigned one specific 
function to each of its witnesses. For instance, Father Sexton had to prove 
that the two marriages took place, something he did easily. He damaged 
the Crown’s case, however, when he testified that “[h]e did not put any 
questions to the prisoner before marrying her because she was recognized 
by the people of St-Roch as widow of Robitaille who had been prayed for 
some years previously as dead in St-Roch’s Church”: evidently, he and the 
neighbours believed Morin a widow.11 Charles Fitzpatrick, a young crim-
inal lawyer who later became Chief Justice of Canada and lieutenant-gov-
ernor of Quebec, organized Morin’s defense around two main pieces of 
evidence. He opened with an official record of the circuit court dated from 
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1873 in which the prisoner was a party in an unrelated suit and was styled, 
“Julie Morin, widow of Édouard Robitaille.” The document had estab-
lished the legal recognition of Morin as a widow. Fitzpatrick concluded his 
case with another document, an 1871 letter received by Morin and seen by 
Robitaille’s father stating that Édouard Robitaille had died after receiving 
the last sacraments of the Church and had made the author of the letter, a 
co-worker, promise to inform his wife of his death.
Without great surprise, all the newspapers announced the following 
day that Julie Morin had been acquitted. The Canadian law on bigamy 
provided exceptions such as “any person marrying a second time whose 
husband or wife has been continually absent from such a person for the 
space of seven years then last past, and was not known by such person to 
be living within that time.”12 The jury deliberated less than ten minutes. 
The newspapers portrayed Fitzpatrick as a much better lawyer than the 
Crown prosecutor who only produced five witnesses, one of whom even 
turned out to be a powerful ally for Morin’s cause. By contrast, Fitzpatrick 
brought nine people to vouch for the defendant and adopted the astute 
strategy of starting and finishing his case with documents. Regardless 
of the sincerity of witnesses, in a court of law tangible documents often 
weigh more heavily than personal recollections. 
I could have stopped the research there, but instead my curiosity 
was awakened by some of the testimonies of the witnesses, especially the 
niece of the illegitimate husband, Ellen Russell. She had mentioned how 
her uncle had made a will making her the sole heir, but had subsequently 
modified it to the benefit of his wife. I checked Canadian censuses (http://
www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/census/Pages/census.aspx), trying to understand 
what happened to the main actors of the saga. I found a Julie Russell, a 
widow living with her sister in 1881, 1891, and 1901. I was also able to 
check online the 1877 marriage contract between William Russell and 
Morin, as well as the different wills Russell had executed (http://bibnum2.
banq.qc.ca/bna/notaires/index.html). One can also consult the parish 
registries online to find out details about marriages (http://bibnum2.banq.
qc.ca/bna/ecivil/). In the United States, and I suspect in many other coun-
tries, genealogical websites are some of the most visited. As such, private 
companies are developing great tools to conduct genealogical research; for 
instance, without having to subscribe to them, one can navigate through 
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the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ FamilySearch database for 
free (https://www.familysearch.org/). These databases allow researchers to 
find more personal information about the people involved in their case 
studies. 
From newspapers to genealogical searches, I decided to do what any 
respectable twenty-first century individual would do: I googled “Julie 
Morin” and “Bigamy.” With great excitement, I found the Queen’s Bench 
Reports and discovered that Russell’s niece contested the validity of his last 
will, which opened up a completely new avenue for this intriguing case.13 
In the end, historical research is about ingenuity, curiosity, and open 
minds. No one should hesitate to use the ever-growing online resources, 
archival or not, and everyone should remember to situate the sources in 
their historical context. 
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Trial Pamphlets and Newspaper 
Accounts
Lyndsay Campbell
Writing history involves a lot of detective work. Among my favorite sources 
of information about trials are accounts written by the parties and their 
supporters before, during, or, most often, after their trials. Publishing 
these accounts was common in the nineteenth-century Anglo-Atlantic 
world, at least where newspaper presses were numerous and energetic. 
Often you learn a lot about not only the trial but also the various partici-
pants’ lives before the trial took place, especially if what they had been up 
to was somehow relevant to what happened during the trial. In libel law—a 
central area of research for me—competing versions of the past are often 
part of the dispute. For example, a man brought a criminal libel action 
against a newspaper in Boston in 1833 over allegations he had wrongfully 
escaped his creditors. In a sixty-four-page pamphlet meant to set the rec-
ord straight, he described being an unpopular opponent of freemasonry in 
upstate New York before moving to Boston, still pursued by freemasons. 
The freemasons were dedicated to making his life miserable for revealing 
their conspiracy to murder a certain William Morgan in 1826, possibly by 
pushing him over Niagara Falls when he threatened to disclose masonic 
secrets.1 The persecuted antimason, Samuel Greene, was now promoting 
the Antimasonic party, the first “third party” in American political life. 
You can often discover the existence of a pamphlet simply by do-
ing an internet search for the names of the participants in the case. 
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Occasionally, finding one pamphlet may lead you to one or more other 
pamphlets, all written to correct the “errors” in earlier accounts. When 
Joseph T. Buckingham suggested that an itinerant Methodist preacher 
named John N. Maffitt was not really devoted to his religious beliefs, but 
actually just liked the access it provided to the private quarters of young 
women, a pamphlet war accompanied Maffitt’s unsuccessful libel pros-
ecution.2 Arguments about freedom of the press and the importance of 
character are intertwined with details about what it was like, in early 
nineteenth-century America, to be a poor but aspiring printer, or a young 
Irishman with religious inspiration but little education.  
The American Antiquarian Society, in Worcester, Massachusetts 
holds a treasure-trove of pamphlets. Even if you will not be travelling to 
Worcester, you can use their search engine to discover the existence of 
pamphlets, which can often be found elsewhere. Some of their collection 
is digitized as well. The Internet Archive, archive.org, is another excellent 
source of pamphlets—and actually of pretty much any text now out of 
copyright. Hathi Trust’s website also has an immense amount of materi-
al, as does Google Books. If you are fortunate enough to have access to 
the database The Making of Modern Law: Trials, 1600–1926 or the Gale 
Primary Sources database, definitely use them. It is also worth checking 
the catalogs of local archives and libraries in the places where the events 
that interest you took place, as well as the catalogs of the Toronto Public 
Library and the Fisher Rare Books library at the University of Toronto 
to find out what kinds of texts exist. Even if you cannot immediately get 
access to the text, the first step is finding out that it exists and getting the 
author’s name and the title. If you have a pamphlet, note the publisher: if 
it is the name of a newspaper or of someone who also published a news-
paper, it is a good bet that the newspaper reported on the trial as well. 
Quite likely a rival newspaper also covered it.
Accounts of trials that appeared in newspapers are generally harder to 
find than pamphlets. You usually have to know when the trial took place 
and then find local newspapers and search them. A wonderful database 
called Worldcat attempts to archive all the surviving holdings of every text 
ever published, meaning that it can tell you, for example, that a certain 
library has all the issues of a given magazine from November 1955 to June 
1957, followed perhaps by a gap, and then all the holdings from March 
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1960 to October 1963. It can also give you the names of all the newspapers 
and other periodicals published in a certain city from year X to year Y, as 
long as copies of at least some of the issues survive. Once you learn the 
names of the papers, you can figure out where to look for them. 
Although digital databases of newspapers exist (such as the Globe 
and Mail Online, Nineteenth Century US Newspapers, Paper of Record, 
and the Early Alberta Newspapers Collection), they are not all reliably 
searchable because optical character recognition does not always work 
well on old documents that have been microfilmed. As well, many if not 
most newspapers still await digitization, so you may have to look for them 
on microforms (microfilm or microfiche). University libraries often have 
microform collections, and you can also order microforms—and books 
and periodicals—through a service called interlibrary loan. You can do 
this through public libraries as well. Your library borrows what you need 
from another library and then lends it to you. Once you receive the film 
or fiche that covers the date range you need, you have to look through it, 
page by page, to find coverage of the trial that interests you. It is often a 
good idea to read a few months before and after the trial as well, to un-
earth any pre-existing controversies and to discover how the opinions and 
arguments diverged once it was over. William J. Snelling, for instance, 
was successfully prosecuted in Boston for a libel against a police magis-
trate called Benjamin Whitman. Snelling alleged that Whitman did his 
job badly and was drunk on the bench. However, even though Whitman 
and the Commonwealth won the libel prosecution, Whitman resigned his 
position shortly afterward, a development that hints that his reputation 
was not thoroughly redeemed through his victory in court.3
What do you do with a pamphlet once you have it in your hands or 
on your screen? First, you have to imagine that you have wandered into 
a room full of people you have never met before having a heated conver-
sation about a matter you only dimly recall. It is important to begin with 
the assumption that you really know very little. Even if you think you 
know how it ended, you may still be wrong. There may have been a second 
act to the play. Be humble but highly attentive. Pamphlets and news-
paper articles can be extremely useful about structural matters that were 
understood by everyone at the time but that we may now wonder about. 
For example, pamphlets from Massachusetts libel cases in the 1820s and 
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1830s will reveal how a trial actually operated: who spoke first, who testi-
fied, and so forth. They make it clear that many people accused of libel 
had legal counsel (evidently lawyers were not forbidden), but many other 
people conducted their own cases. This was because they could not testify 
under oath. The complainant in a criminal case could give sworn testi-
mony, but a defendant who retained a lawyer to conduct the proceedings 
could only sit anxiously and listen. In a civil case neither party could test-
ify. The results of these strategic decisions become clear from pamphlets 
and news articles. The political fortunes of Nova Scotia’s Joseph Howe, for 
example, rose when he successfully defended himself on libel charges in 
1835. According to him, the jury that freed him thereby brought freedom 
of the press to Nova Scotia; being a central figure in the history of freedom 
of the press in your own jurisdiction is not a bad claim for an aspiring 
politician, and it served Howe well.4  
Pamphlets and newspaper descriptions of trials also reveal women, 
racialized minorities, servants, and other non-famous people living their 
lives, criticizing their neighbours, and making their arguments, both in and 
out of court. For example, Boston police magistrate Benjamin Whitman’s 
ex-daughter-in-law testified that Whitman was frequently drunk and abu-
sive to herself and her children (his grandchildren). Whitman supported 
the children, but, she said, “[t]hey are not well treated; they often go lousy, 
and with their knees out.”5 From this you get a glimpse of parenting norms 
and the sorts of criticisms made about them in the time period, not to 
mention a hint about the prevalence of lice. It is not enough for formal con-
clusions, but it is a snippet of evidence, to be combined with other snippets. 
You may also, of course, interpret a pamphlet or an article in order to 
find out what happened. Occasionally a pamphlet provides vital informa-
tion about how some long-gone institution functioned. The Halifax Court 
of Commissioners, for example, heard a huge volume of small debt cases 
in the 1820s and 1830s, but almost no records survive. Joseph Howe’s criti-
cisms of the court—delivered as part of his explanation for printing what 
he had about Halifax’s governing magistrates—amount to one of the few 
accounts of what that court did. Of course, often you are able to correlate 
and cross-match references to details—what people said and when, and 
what they meant—to other records that have survived, such as reported 
versions of legal cases and notes judges left in the files. Like lawyers, judges, 
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and all the other participants, pamphleteers and journalists are almost al-
ways biased but in interesting ways. They may skip over substantial parts 
of one party’s case and give loving regard to the other’s, especially if it is 
their own. One of the great challenges and joys of history is learning to sift 
the facts from the slant. 
Pamphlets can teach us not only about people and institutions, but 
also about what ideas and arguments people thought would be persuasive 
or unpersuasive. In 1829, when a Boston man named Origen Bacheler tried 
to have witnesses from a Christian sect called the Universalists barred 
from testifying on the grounds that they did not believe God would judge 
them in the afterlife (even if they lied on the witness stand), the judge was 
clearly uncomfortable about the effect that excluding relevant testimony 
would have on the trial, and he refused to prevent the witnesses from 
testifying.6 A few years later, however, the same judge barred a witness 
who was a “Free Inquirer,” who, if he believed in anything, believed that 
God was only embodied in the material universe.7 We have to be care-
ful about leaping too quickly to the conclusion that the judge was preju-
diced against one group but not the other. We make sense of these events 
through practices of interpretation that involve, first, understanding what 
the Universalists, the Free Inquirers, and the other courtroom actors be-
lieved and how their various views collided. We also need to understand 
the religious politics of the period: who was influential in society, whose 
influence was growing, and what threats to the public good were perceived 
in these different religious causes. We would want to bear in mind as well 
that Massachusetts prided itself on its freedom of religion. We would look 
outside the courtroom to see what else these different groups were doing. 
The Universalists, as it happens, were lobbying hard to end state financial 
support for religion, and they and others succeeded in having the state 
constitution changed, effective in 1834. Some won and some lost with this 
change. The Free Inquirers were mounting an even larger challenge to 
society: they criticized capitalism, women’s oppression in marriage, what 
they saw as the absurdities of Christianity, and slavery. They advocated 
birth control and a form of marriage that could be ended at will by either 
partner. Their opponents saw the edifice of civilized, God-fearing soci-
ety collapsing all around. Understanding these movements requires us to 
realize that our interpretive horizons (in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s terms) 
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are bounded, and to work to extend them so that they merge, as far as 
possible, with those whose mental frameworks we are trying to under-
stand. Working with pamphlets—and other primary sources—calls for a 
suspension of judgment, a respect for those who came before us, and a 
willingness to set today’s frameworks and assumptions aside in order to 
appreciate yesterday’s. The rewards are rich. 
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The Last Voyage of the Frederick 
Gerring, Jr.
Christopher Shorey*
Twenty-fifth of May 1896. It was late in the afternoon, on a calm day, 
off the southern coast of Nova Scotia. The Canadian Dominion cruiser 
Aberdeen steamed alongside the American fishing schooner, the Frederick 
Gerring, Jr. The Gerring’s crew were busy bailing fish from the purse seine 
into waiting barrels on deck. The ship’s master, Captain Daniel Doren, 
stepped to the gunnel to speak to the Aberdeen’s master, Captain Charles 
Knowlton. Knowlton told Doren that he was seizing the Gerring for fish-
ing in Canadian waters within three miles of the coast, contrary to the 
treaty of 1818 that established the boundary between the United States and 
British North America, as implemented through British and Canadian 
statutes that prohibited foreign ships from fishing in Canadian waters. 
The Gerring would never fish again.
At the admiralty court trial in Halifax, the parties focused on whether 
the Gerring had indeed been within three miles of land when apprehended 
by the Aberdeen. Chief Justice McDonald found that it was. Specifically, 
the ship was within three miles of a small Canadian island named Gull 
Ledge and therefore in violation of the treaty.1
The owner of the Gerring, Captain Edward Morris, appealed the 
admiralty court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. On appeal, 
the parties assumed the fish had entered the nets in international waters. 
The parties focused on the legal question of whether the Gerring was still 
5
Christopher Shorey52
actually “fishing” when it was found in Canadian waters and was therefore 
in violation of the 1818 treaty, UK legislation, and Canada’s Act Respecting 
Fishing by Foreign Vessels, none of which contained a definition of fishing.2 
This issue was tied to a determination of the point at which the Gerring 
had taken possession of the fish. Once possession was complete, the fish 
legally were no longer wild animals but became the ship’s property—at 
which point the Gerring was no longer fishing.3 The relevant questions 
were: (a) were the fish captured once secured by the seine, in which case 
they were caught in international waters and the crew were not “fishing” 
when approached by the Aberdeen; or (b) were the fish only captured once 
secured in barrels on the deck of the Gerring, in which case the crew were 
still fishing when the Aberdeen arrived? 
The Supreme Court favoured the latter interpretation and, on 1 May 
1897, upheld Chief Justice McDonald’s judgment against the Gerring.4 
Undeterred, Morris sought a political solution and pleaded for help from 
his congressmen and senators. It seemed to work. The Canadian govern-
ment immediately offered to return the vessel in exchange for a nominal 
fine. However, Morris rejected the offer, causing significant political em-
barrassment, the reverberations of which lasted for decades.
After an impasse and many years of delay, the case was included in an 
international arbitration of outstanding claims between the United States 
and Great Britain. In May 1914, after eighteen years, it finally seemed 
that the matter had settled. However, for the second time in the case’s 
history, the perceived resolution failed to materialize. Despite reports in 
newspapers and legal journals that the case was over, Canada refused to 
recognize the settlement. The last record of the Gerring v. Canada is from 
16 October 1924, when Canada, while agreeing to pay the other awards 
from the international claims arbitration, reaffirmed that it would not pay 
for the Gerring.5 
Justice Désiré Girouard’s concurring reasons for judgment at the 
Supreme Court of Canada cite and reproduce large sections of a famous 
New York case about fox hunting from 1805, Pierson v. Post.6 Despite being 
over two hundred years old, the Pierson case is still widely cited in legal 
academia and taught in Canadian law schools as establishing the rule that 
one must capture a wild animal in order to possess it. However, the ap-
plication of the rule is not restricted to wild animal cases. Its use in law 
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school classrooms and legal literature helps shape our understanding of 
property law, the legitimacy of claims to possession of all kinds of wild or 
“fugitive” resources, and even the concept of ownership itself.7 However, 
despite the case’s importance in legal academia, there has been no aca-
demic comment on its prominent link to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gerring v. Canada, which remains the only case that includes an extensive 
judicial consideration of Pierson.8 
As a foundational decision for generations of North American law-
yers, Pierson’s uptake and incorporation in Girouard’s judgment warrants 
greater scrutiny for Gerring v. Canada. This is especially so considering 
the aftermath of the case, which suggests that Canadian political and 
economic needs, rather than abstract legal concepts, were the ultimate 
driving force behind the Gerring’s fate. The case sparked international 
scandal, was a thorn in the side of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
for over a decade, came across the Prime Minister’s desk more than once, 
was energetically covered by the press, and singlehandedly delayed inter-
national arbitration proceedings between Great Britain and the United 
States. More than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court’s decision, 
the controversy was still, unbelievably, live. The extent of Canada’s bound-
aries, its ability to enforce them, and Canada’s recent independence from 
Britain were all at stake in this case and were probably more significant 
for Canada than whether the Gerring took a net or a barrel to catch a fish.
Gerring v. Canada is the case that incorporated Pierson-style first 
possession principles into Canadian law. Whether it is only recognized 
as such, or whether it also sparks further conversation about the legitim-
acy of these principles in Canadian law, depends on the legal community. 
Regardless of its legacy, the extraordinary history of the case should be a 
part of the conversation. 
The primary sources for this chapter are the British and American 
“memorials” that were assembled for the international claims arbitration. 
These memorials include the transcripts from trial, the factums filed with 
the Supreme Court, and exhibits from trial such as copies of the chart 
showing the Gerring’s location. Most of the information from the time 
period after arbitration came from Canadian government correspondence 
retrieved from the National Archives.9
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The Arrest of the Frederick Gerring, Jr.
The story begins in the late spring of 1896, in the bustling seaport of 
Gloucester, Massachusetts. Gloucester was renowned for its fishing 
schooners. Thousands of its handsome wooden sailing ships plied their 
trade on the east coast and throughout the Maritimes. Every Canadian 
knows what a fishing schooner looks like, as the famous Bluenose is on the 
face of the dime.
The life of a fisherman was exceedingly dangerous. Between 1860 and 
1906, over six hundred fishing vessels were lost at sea from Gloucester 
alone, either to heavy weather or wrecked on shoals and islands.10 A 
schooner like the Gerring was not itself used for fishing. Once the ship 
arrived at the fishing grounds it launched its dories, small, open boats that 
were rowed into position. From the dories, the dorymen netted the fish, 
encircling whole schools of fish in large nets called purse seines. 
The Gerring was built in 1870 in Essex, a few miles west of Gloucester.11 
Edward Morris purchased the ship in November 1892 for approximately 
$3,000.12 The Gerring was 73’7” in length, with a 21’1” beam, a draft of 7’8, 
and a displacement of 67 tons.13 Unlike the coal-powered Aberdeen, which 
towed it away, the Gerring recalled an earlier age, being powered only 
by sail. 
Morris was originally from Guysboro, Nova Scotia, but became an 
American citizen on 20 July 1866, and made his home in Gloucester.14 
He was a fisherman-turned-ship owner.15 The loss of the Gerring and the 
costs of litigation were ruinous to Morris. According to a sympathetic 
Washington Post report, “It broke the old man completely. Everything he 
had was tied in that vessel.”16
The Gerring operated with a crew of nine: three Canadians, five 
Americans, and one Frenchman.17 Although Morris owned the Gerring, 
he was not on board when it was seized. The master operating the ship at 
the time was Daniel Doren. Doren had been master of the Gerring for only 
four days when they left Gloucester on 13 May 1896, headed for the White 
Islands, off of Guysboro County, Nova Scotia.18 
The Gerring arrived at the fishing grounds off the south shore of Nova 
Scotia at about 3:00 pm on Monday, May 25, joining at least a dozen other 
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American schooners. The winds were calm and the mackerel were “play-
ing about” on the surface of the water.19
The Vigilant was also sailing the area. The Vigilant was a “Dominion 
cruiser” that belonged to the precursor of the Canadian Coast Guard, 
which was not formally created until 1962. Commanded by Hector 
MacKenzie, the Vigilant was a former fishing schooner, previously called 
the Highland Light, which had been seized a few years earlier for fish-
ing within the three-mile limit and bought by the federal government.20 
Charles Hardy, the captain of another American fishing schooner, the 
Marguerite Haskins, called out to MacKenzie to ask if they were outside 
the three-mile limit. MacKenzie replied, “you are all right, go ahead.”21 
Hearing this, the crew of the Gerring launched their dories, cast their nets, 
and started fishing.
The Gerring was purse seine fishing. With this type of fishing, a large 
rectangular net (the Gerring’s net was approximately one thousand feet 
long and one hundred and eighty feet deep)22 was lowered into the water. 
The net had floats on the top and weights at the bottom so that it floated 
vertically. The dorymen would encircle a school of fish with the net so 
that it formed a large cylinder. The bottom of the cylinder was then drawn 
closed or “pursed up.” When pursed, the net was shallower but still about 
ninety feet deep.23 The top ends of the net were then secured to either end 
of the schooner. The result was a net full of fish attached to the side of the 
ship. The crew would then bail the fish into barrels on the schooner with 
a “dip net.”24 The ship would be allowed to drift during the bailing, as the 
net would foul if the ship were anchored.
The crew of the Gerring had finished netting the fish and were bailing 
them onto the ship when another Dominion cruiser, the Aberdeen, ar-
rived.25 Its captain, Charles Knowlton, had his chief officer take a bearing, 
and he determined the Gerring to be within three miles of Nova Scotia. 
More specifically, he calculated that they were just less than two miles 
from a small island called Gull Ledge. Knowlton seized the Gerring for 
fishing within the three-mile limit and towed it to Liscombe Harbour for 
the night and then on to Halifax for trial in admiralty court five days later, 
on Saturday, 30 May 1896.26
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The Trial
The Nova Scotia Court of Vice-Admiralty, Nova Scotia’s original ad-
miralty court and the second admiralty court in what would eventually 
become Canada, had existed since 9 September 1720, when Daniel Henry 
received his commission and was appointed the judge at Annapolis.27 One 
of the court’s principal functions was to regulate trade among the North 
American colonies and Great Britain.28 Barristers of the Supreme Court 
of Nova Scotia were permitted to appear at the Court of Vice-Admiralty.29 
British acts of Parliament gave authority to these colonial courts. However, 
after Confederation in 1867, the provinces started asking for their own 
home-grown admiralty courts, citing excessive litigation costs, procedur-
al issues, and the general disconnect between local problems and far-away 
British administration.30
The Exchequer and Supreme Courts of Canada were established in 
187531 and, in 1891, the Exchequer Court acquired admiralty jurisdic-
tion.32 The vice-admiralty court in Halifax became the “Exchequer Court 
of Canada, Nova Scotia Admiralty District.” The chief justice of the 
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, James McDonald, who had been the judge 
of vice-admiralty since 1881, became the new judge of the Nova Scotia 
admiralty district.33 It was McDonald who heard the Gerring trial. 
The Gerring was represented by local lawyer William F. MacCoy, Q.C. 
of MacCoy, MacCoy & Grant.34 Morris paid MacCoy $808.11 for rep-
resentation at trial, $250 for representation at appeal, $80 for transcripts, 
and $50 for security for court costs he might be required to pay if he lost.35 
For Morris, already suffering the loss of his ship, the total amount—al-
most $1,200—was a significant sum of money, approximately a third of 
the cost of a new sailing ship.
Canada was represented by William Bruce Almon Ritchie. Ritchie 
was a third-generation member of a prominent Nova Scotia legal family.36 
Ritchie’s uncle, Sir William Johnstone Ritchie, was one of the first six 
Supreme Court of Canada judges and chief justice from 1879 to 1892. 
W.B.A. Ritchie’s son, Roland Almon Ritchie, would go on to become a 
Supreme Court of Canada judge as well, from 1959 to 1984. 
W.B.A. Ritchie, educated at Harvard University in 1881 and 1882, was 
part of a new generation of Canadian lawyers educated in the American, 
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Harvard style of law rather than traditional British models of legal educa-
tion.37 In 1889, he joined Robert Borden, future prime minister of Canada, 
in forming the firm of Borden, Ritchie, Parker, and Chisholm. Ritchie and 
Borden were both very successful and sought-after appellate-level barris-
ters.38 Ritchie was still with Borden in 1896 when he argued the Gerring 
case on behalf of the attorney general of Canada.39
The Gerring trial began on Saturday, 30 May, and continued on 1 June, 
29 June, and 5 August 1896.40 Procedure was as in any other common law 
court, and trial proceeded by judge alone, as was always the case in the 
admiralty court. Although the trial took five days and twenty witnesses 
were called, the issues in dispute were relatively straightforward.41 First, 
where was the Gerring when seized by the Aberdeen, and second, was the 
Gerring, in law, “fishing” at the time?
The Gerring began fishing outside the three-mile territorial limit. As 
well as telling the master of the Marguerite Haskins that they were “all 
right” to fish, MacKenzie of the Vigilant took a bearing of the Gerring 
and determined it was a “good half mile” outside the limit, presumably 
as measured from Gull Ledge.42 The real factual dispute came when de-
termining how far the Gerring had drifted after an hour or two of bailing 
fish. Knowlton of the Aberdeen testified that the Gerring was apprehended 
“less than a mile and three quarters” from Gull Ledge.43 If this was cor-
rect, the ship had drifted nearly two miles to the northwest.
MacCoy called four witnesses, including Morris, who testified that, 
given the direction of the wind, to travel northwest towards Gull Ledge 
would have been impossible.44 So long as the net was in the water attached 
to the Gerring, it would have acted as a sea anchor, and the swell should 
not have carried the ship that far. The problem for the Gerring was that 
Knowlton of the Aberdeen was the only one who had actually measured 
the Gerring’s final position. Despite the testimony of experienced sailors 
that they could not see how the Gerring could have moved from where 
MacKenzie thought it had been to where Knowlton said it had ended up, 
Knowlton’s measurement carried the day. For Justice McDonald, it was 
“immaterial to inquire how the vessel reached that position.”45 Unless 
Knowlton was dishonest or incompetent, of which McDonald found there 
was no evidence, the Gerring was in fact within three miles of Gull Ledge.46 
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But was Gull Ledge a landform from which the three-mile limit could 
be drawn? The parties spent significant time at trial determining the na-
ture of Gull Ledge. If it was too small to be considered part of the coast 
of Canada, then the Gerring would have been safely outside the limit. 
However, MacCoy probably recognized that this was a losing argument 
and abandoned it before making final submissions, as there is no dis-
cussion regarding the size of Gull Ledge in Justice McDonald’s decision. 
While Gull Ledge is a small, barren island, it is not some partially sub-
merged wash rock or “a sunken reef several miles seaward,” as described 
in the American press.47 Ritchie produced witnesses at trial who testified 
that a half acre of the island was covered in long grass and that it even held 
the remnants of an old wooden shanty.48 
Was the Gerring fishing when apprehended? The Court found that the 
Gerring had netted the fish in international waters, but was bailing them 
in Canadian waters. Whether the bailing of the fish, or simply netting the 
fish, constituted “fishing” was a legal question, not an evidentiary one. 
However, Mackenzie, who had originally said that the schooners were “all 
right” to fish, thought that the seizure was wrong. He gave the following 
testimony at trial while being cross-examined by MacCoy: 
Q. Where were you when [the Gerring] was seized?
A. I was a mile or a mile and a half away. 
Q. Why did you not bear down and seize her yourself? 
A. I did not feel myself justified in doing so, because I know 
that she had taken the fish outside.49
MacCoy argued that the act of fishing was complete once the fish were 
trapped in the pursed up seine; however, Justice McDonald did not agree:
I cannot accept [MacCoy’s] contention that the “fishing” 
and the “catching” of the fish was complete when the seine 
was successfully thrown. Further labour is required to save 
the fish from the sea, and reduce the property to useful pos-
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session, and until that be completed the act of fishing and 
“catching” fish is not in my opinion completed.50
Justice McDonald ordered the Gerring and its catch forfeited with costs. 
This was the only penalty available for a foreign vessel caught fishing in 
Canadian waters.51
The Supreme Court of Canada
After the trial, Morris met with US Secretary of State Richard Olney, 
who was a prominent Boston lawyer before being appointed by President 
Cleveland and also reportedly an avid fisher. Olney advised Morris to ap-
peal to Canada’s Supreme Court.52 In October 1896, Olney wrote to the 
American ambassador in London, Thomas Bayard, for help.53 Olney relied 
on the following passage from McDonald’s decision, which Olney inter-
preted as supporting the view that this was “a proper case for the exercise 
of executive clemency”:
It would, I apprehend, be difficult, if not impossible, to 
enforce these Fishery laws, to which our people attach su-
preme importance, if those American subjects who so ea-
gerly seek to compete with our people along our shores in 
this industry, and who are not, I fear, overscrupulous in the 
observance of laws of which they have ample notice, should 
be permitted to plead accident or ignorance to a charge of 
infraction of such laws. Such a plea, however effective it may 
be to the executive authority of the country, cannot avail in 
this court.54
However, London advised that there could be no political intervention 
until after the decision of the Supreme Court.55
At the Supreme Court, MacCoy focused his submissions on where 
the Gerring was apprehended, arguing that Knowlton must have been 
wrong that the ship was within the three-mile limit, and, in any event, 
that the Gerring was not, at law, “fishing” when it was apprehended by 
the Aberdeen. He argued that the fish had been “taken” once they had 
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been secured in the seine and that therefore the act of fishing had been 
completed.56
Although the lawyers for Canada addressed the issue of where the 
Gerring was caught, their focus was on the definition of fishing.57 The 
crux of their argument was that, whatever property right the Gerring 
might have earned through netting the fish, the act of fishing was not yet 
complete, because it could still be frustrated by the escape of some or all 
of the fish:
It was contended that the act of fishing is complete when 
in line fishing the fish is hooked, or in net fishing, is sur-
rounded by a net. According to this contention, a fish would 
be caught as soon as it is hooked, which would, I think, be 
found to be contrary to experience.
It is submitted that fish caught in a net on the high seas 
and still in the water are not in the possession in any sense 
of the fisherman; but assuming that they are to be so re-
garded, and that property in them is thereby vested in the 
fisherman his title is qualified, a special interest liable to be 
divested before they are killed by the escape of the fish.
See Blackstone’s Commentaries, 15th edition, page 403.  
Kent’s Commentaries Text Book Series, page 348.58 
It is submitted that the acquiring of this special and very 
precarious right is not, in the ordinary use of language, the 
completion of the act of fishing, but that something more 
remains to be done before the fishing is completed and the 
fish finally taken.59
In May 1897, a panel of five Supreme Court judges released their deci-
sions. Although Chief Justice Sir Henry Strong and Justice John Gwynne 
would have allowed Morris’s appeal, they were in the minority. By a 3:2 
majority, Justices Robert Sedgewick, George Edwin King, and Désiré 
Girouard agreed with Justice McDonald that the Gerring’s crew were still 
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“fishing” when they were bailing the fish into barrels. Sedgewick defined 
fishing as follows:
The act of fishing is a pursuit consisting, not of a single but 
of many acts according to the nature of the fishing. It is not 
the isolated act alone either of surrounding the fish by the 
net, or by taking them out of the water and obtaining man-
ual custody of them. It is a continuous process beginning 
from the time when the preliminary preparations are being 
made for the taking of the fish and extending down to the 
moment when they are finally reduced to actual and cer-
tain possession. That, at least, is the idea of what “fishing,” 
according to the ordinary acceptation of the word, means, 
and that, I think, is the meaning which we must give to the 
word in the statutes and treaty.60
There are currently over sixty cases citing to the Supreme Court case, and 
Sedgewick’s definition of fishing as a “continuous process” is still quot-
ed to this day.61 For example, the above quotation has been reproduced, 
exactly, by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 1994,62 the New Brunswick 
Court of Queen’s Bench in 2003,63 the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in 
2006,64 the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2008,65 and the PEI Court 
of Appeal in 2009.66 The Federal Court of Canada cited the decision in 
200367 and the Tax Court of Canada in 2008.68 The Supreme Court has 
cited Gerring v. Canada three times: in 1914,69 1917,70 and 1931.71 
Although Sedgewick’s judgment is often cited, Justices King’s and 
Girouard’s concurring decisions have received little attention.72 For ex-
ample, of the over sixty cases that cite Gerring v. Canada, only two cite 
King’s or Girouard’s decisions.73 King and Girouard were also the only 
judges to refer to James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, and 
Girouard is the only judge to cite Pierson directly. However, despite 
Pierson’s evident importance to Girouard, none of the cases that reference 
Gerring v. Canada also reference Pierson. This is an unfortunate omission, 
because, for over one hundred and twenty years now, the link between 
Canadian law and Pierson, the foundational American property law case 
so many American and Canadian lawyers were raised on, has been missed.
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Pierson v. Post
Pierson is a very well-known case. It has been referenced in almost eight 
hundred law journal articles and other secondary sources since it was de-
cided some two hundred years ago74 and has been a mainstay in American 
property law casebooks since the early twentieth century.75  However, 
despite its incredible uptake into legal academia, Pierson has only been 
cited in reported cases thirty-three times.76 Until very recently, Gerring v. 
Canada was the only Canadian decision to reference it. There has been no 
commentary on this Canadian link to Pierson.77 
Pierson was included in Girouard’s decision because Ritchie cited it. 
And Ritchie cited it because, like William Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law was 
a staple text both inside and outside the United States. Kent’s work was 
first published in 1827, and in it he discussed Pierson (a case he heard as a 
judge) at length. Kent also mentioned Buster v. Newkirk, an 1822 New York 
case that cited Pierson.78 The cases were in a chapter on qualified property 
rights and wild animals.79 Kent’s Commentaries was hugely influential on 
American lawyers and was largely responsible for plucking Pierson out of 
obscurity and sending it on its path to rockstar-case status.80
W.B.A. Ritchie may have become familiar with Pierson during the 
time he studied at Harvard University in 1881–82, given that 1881 was the 
year when Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. published his famous lectures The 
Common Law. In Lecture VI, “Possession,” Holmes discussed at length 
whether the impossibility of escape was the true test for the possession 
of wild animals. He discussed the facts of Pierson, citing it and Kent’s 
discussion of it in the Commentaries.81 As he prepared the Government 
of Canada’s factum for Gerring, Ritchie turned to one of the editions of 
Kent’s Commentaries published between 1873 and 1896. The most famous 
12th edition (1873) was edited by Holmes, and other editions appeared in 
print as well.82 The references to Pierson in these editions remained essen-
tially the same as they had since the first edition.
As noted above, Ritchie included the reference to Kent’s Commentaries 
in his factum, which was relied on by the Supreme Court. Justices Girouard 
and King both picked up on the reference to Kent’s Commentaries and 
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included it in their own judgments. Justice King more or less paraphrased 
Ritchie’s factum:
It may well be that the “Gerring” people had sufficient con-
trol and dominion to have acquired a qualified property in 
the fish; Young v. Hichens [6 Q.B. 106]; Pollock & Wright on 
Possession 37; 2 Kent’s Com. 348; but an operation at sea 
of taking several hundred, or one hundred barrels (as here) 
of loose and live fish from a bag net, is attended with such 
obvious chances of some of them at least regaining their 
natural liberty, that the act of fishing cannot be said to be 
entirely at an end in a useful sense until the fish are reduced 
into actual possession.83
Girouard took his decision to a loftier scholarly level, citing to famous, if 
not antiquated, French, German, Dutch, and ancient Roman legal scholars 
to support his view on whether the crew of the Gerring were still fishing.84 
Rather than just citing Kent, he mentioned that “Chancellor Kent” cited 
two American cases “with approbation,” and then proceeded to repro-
duce large sections of Justice Daniel Tompkins’s majority judgment from 
Pierson within his own reasons.85
As a final quirk, it is not clear that the Pierson case or Kent’s 
Commentaries actually fully support the conclusions that Chief Justice 
McDonald and then Justices Girouard, King, and Sedgewick drew from 
them. In Pierson, Tompkins wrote that,
[E]ncompassing and securing such animals with nets and 
toils, or otherwise intercepting them in such a manner as 
to deprive them of their natural liberty, and render escape 
impossible, may justly be deemed to give possession of them 
. . . 86
Here the fish were in the purse seine net. While a few fish might get out, 
not many would. In fact, fish would sometimes stay in the seine for days 
if the crew wished to carefully pack and salt the fish while still at sea.87 
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Would the possibility of a few fish escaping mean that the fish, generally, 
are not caught? 
State v. Shaw, an American case from 1902, concerned fish in Lake 
Erie caught in a “pound,” basically a large net with a one-way entrance.88 
Fish could escape the net, especially when heavy weather caused waves to 
roll over the top of it. Shaw was charged with larceny for stealing the fish 
out of the pound, but argued that unowned property cannot be stolen. 
Citing a number of cases as well as Kent’s Commentaries as authority, he 
argued that the owner of the pound had only a qualified possessory right 
in the fish, as escape from the pound was not impossible. The Supreme 
Court of Ohio disagreed:
We think that this doctrine is both unnecessarily technical 
and erroneous. . . . 
They were confined in nets, from which it was not absolute-
ly impossible for them to escape, yet it was practically so 
impossible; for it seems that under ordinary circumstances 
few, if any, of the fish escape.89
This case, aside from being another example of the pervasiveness of Kent’s 
Commentaries at the turn of the century, also shows that the Gerring case 
could have been decided differently. That it was not suggests that the driv-
ing force behind the decision was the policy reason behind the Treaty of 
1818, that is, the enforcement of Canada’s borders and sovereignty, rather 
than what was necessarily so in property law. Clearly this political concern 
was on McDonald’s mind in the Nova Scotia admiralty court, as he rea-
soned that it would “be difficult, if not impossible” to enforce Canada’s 
fishery laws if American ships could claim that they accidentally drifted 
over while engaged in lawful fishing under the treaty.90
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Failed Diplomacy after the Supreme Court’s 
Decision
In June 1897, soon after the Supreme Court’s decision, Morris wrote to the 
US Secretary of State, John Sherman, for assistance with the case.91 Rather 
than dealing with Canada directly, Sherman wrote to the British am-
bassador, Lord Julian Pauncefote. Sherman explained to Pauncefote that 
the violation of the treaty was unintentional and asked for the Gerring’s 
return.92
The Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Louis Henry Davies, 
sympathized with the plight of the Gerring and recommended that the 
ship be returned to Morris: 
[The minister] is convinced that notwithstanding the fact 
that the vessel was found actually taking fish from the seine 
within the three-mile limit, that these fish had been practi-
cally taken, to all intents and purposes, so far as the actual 
netting is concerned, outside the prohibited zone. . . . ”93 
On 15 July 1897, the British happily reported to Sherman that the 
“Government of the Dominion” was prepared to return the ship, less a 
nominal fine ($1) and litigation costs.94 On 19 July, the Acting Secretary of 
State, William Day, wrote to Morris with the good news.95 Day also wrote 
to the British Chargé d’Affaires, Frederick Adam, warmly thanking the 
British government for the positive outcome.96 It seemed that, despite the 
Supreme Court’s decision against Morris, just over two months later the 
parties had come to an amicable conclusion. However, on 7 September 
1897, Morris wrote back to Sherman, explaining that the Gerring had been 
left in terrible condition by the Canadians and was not worth the cost to 
recover.97 He had good reason to believe this as, in July that year, his insur-
ance agent from the Mutual Fishing Insurance Company had inspected 
the Gerring and, Morris asserted, reported that it had deteriorated to a 
near worthless condition. The seine was ruined, the boats had lain in the 
water and one had “split to pieces,” the stores and provisions had spoiled, 
the sails had been put away wet, and other equipment had rusted. The 
whole thing was now worthless, Morris said.98 
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On 25 November 1897, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier wrote to 
Davies, asking about the Gerring.99 Laurier had read a letter from Morris 
(probably the letter he wrote to Sherman) that had alleged that the Gerring 
was in poor condition. Davies assured Laurier that the Gerring had been 
well taken care of and the “innuendos” from Morris were unfounded.100 
On 1 March 1898, Sherman wrote an apologetic letter to the British 
ambassador Pauncefote, explaining that, despite the apparent agreement 
made with Acting Secretary Day, Morris had rejected the Canadian offer. 
Sherman acknowledged that it was exceptional to reopen a matter after a 
diplomatic settlement had been reached.101 
In April 1898, Pauncefote wrote back to Sherman. He appended a 31 
March 1898 report from the Privy Council of Canada about the Gerring. 
The report explained that while the Canadian government was originally 
sympathetic with Morris’s plight after the trial decision, they had waited 
for the Supreme Court’s decision in case it allowed the appeal.102 When 
the Supreme Court upheld the trial decision, Canada “voluntarily offered 
to exert Executive clemency, and remitted the penalty of forfeiture, substi-
tuting a fine of one dollar,” and about $600 in costs.103 The Privy Council 
thought this was a generous offer and that the Gerring was in good shape; 
the Minister was “unable to see what further relief Canada could afford.”104 
They also made a point of stating that they were not under orders from 
Britain.
By July 1898, the Canadian government was unsure about how to 
proceed. The Gerring was incurring holding costs and they were not sure 
whether the offer to return the vessel had been squarely rejected or not.105 
The Americans suggested that, in order to resolve the matter, represent-
atives from both the United States and Canada go to inspect the vessel’s 
condition.106 However, Minister Davies objected, saying that there should 
be no survey of the Gerring:
The offer for the return of the vessel was an offer made pure-
ly as a matter of grace and favor on the part of the Crown, 
and whether the vessel had deteriorated or not could not in 
any possible way affect the offer, though it might affect the 
determination of the owners to receive her.107
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The Privy Council authorized the sale of the Gerring at public auction 
and the ship was sold by James Duggan & Sons at Halifax on 31 May 
1899.108 Morris had sworn that the vessel and gear together were worth 
$5,251.50.109 Three other affidavits, from Gloucester-based ship owners 
and a purse seine manufacturer, supported his valuation of the Gerring.110 
However, the federal government ultimately purchased the Gerring and its 
gear for only $870. 
The Gerring’s low selling price indicates that it probably was in bad 
condition. Moreover, it was never again used as a proper sailing ship. The 
federal government converted the Gerring into a lightship (a floating light-
house), stripping its rigging and anchoring it to the floor of Miramichi Bay, 
New Brunswick, to guide mariners in fog and darkness.111 The Gerring 
was the Miramichi lightship until at least 1904.112 Captain Robert McLean 
received his salary as the lightkeeper of the “Miramichi lightship”—quite 
possibly still the Gerring—from 1902 until at least 1916.113 
Although the Gerring sold at auction in 1899, the matter was not 
over. On 6 December 1900, the American ambassador, Joseph Choate, 
wrote a lengthy letter to Lord Lansdowne, a former Governor General 
of Canada and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Choate 
wrote a detailed history of the matter and requested “payment of a just 
and reasonable indemnity.”114 Included in his letter were memoranda 
from Senator George Hoar and Congressman William H. Moody, both of 
Massachusetts. Moody, who chaired the Appropriations Committee in the 
House of Representatives, stated that Morris was seeking $11,549.11 from 
the Canadian government.115
Moody’s letter, aside from disagreeing with the judge’s concept of fish-
ing, addressed the issue of the three-mile boundary. The Treaty of 1818 
demarcated a boundary “within three marine miles of any of the coasts, 
bays, creeks, or harbours” of what had become Canada.116 According to 
the American ambassador, senator, and representative, Gull Ledge was 
such a minor and “isolated piece of rock” that it should not be considered 
part of Nova Scotia’s coast from which to extend the three-mile boundary.
The following spring, in May 1901, Minister Davies outlined the 
ministry’s position to the Canadian cabinet.117 Davies disagreed with 
the Americans that the three-mile boundary could not be drawn from 
Gull Ledge.118 Davies quoted Thomas Bayard himself—the American 
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ambassador who began the dialogue with London—who, while Secretary 
of State, wrote,
[T]he sovereignty of the shore does not, so far as territori-
al authority is concerned, extend beyond three miles from 
low water mark, and that the seaward boundary of this zone 
of territorial waters follows the coast of the mainland, ex-
tending where there are islands, so as to place around such 
islands the same belt.119
Davies also referenced a British admiralty case from 1805, the Anna, in 
which an American ship was seized by a British privateer within a mile and 
a half of islands formed from “temporary deposits of logs and drift” off the 
mouth of the Mississippi River. In that case, the High Court of Admiralty 
in London proclaimed that islands must form a part of the territory, or else 
they could be “‘embanked and fortified’” by foreign powers, creating hos-
tile bases just offshore.120 Also, Morris had not brought a further appeal to 
the Privy Council in England, apparently on the advice of then-Secretary 
of State Olney. Davies thought it “inconceivable” that Olney would have 
advised against bringing the appeal so long as there was any doubt about 
the legal basis for the decision because, in the past, the US had prohibited 
any diplomatic efforts before judicial options were exhausted.121 Finally, 
Davies addressed the fact that America and Canada had each released 
ships to each other in the past when they had accidentally drifted into for-
eign waters in similar circumstances. In each case the ships were returned 
without compensation, the same offer that Morris rejected.122 Davies ad-
vised Lansdowne that, in short, the request for compensation could not 
be entertained. Lansdowne, in turn, paraphrased Davies’s report, editing 
out some of the less diplomatic turns of phrase, in a letter to the American 
ambassador Joseph Choate on 12 August 1901.123 Congressman William 
Moody relayed the bad news to Morris.124
However, although three years passed, the matter of the Gerring was 
not over. On 16 June 1904, the American Secretary of State, John Hay, 
proposed that the British and American governments come to “‘an ar-
rangement for the adjustment of all claims of citizens of the United States 
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against the British Government and of all claims of British subjects against 
the Government of the United States by a mixed claims Commission.’”125 
On 5 January 1906, the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
instructed the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Mortimer 
Durand, that an independent arbitration at The Hague would be prefer-
able, and that Britain and the United States should exchange a preliminary 
list of claims that they would like included in the arbitration.126 However, 
American Secretary of State Elihu Root, who replaced Hay, doubted that 
Congress would agree to the expense associated with arbitration at the 
Hague, which had the potential to eclipse the amount of the claims at 
issue; Root would have favoured a mixed-claims commission.127 Britain 
preferred to discuss costs after “the value of the claims and the form of 
procedure” had been agreed to.128 
On 20 February 1906, Durand spoke with Root.129 Already, the Gerring 
was getting in the way. Root told Durand that “certain Senators” still 
thought “the Gerring case involved ‘gross injustice’” and asked Durand 
whether they “could not get the case ‘out of the way’.”130 At Britain’s re-
quest, Canada reluctantly agreed that the Gerring claim “would not be 
excluded from the scope of the proposed arbitration.”131 
By January 1907, further pressure was mounting on Canada. Britain’s 
Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Esme Howard (standing in for the am-
bassador), sent a confidential dispatch to Canada’s Governor General, 
Albert Grey.132 Howard advised that there were several British claims that 
the Americans recognized as payable but for which Congress had not 
ratified payment. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was pre-
venting any payments until the Gerring case was settled:
[T]here are only three or four American claims outstanding 
against His Majesty’s Government, and of these the claim 
of the “Frederick Gerring Junior” is the most important.... 
Mr. Lodge, from his place in the Senate, has said that they 
are just, and ought to be paid, but that they will not be paid 
until the British Government settle the American claims.133
In February 1907, Prime Minister Laurier demanded a full report on the 
Gerring and an explanation for why the claim could not be paid.134
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On 6 July 6 1911, the Americans and British agreed to a schedule of 
claims that included the Gerring, and in August they agreed to estab-
lish an arbitral tribunal to hear these claims.135 In September 1911, the 
Washington Post reported,
No redress was obtainable for the Captain. So Senator 
Lodge planted himself on the floor of the Senate against al-
lowing the payment of any claims of British subjects against 
the United States. This held up the pecuniary claims of both 
countries. The agreement to include the Frederick Gerring 
claim among those to be adjudicated in the forthcoming ar-
bitration loosened the key-log and claimants on both sides 
now have a chance, of adjudication at least, although even 
after that it may take years to get the money from Congress 
for such damages as may be awarded the Americans.136
The Americans and the British prepared and submitted the detailed me-
morials that contain much of the information supplied in this chapter. 
The parties argued their case in Washington in the spring of 1914.137 
Instead of imposing an arbitrated resolution, the president of the tribunal, 
Henri Fromageot, suggested that Canada settle the matter by paying out 
the value of the ship, minus the costs of prosecution and a nominal fine—
nominally identical to their original offer to return the ship.138 On 1 May 
1914, it appeared that Canada had agreed to pay $9,000, more than ten 
times what the Gerring sold for at public auction, and the settlement was 
put on the record of the tribunal.139
Unfortunately, for the second time, the reported settlement was pre-
mature, although this time it was the Canadians who were backing out. 
What Canada had meant to agree to was for the arbitrator to make a 
“recommendation” that they pay approximately $7,000, with the under-
standing that the Canadian government would then implement that rec-
ommendation.140 However, the idea that the issue had been “settled” for 
payment of $9,000 was unacceptable to Canada, and it refused to ratify the 
settlement. World War I would break out in a matter of months and the 
problem was left unresolved.
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After the war, the parties were arranging to have their respective 
awards paid, and Britain contacted Canada to see if it was prepared to pay 
the awards made against it. On 16 October 1924, Canada advised that it 
concurred that “provisions should be made . . . for immediate payment of 
the awards,” but that it was “unable to regard the F. Gerring Jr. claim as the 
subject of any award or liability.”141 Canada remained steadfast that it had 
not settled the case for $9,000, and it appears the claim was never paid.142
The Legacy of the Frederick Gerring, Jr.
There is a divergence between what a judge orders and what actually hap-
pens after a trial.143 The Frederick Gerring, Jr. case is a good example of 
how different those outcomes can be. The decision itself nowhere reveals 
(and could not have revealed) that the Supreme Court’s judgment was only 
a prelude to over two decades of diplomatic efforts. Had the case been 
included in Canadian law school property law casebooks in the standard 
way, this long and complicated after-life of the case would very likely have 
gone untold.
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Canadian government was 
quick to offer to return the Gerring, although they had just spent a year 
and great expense litigating over the validity of the seizure. Perhaps the 
government was concerned with establishing a principle? The Minister of 
Marine and Fisheries, Davies, at least at first, questioned the legal princi-
ple regarding fishing, arguing that for “all intents and purposes” the act 
of fishing had been complete before the Gerring was apprehended by the 
Aberdeen.144 Given the initial offer to return the ship, albeit spurned, and 
given that Canada was later prepared to pay $7,000, if recommended by 
the arbitrator, what do such concessions mean for Gerring v. Canada as a 
piece of legal doctrine and as a precedent? Should it matter that the seem-
ingly correct result at law is treated as impractical, harsh, and unworkable 
by nearly all parties involved? Gerring v. Canada is the leading case on 
the definition of fishing under the Fisheries Act, although the diplomacy, 
arbitration, settlement, and connections to Pierson v. Post and Kent’s 
Commentaries are all but forgotten. With how much reverence ought we 
to treat the decision when the federal government was ultimately prepared 
to fully compensate Morris for seizing his ship? If the majority of the 
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Supreme Court of Canada judges were politically motivated in deciding to 
adopt the capture rule, how confident can we be that the correct definition 
of fishing was adopted?
Regardless of the case’s extrajudicial history, as a matter of law, the legal 
principle remains suspect: the Supreme Court was split on the matter, and 
the majority judges’ reasons included references to Kent’s Commentaries 
and Pierson. Both of these authorities specifically contemplate possession 
by way of catching wild animals in nets and lean towards a standard of 
impossible escape.145 However, was it truly significant that a few fish, out 
of thousands, might escape? 
Whether the Gerring case continues as a throw-away reference in 
fishing cases or becomes part of a broader discussion about how we treat 
possession cases in Canada is up to the legal community. As a first step, 
Gerring v. Canada should be recognized not simply as a fishing case but 
as the case that incorporated Pierson-style first possession principles into 
Canadian law. The next step, given what we know about the history of the 
 
Figure 5.1 Detail of the chart of Nova Scotia’s south east coast included in the US 
Memorial showing the location and bearing of the Frederick Gerring, Jr.
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case, would be to consider whether we should rethink our understanding 
of those principles. Generally, I hope that this chapter shows how import-
ant and interesting it can be to look beyond the reported decision of a case. 
Lastly, I hope the reader feels some sympathy for Captain Morris and 
his ship. Whatever the merits of the case, it seems wrong for a once proud 
wooden schooner to spend its final years with its sails cut, chained to the 
bottom of a harbour. The legacy of the Frederick Gerring, Jr. should be 
more than that.
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The Text Book Edition of James 
Kent’s Commentaries Used in 
Canada v. Gerring
Angela Fernandez*
Nova Scotia judge Alexander Stewart wrote to American judge and jur-
ist James Kent in 1847, the year Kent died: “[y]our Commentaries are the 
textbook we put into our students’ hands and next to Blackstone . . . are 
our most esteemed works.”1 As if to prove the point was still true nearly 
fifty years later, the Nova Scotian lawyer who argued the Gerring case for 
the government, W.B.A. Ritchie, cited both famous works in his factum 
when arguing that the fish caught by the Gerring were “qualified prop-
erty” and hence her captain and crew were indeed fishing inside the three-
mile limit when the ship was apprehended by the Canadian authorities. In 
his factum, submitted in 1896 to the Supreme Court of Canada defending 
the government’s action, Ritchie wrote:
It is submitted that fish caught in a net on the high seas 
and still in the water are not in the possession in any sense 
of the fisherman; but assuming that they are to be so re-
garded, and that property in them is thereby vested in the 
fisherman his title is qualified, a special interest liable to be 
divested before they are killed by the escape of the fish.
See Blackstone’s Commentaries, 15th edition, page 403.  
Kent’s Commentaries Text Book Series, page 348.2
6
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Both sets of Commentaries used a version of the “institutes” form de-
rived from the Roman legal thinker Gaius, who divided everything into 
three fundamental social categories: persons (subjects), things (objects), 
and actions (the interrelation between subjects and objects), creating a 
system of ordering reality and of perceiving and constructing the world 
probably rivalled only by Aristotle’s.3 In doing so, “Gaius formulated (if 
he did not create) one of the most distinctive enduring systems of thought 
in Western history,” imitated in influential legal works by the Roman 
Emperor Justinian and much later the German jurist and historian 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny.4 Civil law countries such as France and Spain, 
where formal state law was used in order to solidify the nation state in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, employed versions of the tripartite 
Gaian arrangement, e.g., in the order and structure of the civil code and 
in choosing how to organize the study of national law in their universities 
and the attendant text book commentary.5 
In the 1760s, William Blackstone created a very influential four-vol-
ume version for English common law, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, in an environment in which Roman and civil law had domin-
ated university-taught legal education (as opposed to the Inns of Court, 
where teaching the common law prevailed).6 Blackstone was widely used 
in the United States (and Canada) even after James Kent produced a 
home-grown American version in the 1820s, Commentaries on American 
Law, which itself became an influential contributor to variations on the 
Institute theme.7 Both were common law works patterned on the Gaian 
dialectical method and arrangement, aimed at bringing clarity, order, and 
elegance to the chaos of the common law by presenting its elemental (i.e., 
foundational) aspects in a format that—unlike the formerly used insti-
tute-work for the common law, Coke Upon Littleton—was easy to read.8 
Blackstone’s discussion of qualified property occurs in the second 
(1766) volume on property in a section on acquiring “title to things per-
sonal by occupancy,” and specifically how occupancy is established in 
wild animals (ferae naturae).9 He wrote that unless restrained by some 
municipal law, all mankind has the right to pursue and take wild animals 
and “when a man has so seized them, they become while living his quali-
fied property, or, if dead, are absolutely his own.”10 Kent, who was provid-
ing an American version of Blackstone’s text, wrote, in a section entitled 
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“Property in chattels personal is either absolute or qualified,” that like air, 
light, and water, which “are the subjects of qualified property by occu-
pancy,” animals ferae naturae “are also the subject of a qualified prop-
erty.”11 The fish in the Gerring were still alive in the purse seine net and so 
were not absolute property, which according to Blackstone required that 
they be dead. The fish had not yet been reduced to possession. They were 
still qualified property that could escape because they were still alive, or 
so the argument went according to these two august and regularly relied 
upon authorities.
Kent’s text was originally published in 1827. The nineteenth century 
saw multiple editions of the text, the first five in Kent’s lifetime and then, 
after he died in 1847, his son William published the following three edi-
tions.12 The publisher changed to Little, Brown in the ninth edition in 
1858.13 By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the most famous edi-
tion was undoubtedly the twelfth, completed by Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr., then a practising lawyer and legal scholar.14 Yet Ritchie used something 
called the “Text Book Series” edition in his Gerring factum.15 What was this 
edition and why was a lawyer as eminent as Ritchie using it, rather than the 
fancier Holmes edition? This short essay seeks to answer these questions.
According to Philip Girard, Ritchie was a “member of . . . Nova Scotia’s 
best-known legal dynasty.”16 His uncle, Sir William Johnstone Ritchie, was 
one of the first six Supreme Court of Canada judges appointed in 1875 
and chief justice from 1879–1892;17 W.B.A.’s son, Roland Almon Ritchie, 
Oxford educated, would go on to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada from 
1959–1984. W.B.A. attended Harvard Law School in 1881–82 (following in 
the footsteps of an older brother who received a Harvard LL.B. in 1877 
and four cousins who also studied there).18 W.B.A. Ritchie returned to 
Nova Scotia where he was called to the bar in June 1882.19 In 1889, fu-
ture Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden asked him to join his law 
firm. As Girard puts it, W.B.A. Ritchie was “an exemplar of the Maritime 
lawyers who in the 1890–1920 period migrated to the western provinces, 
where they soon rose to positions of power and influence.”20 Indeed, “he 
and Borden were two of the most sought-after counsel in Nova Scotia ap-
peals before the Supreme Court of Canada in the years 1890–1905.”21 The 
Gerring in 1897 falls squarely in this period.22
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The “Text Book Series” was a book-reprinting and selling initiative 
spearheaded by an American company named “the Blackstone Publishing 
Company,” a business located at 19 South Ninth Street in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.23 The series provided pirated editions of classic English 
works to Americans and those in other countries at a fraction of the 
regular price, one book per month for a set subscription fee of $15 per 
year.24 Single volumes could be purchased for $1.25 each.25 Their agents in 
Canada were “Carswell and Co.”26 
Book notices touted the Blackstone Text Book series as an excellent 
way for students to obtain valuable treatises at extremely reasonable prices. 
For example, the Kansas City Law Reporter contained an advertisement 
 
Figure 6.1 Small sticker from inside the front cover (bottom right-hand corner) of 
volume 2, from James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, edited by William 
M. Lacy, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Blackstone Publishing Company, 1889) of the copy 
“presented to the Library of the University of Toronto by the Executors of the 
Estate of the Late George Tate Blackstock, Esq., K.C.” George Tate Blackstock was 
a prominent Toronto lawyer, who practised with the law firm that became Faskens. 
See Wilson, “Blackstock, George Tate.” (Image provided by Sufei Xu, Infoexpress 
Librarian and Access Services Coordinator at the Bora Laskin Law Library.)
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from the company which described the system as a way to get a “working 
library” at a moderate price. This advertisement appeared among others 
for things that were useful to lawyers such as legal blanks, typewriters, 
and fireproof safes.27 The first volume in the series (Smith on Master and 
Servant) was issued on 1 December 1886.
The Canada Law Journal listed the books in the series to date, de-
scribing the “prices [as] so absurdly low, as to enable even every student 
who enters an office to secure a good law library by the time he is ready 
to begin practicing.”28 A month later, in May 1887, it stated, “We presume 
most of our readers are subscribers to this series by this time. If not they 
had better begin at once.”29 A South African law journal reprinting of the 
Canada Law Journal note demonstrates that the series was marketed be-
yond North America.30 
British commentators (predictably) frowned upon this system of “ab-
sorbing the brains of English law authors without paying [them] a penny.”31 
Editors of the Canada Law Journal objected to the use of the term “pirat-
ed” in connection with the Blackstone Text Book series, pointing out that 
it was legally permissible to reprint in places where the copyright did not 
extend.32 Some called for an international law of copyright.33 Meanwhile 
the Railway and Corporation Law Journal reported that the series (5,738 
printed pages to date in early 1888) “met the approval of a large class of 
American lawyers” grateful for these “English treatises of exceptional ex-
cellence and value.”34 The reviewer did, however, note that the encourage-
ment and commendation of the series left aside “the question of piracy.”35 
Such reprints were very common in the United States because they were so 
much cheaper than the originals.36 There was no American copyright pro-
tection for foreign authors.37 One estimate put the price at about 1/10 the 
cost of imported versions of these books.38 Editions ranged from straight 
reprints to those that involved an editor, who would be paid for adding 
American notes and cases.39 
The editor, who would have been hired and paid for this express 
purpose by the Blackstone Publishing Company, was a lawyer named 
William M. Lacy of the Philadelphia Bar.40 Kent’s work was “a perennial 
bestseller” and so it made sense for the Blackstone Publishing Company 
to want to reissue it.41 However, Kent’s Commentaries were a domestic, 
not a foreign work. 
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Perhaps this is why, when the Text Book series edition appeared in 
1889, it earned the Blackstone Publishing Company the accolade that it 
was “revolutionizing the law book business.”42 The practice of hiring an 
in-house editor who would be paid a fixed fee for their work and then 
reproducing “unauthorized,” but just-as-good and much cheaper editions, 
was a winning strategy for foreign books. Could it also be used for domes-
tic ones? Were a new editor’s additions and changes to the notes enough to 
protect the Text Book edition from infringing the copyright Kent’s heirs 
or publishers of the Commentaries held inside the United States? What did 
Kent himself have to say about the matter?
In his Commentaries, Kent wrote quite extensively about the “original 
acquisition, by intellectual labour” (in the same part coincidentally where 
he discussed “original acquisition, by occupancy”) and specifically copy-
right.43 He did not discuss the point about editors’ notes in particular, at 
least not initially. He did write that “[a] copyright may exist in part of a 
work, without having an exclusive right to the whole,” words that could 
be interpreted to give an editor protection.44 In the second edition (1832), 
Kent discussed amendments made to the Copyright Act in 1831, which 
extended protection from fourteen to twenty-eight years with a possible 
renewal for another fourteen years.45 Unlike the fourteen-year renewal 
provided under the 1790 act, an author no longer needed to be alive to 
renew. Noah Webster, the chief architect of the 1831 act, secured the re-
newal right for the widow and children of the author.46 Kent emphasized 
the “personal benefit” this change in the law bestowed on the author’s wife 
and children, and their “entitlement.”47 Ironically, however, it was the fifth 
edition of his text, published in 1844, shortly before he died, that intro-
duced a note, relying on the famous copyright dispute between reporters 
for the United States Supreme Court Wheaton v. Peters (1832), that stated 
“[a]n editor may have a copyright in his own marginal notes.”48 
Kent died in 1847. He had re-registered the copyright twice, in 1832 
(six years after the initial registration on 25 November 1826 and one year 
after the law changed in 1831) and 1840 (fourteen years after the initial 
registration). William Kent re-registered the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th editions 
in 1848, 1851, 1854, and 1858, the year the publisher changed to Little, 
Brown.49 William was still the name on the copyright on the 10th edition 
in 1860.50 However, the 11th edition in 1866, which featured a new editor, 
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one George Comstock, changed to “Mrs. William Kent” (presumably 
William’s widow). The 12th and 13th editions in 1873 and 1884 reverted 
back to “James Kent” (edited by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Charles 
Barnes, respectively) with the last, 14th edition (edited by John Gould) 
naming the copyright registrant as “Estate of James Kent.”51
How would the law have treated these registrations if they had been 
contested, and exactly whose interests in what text would they have pro-
tected? Well, twenty-eight years after Kent’s original registration in 1826 
would bring the protection to 1854, which, when renewed by his heirs for 
another fourteen years, would have extended the protection until 1868, 
only ten years after the publisher changed from Kent’s son to Little, Brown. 
Yet Little, Brown carried on for almost thirty more years, until 1896, with 
no direct competitors, at least until the Blackstone Publishing Company 
came along.52 
Little, Brown might have argued against any such interlopers that 
each new edition restarted the forty-two year clock, especially if signifi-
cant enough changes were made by the editor. In the 12th edition, in his 
summary of the 1870 congressional consolidation of the copyright stat-
utes, Holmes noted that “[t]he subject of a book need not be new, nor the 
materials original, in order to entitle an author to copyright, provided he 
has made a new arrangement and combination of materials.”53 But were 
new notes, even those as elegant as Holmes’s, really “a new arrangement 
and combination of materials”? Holmes himself seemed to understand 
that, however great he might become and however important his work on 
the edition was to him, “the owners of the copyright” were Kent’s heirs 
and the estate.54 
Acknowledging in his treatise on intellectual property that new edi-
tions “present questions of extreme nicety and great difficulty in deter-
mining whether this is a basis for a new copyright,” Eaton Drone did think 
there was a “general rule,” namely,
that each successive edition, which is substantially different 
from the preceding ones, or which contains new matter of 
substantial amount or value, becomes entitled to copyright 
as a new work. It is immaterial whether the new edition is 
Angela Fernandez90
produced by condensing, expanding, correcting, rewriting, 
or otherwise altering the original, or by adding notes, cita-
tions, &c.55
The question, as Drone put it, was whether the work was “substantially dif-
ferent.”56 It seems pretty clear that none of the texts of Kent’s Commentaries 
would have been considered different enough to be the basis for an entirely 
new copyright. The notes, even Kent’s, did not change the text that much. 
It was still Kent’s work. If the copyright on the original text and notes had 
expired, then it was fair game. Drone wrote that “anyone may revise or 
annotate and republish a book not protected by copyright, and obtain a 
valid copyright for the new edition,”57 although “the new copyright, as a 
general rule, will cover only what is new.”58 The Text Book Series edition 
had a different publisher with a different editor and its own notes. For 
example, Lacy did not include the note, which appeared in the 5th through 
14th editions, about the possibility that an editor could hold a copyright 
in his own marginal notes (the note with the Wheaton v. Peters citation). 
The copyright on Kent’s main text and notes had likely expired. The law 
is not very clear, but we probably can safely say that new notes by other 
editors did not extend the copyright on the original material and its notes 
because they did not make the text different enough. Given Drone’s views, 
it is possible that a court might have found that the Blackstone Publishing 
Company’s copyright only extended to protect Lacy’s new notes. At the 
end of the day, even if the notes were valuable and distinctive enough to 
be protected, what would they be without the text they commented upon? 
That out-of-copyright text would have to accompany the new materi-
al in order for it to make any sense, whether published by Little Brown, 
Blackstone Publishing, or someone else. 
When Lacy’s edition appeared, the Virginia Law Journal announced 
that the volumes would be in “the usual style” of the Blackstone Publishing 
Company Text Book series, namely, “well printed and cheap.”59 After vol-
ume one, volumes two, three, and four would follow, one a month.60 Not 
everyone was happy about this, specifically Little, Brown. The American 
Law Review, published by Little, Brown, charged that the Text Book Series 
edition was not as good in terms of print and paper as the Little, Brown 
edition.61 This review also reported that Kent’s heirs were willing to offer 
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Figure 6.2 Title page of James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, edited by 
William M. Lacy, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Blackstone Publishing Company, 1889) from 
the same copy identified in Figure 6.1. (Image provided by Sufei Xu, Infoexpress 
Librarian and Access Services Coordinator at the Bora Laskin Law Library.)
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the 13th edition, “retain[ing] the valuable notes of Judge Holmes,” in “Law 
Sheep,” for $1262—nice, but subscribers to the Blackstone series obtained 
eight more books throughout the year for their $15. The claim about 
problems with the print and paper did not appear in other reviews. The 
Green Bag said “type and paper are satisfactory in every respect.”63 And 
the Legal News said it was “on good paper.”64 However, the Railway and 
Corporation Law Journal did note that it fell “below the high standard 
of Mr. Justice Holmes’ elegant edition.”65 And the Central Law Journal 
described the leatherette binding as “very unsatisfactory.”66 The Canada 
Law Journal showed no hesitation endorsing the volumes, which it said 
were “of considerable interest and value to Canadians.”67 The review in 
the Railway and Corporation Law Journal, when volumes 2 through 4 ap-
peared, pretty much sums up the situation. First, Lacy’s edition “of course 
suffers in comparison with the elegant edition of Judge Holmes.”68 And, 
second, although it was “well printed, on good paper,” it did need to be 
better bound, which when done would still keep the price lower than the 
set from Little, Brown.
Important to note here is the wider context of books being offered using 
the “subscription method.” Michael Hoeflich explains that this was a com-
mon and important publishing scheme in nineteenth-century America.69 
It was the way the first American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
was sold in the late eighteenth century.70 “Forced” or guaranteed sales 
were a way, as Hoeflich puts it, to offer “substantial risk reduction to 
printers and booksellers and often substantial price savings to buyers.”71 
Philadelphia was an old player in the book publishing and book printing 
trade.72 Hoeflich identifies the most important and longest-lived law sub-
scription publishing scheme in antebellum America as “The Law Library” 
initiated by John S. Littel of Philadelphia in 1833.73 Subscribers were asked 
to pay $10 a year for one book a month.74 It ran for twenty-six years and 
reprinted more than one hundred English legal texts.75 It would have been 
a model for the Blackstone Publishing Company’s Text Book Series.
In terms of understanding legal publishing and law-book habits, 
Hoeflich has emphasized “the importance of the mundane necessities of 
life without which high theory can come to nothing. . . . [G]reat doctrinal 
developments in the law may be advanced or impeded by nothing more 
glamorous than a decent postal route.”76 Decent postal routes and cheap 
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editions are not the things of grand theory, but they did determine what 
editions of what books lawyers in the nineteenth century had access to, 
and were using, at any particular time and place; they also influenced 
which ideas lawyers would formulate. The fact that the Text Book edi-
tion of this volume of Kent’s Commentaries cost $1.25 is highly signifi-
cant and provides pretty much all the explanation one needs in order to 
understand why Ritchie was using it, especially when there was scarcely 
any difference in quality between it and the authorized edition, with the 
exception of notes. However fancy a lawyer Ritchie was, $1.25 is pretty 
difficult to argue with. And it might be that differences over something 
rather esoteric like the authorship of the notes was less meaningful the 
further away one was from Boston, the stomping grounds for Holmes and 
his elite Brahmin community.77 
We do not know where or how Ritchie acquired his copy of the Text 
Book series edition of Kent’s Commentaries. However, Ritchie’s use of the 
book did not necessarily mean that he subscribed to the whole series, as 
it was common practice for local book agents to obtain multiple copies as 
subscribers, which they would offer for resale.78 Ritchie might have ob-
tained it as a solitary set or even a stand-alone volume from a book shop 
or law book agent in Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, or New York at any 
point between 1889 (when it was published) and 1896 (when he used it in 
Halifax for his factum in the Gerring).
The fact that Ritchie was located in British North America, specif-
ically Halifax, meant that he would have been part of a legal culture that 
long benefited from pirated texts from the United States, whether the au-
thors were English or American. The Canada Law Journal, at least, con-
sistently showed no hesitation in touting the strengths of the Text Book 
Series, including its reproduction of English works. Belonging to this cul-
ture would have meant Ritchie had little concern about using an allegedly 
“pirated” edition, which, once shipping costs were taken into considera-
tion and any mark-up from resale was added, likely cost him more than 
the bargain basement price of $1.25. He probably would not have been 
thinking in terms of “piracy” at all, being very used to editions that were 
straight reprints, as well as those with variations that ranged from slight 
to significant, especially for legal texts where updates were required given 
changes in the law.
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Little, Brown issued the last edition of the Commentaries in 1896, 
highlighting its key strength and competitive advantage, namely, that it 
had been edited by Holmes.79 The 13th edition in 1884 had not included 
Holmes’ name, suggesting that experience with the Blackstone Publishing 
Company edition in 1889 spurred Kent’s heirs and Little, Brown on to 
competitive action.80 The 14th edition only listed the copyrights going back 
to the Holmes 12th edition, perhaps to dissuade anyone who could count to 
forty-two from wondering how, when the initial registration by Kent was 
in 1826, the heirs could still claim to be in possession of the copyright in 
1896. Yet all of this skirmishing appears to have been end-of-life activity, 
as the 14th edition was the last edition of Kent’s Commentaries that anyone 
published. The Blackstone Publishing Company’s edition in 1889 also ap-
pears to have been its last imprint.81 
The 1891 International Copyright Act (or Chace Act) gave some copy-
right protection to non-US authors so long as the work was manufactured 
on US soil.82 The express permission to reproduce the works of foreign 
authors that had existed in US law until this time was finally removed.83 
This meant that the Blackstone Publishing Company could no longer 
boldly republish British works. Yet domestic works were also legally risky, 
since, as we have seen, uncertainties existed over what was or was not 
a substantially different or substantially similar work that might either 
entitle a publisher to a new copyright or render them in violation of an-
other’s copyright. Authors’ heirs and estates (and their lawyers) could be 
keen to argue over copyright ownership issues, especially for famous law 
books (as was evident from the dueling court reporters in Wheaton v. 
Peters). American judges and juries were likely to be more sympathetic to 
American authors than to British ones, should legal contests arise. All of 
these factors would have created a hostile environment for the Blackstone 
Publishing Company to continue doing in the 1890s what it had been do-
ing in the 1880s.
As for Kent’s Commentaries, perhaps the substantially cheaper (and 
probably still available) Text Book Series absorbed the extant market of 
readers for such a text at home and abroad, and Little, Brown simply gave 
up on making money out of it. Moreover, the size of the market for that 
particular text would have been shrinking, as Kent’s style of cosmopolitan 
learning (drawing on natural law, Roman law, and civil law) was on the 
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wane in the United States and was coming to an end, at least in Upper 
Canada, by the 1890s.84 This feature—namely, the Roman and civilian 
orientation to the old question of how one acquires possession in a wild 
animal—more than any other explains why the Gerring did not experi-
ence the uptake one might have expected in the twentieth century, at least 
in Ontario, despite the fact that it did become a leading case on the defin-
ition of “fishing” in Canada under the Fisheries Act.85 However, that is a 
story for another day.86
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Empire’s Law: Archives and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council
Catharine MacMillan
Canada, as an independent political nation, was largely a product of evo-
lution, rather than revolution, from its British colonial origins. Nowhere is 
the nature of this evolutionary process clearer than in the development of 
Canadian law and legal institutions. While the Dominion created by the 
1867 British North America Act1 soon had its own Supreme Court sitting in 
Ottawa, the final appellate court was the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council sitting in London, England. As the British constitutional theorist 
A.V. Dicey drily observed, the Judicial Committee was the “true Supreme 
Court of the Dominion.”2 While Canadian scholars have long studied the 
decisions of the Judicial Committee in relation to the Canadian consti-
tutional structure, legal historians have examined the role of the Judicial 
Committee in relation to particular cases. However, there has been little 
systematic study of the broader impact of the Judicial Committee on 
the development of Canadian law beyond constitutional law. This fits 
into what could be seen as an even broader pattern of neglect, for there 
has been little detailed consideration of the functioning of the Judicial 
Committee as a whole.3 There are many reasons for this, a prominent one 
being the physical disconnection between prospective scholars (generally 
located outside London) and the historical records (generally located in 
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London) which would form the basis for their study. This chapter attempts 
to bridge this disconnection by describing the records available in London 
and shedding light on how they may be approached from a distance. It 
presents an explanation of what the Judicial Committee was (and to some 
extent still is), how it functioned, and where scholars can locate its records 
in public archives in London. As will become apparent, these records are 
important for a range of different research projects: while some may be in-
terested in the functioning of the Judicial Committee, which ran as a form 
of global court, others will be interested in how the Judicial Committee 
shaped the law of particular jurisdictions. The records also contain ma-
terial of use to political, social, economic, and cultural historians.
What was the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council?
While the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee is originally derived from 
medieval custom with the Curia Regis (the court of the king’s counsellors 
who did the business of state of whatever kind), the Judicial Committee 
was created in the modern period by the Judicial Committee Act, 1833.4 
That this fount of colonial justice grew from an ancient crown preroga-
tive is only one of the many oddities of the Judicial Committee. The 1833 
Act came about as a result of the work of the reforming Whig Henry 
Brougham as a part of his much more wide-ranging plans in 1828 to re-
form the administration of justice. By that point the Judicial Committee 
was struggling to make its way through the growing numbers of colonial 
appeals. This growth in numbers was exacerbated by imperial expansion, 
which produced a greater and increasing range of legal systems, both 
European and non-European, which required adjudication—and also only 
a modicum of suitable legal talent in London to decide these appeals.5 The 
Judicial Committee was given appellate jurisdiction over all of the col-
onies in the British Empire, along with consular courts and protectorates. 
It was, in short, the world’s first global court. It adjudicated these appeals 
according to the legal system of the jurisdiction from which the appeal 
came, a development that gave it a unique diversity in its jurisprudence. 
The judges of this court were privy counsellors; in 1871 legislation allowed 
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the appointment of two former Indian judges and two former judges of 
English superior courts.6 The 1871 Act was designed to overcome the 
backlog of Indian appeals. Indian appeals presented their own complexity 
in that they were decided according to the legal system of the litigant. In 
1876 the Appellate Jurisdiction Act authorized the appointment of the first 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and, for the first time, requirements for legal 
qualifications were put in place.7 The Judicial Committee Amendment Act, 
1895 permitted a select group of judges from dominions and colonies to 
sit as members of the Judicial Committee8: eventually Canada sent more 
judges than did any other colony or dominion. In addition to what was re-
ferred to as Indian and colonial appeals, the Judicial Committee also had 
a domestic jurisdiction. As envisioned by Brougham, this encompassed 
ecclesiastical cases, admiralty,9 and appeals from the Prize Court. To 
Brougham’s vision was added (until 1907) the power to extend the life of a 
patent, a more limited role in copyright, and appeals under the Endowed 
Schools Amendment Act, 1873.10 In short, this was a court that heard cases 
without a natural home elsewhere in English courts. The homeless na-
ture of the Judicial Committee is also apparent in the fact that its imper-
ial functioning was largely ignored by English contemporaries. The little 
public awareness that arose in England regarding the court was in relation 
to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction which involved the Church of England. 
The contemporary view of the relative importance of ecclesiastical cases 
and the colonial litigants before the Judicial Committee is summed up by 
a “correspondent” to the satirical weekly Punch in a “letter” to the editor:
SIR,
Why can’t the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
stick to one thing at a time, and finish that off, instead of 
muddling themselves with all sorts of cases, running into 
one another?
For instance, I am fond of Ecclesiastical squabbles, and 
therefore I look with pleasure for the continuation of those 
Ritualistic Causes which were only partly heard.
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Well, Sir, say on Monday I read MARTIN v MA-
CHONOCHIE, it reaches an interesting point, and is to be 
continued in to-morrow’s paper. 
I take up to-morrow’s paper, and turn to Judicial 
Committee Privy Council. Instead of MARTIN v MA-
CHONOCHIE, I find EMILY ANNE v AMELIA JANE, 
which turns out to be not a question of people utterly at sea 
about lights, but of people not having lights at sea. After this 
is THE BOOMERSUND V ALLEN BAY, a dispute about a 
collision, unworthy of the Great Judicial Privy Council! The 
next day I again turn to the Judicial Committee and expect 
MARTIN v MACHONOCHIE or some such serious eccle-
siastical trial, which is more befitting the J.C.P.C.’s consid-
eration than the horrid swearings and counter-swearings 
of a lot of reckless mariners. No, Sir, I read that the Court 
was occupied in investigating whether RUMTUM JELLY 
BAG of Badhapoorlooror was right in appealing against a 
decision of a Judge in Calcutta who had directed a verdict 
in favour of BABOO BRODLECURT TUBAHOY BHOY. 
A thoroughly heathen case is allowed to put the Christian 
out of Court. Collisions are taken the next day, and BAR-
RY LULLABY LALLA RHOO has his turn next day. I be-
lieve they’ve forgotten all about the important Ecclesiastical 
questions awaiting their Lordships’ final decision.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant, 
A MAN 
(Clerk to St. Simon’s Without.)11
Since 1833, a number of procedural treatises have been written which 
have explained to contemporary lawyers the functioning of the Judicial 
Committee.12 Inevitably, these have become useful guides to the legal his-
torian. We are not concerned here with an examination of the different 
rules applicable to different jurisdictions as to how an appeal could be 
brought before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but with the 
procedural requirements applicable once the appeal was brought, for these 
tell us what can be found in the archives. The appellant and respondent 
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were required to agree upon a record, an inclusion of all that was neces-
sary to consider the disputed question before the Judicial Committee. This 
could include not only procedural records but also transcripts of lower 
court proceedings and judgments, copies of exhibits given in evidence in 
the lower courts, and documents filed before these lower courts. For some 
appeals copious materials went into the record. Each party also submitted 
a case as a pre-condition to the hearing of the appeal. The case was to 
consist of numbered paragraphs stating concisely the circumstances out 
of which the appeal arose, the contentions to be urged by the particular 
party, and the reasons for appeal. While similar to a Canadian factum, 
the case rarely contained extensive legal arguments or many references 
to law for this was not the practice of the Judicial Committee. The cases, 
of course, provide insight into how the litigants, or more aptly the liti-
gants’ counsel, saw their cases. It was the appellant’s responsibility to bind 
together, “in cloth or half leather,” ten copies13 of both parties’ cases, the 
record, and any supplemental record for the use of the Judicial Committee 
at the hearing.14 It is undoubtedly the production of such a comparatively 
large number of copies of the cases and records which ensured the surviv-
al of so many of these into the twenty-first century.  
The records form a rich trove of information about each case.15 Few 
Canadian lawyers or political scientists are unaware that Canada’s consti-
tution is a “living tree” and that women are persons; the papers filed before 
the Judicial Committee provide a unique understanding of the arguments 
of counsel in the “Persons Case.”16 Taken as a whole, these records explain 
the workings of the Judicial Committee and its role in the development 
of Canadian law, both common law and civil law. The records give the 
best available knowledge of the workings of this global, imperial court. 
And the materials contained within the reports provide a rich source of 
information not easily available elsewhere for historians concerned with 
matters beyond legal history. Within the records of the proceedings, one 
finds copies of the sworn testimony of witnesses and the documentary ex-
hibits produced at trial, and these give insights into a huge range of areas: 
cultural and familial practices of birth, death, marriage, and inheritance. 
Corporate records provide information into the business and mercantile 
practices across the centuries and around the globe. Scientific reports 
and testimony furnish fascinating insights into the state of knowledge 
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employed in particular cases. That they are largely unstudied makes them 
all the more alluring. We turn now to consider where the records of the 
Judicial Committee can be found, both in their original sources and in 
online digitizations.
The London Records
A number of publicly accessible sources in London hold records from 
the Judicial Committee. Because our focus is on Canadian legal history, 
this chapter will consider the Indian and colonial appeals to the Judicial 
Committee. At the time of writing, none of these archives held a com-
plete set of the records available to the public. The records of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council were kept onsite at 12 Downing Street, 
where the Judicial Committee sat, as a part of its registry until the Judicial 
Committee was moved to the Middlesex Guildhall in 2009, the result 
of a wider program of constitutional and judicial reform in the United 
Kingdom. Since that time the records have been held in storage controlled 
by the Ministry of Justice; some of these records have been released to 
the National Archives in London, where they are available for research. 
While there are plans to transfer the entirety of the records to the National 
Archives, the time line for this transfer remains uncertain.
At present, the National Archives have only a small number of the 
total records available for public use, but these are unique because the 
Judicial Committee itself created them. The most significant of these re-
cords—the minutes of its proceedings between 1830 and 2005—became 
available in September 2016.17 These are an invaluable starting point for 
anyone concerned to gain an overview of the functioning of the Judicial 
Committee. The minutes contain a day-by-day record of when the Judicial 
Committee sat, the judges who made up the panels, the parties’ names, 
the origins of the cases, and the cases the panels heard. Announcements 
made to the Judicial Committee were also recorded and it is in this way 
that one learns of the appointment of new members to the panel, the death 
of previous members and counsel, the appointment of new registrars, new 
procedural announcements, and so forth. While there is much one would 
have liked to see in the minutes, such as the names of counsel, information 
that was only introduced well into the twentieth century, there is no other 
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overall record of such detail currently available. An index exists at the 
front of each volume listing appeals according to jurisdiction and, within 
each jurisdiction, in the chronological order by which each appeal or pe-
tition was first heard.
The National Archives also contain a record of the petitions brought 
to the Judicial Committee for leave to appeal since 1917. These petition 
books record a summary of the details of applications to process appeal 
actions. From these records one can ascertain the year of the petition, the 
identity of the petitioner, the respondent and their solicitors, the subject of 
the petition, and various related observations.
What was not available at the National Archives at the time of writ-
ing were the printed cases and records from the appeals to the Judicial 
Committee.18 The printed cases and records make up the materials filed 
by the parties in their presentation of the appeal. As noted earlier, they 
generally contain a wealth of material not readily available elsewhere and 
form a significant source of information not only for legal historians but 
also for economic, social, and political historians. While the broad over-
view of the proceedings before the Judicial Committee can be ascertained 
from the holdings at the National Archives, a detailed study of particular 
case papers and judgments currently needs to be undertaken in other ar-
chives. To undertake that study, the researcher needs to board the Tube 
and travel from leafy Kew in southwest suburbia to the bustle of Russell 
Square and Euston Road in central London.
Because multiple copies of cases had to be filed with the Judicial 
Committee’s registry, multiple copies continue to exist: another important 
archive for these records is the British Library on Euston Road in London. 
The British Library holds the printed cases of appellants and respondents 
from 1861–2009.19 Also included in these holdings are the judgments and 
associated orders in council, combined with the printed records of the 
proceedings in the courts in which the case originated. Privy Council 
Registers from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries can be consulted 
electronically from the Reading Rooms (but not yet online). The British 
Library also holds the records of the India Office and thus, the detailed 
background to the numerous Indian Appeals to the Judicial Committee. 
The Institute for Advanced Legal Studies on Russell Square—part of 
the University of London—holds a partial set of printed cases and related 
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materials filed by litigants between 1866 and 2008. These materials are to 
be found in its library. By a happy accident the founding of the Institute 
coincided with the end of Canadian appeals to the Judicial Committee in 
1949 and the Institute purchased a Canadian law library in London which 
was no longer needed by Canadians. The result is that the holdings of 
Canadian materials are particularly strong, including not only the materi-
als filed by litigants but also the treatises and legal authorities consulted 
by the Canadian barristers who travelled to London as they prepared to 
argue their cases. Intriguingly, the annotations within some of the printed 
cases appear to be those of the judges who heard the appeals, a matter 
which provides a unique insight into the basis of the resulting judgments.20
Online Resources
Few online sources of Judicial Committee material exist. A prominent 
exception, though, is the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies’ digitiza-
tion project. The Institute has digitized many of the materials it holds and 
made these available on the British and Irish Legal Information Institute 
(BAILLI).21 Thousands of searchable PDFs of case papers have thus been 
made available online. In addition, BAILLI contains a complete set of 
judgments for the Judicial Committee taken from the original records.22 
A number of online articles on the website explain the significance of the 
Institute’s records to the history of the Judicial Committee.
The Privy Council Papers, a research project undertaken by Dr. 
Nandini Chatterjee and Dr. Charlotte Smith, consists of the case papers 
for six cases decided between 1869 and 1939.23 Also included on their on-
line website is a catalogue of metadata for appeals decided between 1792 
and 1998. As well, the site comprises a number of significant research arti-
cles concerned with the Judicial Committee and its records.  
Various other websites offer smaller “snapshots” of portions of the re-
cords. These include the first fifty appeals from the East India Company 
Territories to the Privy Council (1679–1774).24 In addition, McQuarrie 
University has posted material pertaining to Australian appeals to the 
Judicial Committee between 1809 and 1850.25 Materials regarding the ap-
peals from the thirteen colonies which became the United States are avail-
able through the Ames Foundation at Harvard University.26 The website 
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also contains a wealth of information about the functioning of the Judicial 
Committee with regard to pre-revolutionary America.
The current state of online sources provides a useful and productive 
starting point for scholars interested in both the functioning of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council and the individual cases which appeared 
before the Judicial Committee. The high quality PDFs of documents avail-
able on BAILLI through the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies’ digitiza-
tion project are particularly significant. And there is every indication that 
the online sources will continue to expand in the next few years. For the 
impatient, though, the temptation of archival research in London beck-
ons. The records that await her will more than compensate for the length 
of the journey.
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Practising Law in the “Lawyerless” 
Colony of New France
Alexandra Havrylyshyn
For more than a century, historians have, to varying degrees, clung to the 
myth that there were no lawyers in New France. This chapter investigates 
that claim specifically as it applies to early Canada, or the French colony 
centering around the Saint Lawrence River Valley. The French monarchy 
laid claim to this geographic space between 1534, when Jacques Cartier 
first began exploring the Saint Lawrence River, to 1763, when King Louis 
XV ceded the colony of Canada to Britain as part of the Treaty of Paris to 
end the Seven Years’ War. Today, early Canada is known as the province 
of Québec. Although French speakers had also settled in the places we 
now call Maine, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, 
the French monarchy referred to that region as “Acadia,” to distinguish it 
from “Canada.” 
One of the first historians of the Canadian legal profession confidently 
declared in 1897 that under the French regime, “il n’y avait pas d’avo-
cats.”1 This historian, indeed, argued that the Canadian legal profession 
only began to exist with the transition to British rule in 1763.2 A recent 
study, published in 1997, dates the origin of the Québec Bar Association 
to 1779, and fails to explicitly reject the claim that there were no lawyers 
in New France.3 
The assertion that there were no lawyers in early Canada, however, 
rests on a misreading of primary sources. First, the myth depends upon a 
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narrow and anachronistic definition of the lawyer as a university-educated 
legal expert who belongs to a professional bar association. It is true that in 
1678, three members of the colony’s highest court, or Sovereign Council, 
reported that “in this country neither advocates, attorneys, nor practi-
tioners are to be found.”4 Advocates (avocats), attorneys (procureurs), and 
practitioners (praticiens) might today all be known as lawyers, but in early 
Canada and in Ancien Régime France they constituted three distinct cat-
egories of professional legal representatives. Professional here means both 
experienced in and paid for one’s services. To clump advocates, attorneys, 
and practitioners all together into the modern Anglo-American category 
of “lawyer” obscures cultural and historical differences. Indeed, one goal 
set in this chapter is to elaborate on the meanings of these terms with-
in their socio-historical context and ensure that we impose neither early 
modern English nor modern categories of legal practice.5
To understand what the members of the Québec Sovereign Council 
meant by the categories of advocate, attorney, and practitioner, I first con-
sult Ancien Régime French legal dictionaries. University-educated advo-
cates ranked above formally-trained attorneys, who in turn ranked above 
informally-trained legal practitioners. Appreciating the variety of legal 
representatives in Ancien Régime France expands the definition of “law-
yer,” thereby helping to dispel the myth that there were no lawyers in New 
France. Just as historians have identified many legalities in colonial North 
America, we can identify many modalities of legal representation in New 
France, where a mixture of paid and unpaid, trained and untrained in-
dividuals did the work of representing people in court.6 This is not to say 
that the categories of advocate, attorney, and practitioner functioned the 
same way on the books as they did on the ground, or that they operated 
in Canada the same way as they did in France. Disentangling these terms, 
however, allows us to begin to describe more precisely the hierarchy of 
legal representation in the French colony of Canada.
The myth that there were no lawyers in New France further springs 
from a misreading of the Sovereign Councillors’ remark, in 1678, that “it 
is even to the advantage of the colony not to allow any [advocates, attor-
neys, or practitioners].”7 Historians have wrongly extrapolated from these 
words that the administration of New France officially banned French 
lawyers from immigrating to the colony of Canada. However, the primary 
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source merely states a policy recommendation, and should not be taken 
as evidence of a policy that was actually implemented. The councillors 
reasoned that the colony would be better off without these various kinds of 
Ancien Régime legal representatives, not only because of the inexperience 
of judges and process-servers, but also because of the difficulty of travel-
ling during winter months. As in other colonial spaces, this suggests that 
judges travelled from place to place to perform their duties.8 Furthermore, 
the councillors described the colonial inhabitants as both ignorant and 
impoverished.9 Greedy lawyers, the councillors insinuated, could easily 
persuade colonial inhabitants to undertake frivolous lawsuits, and this 
would increase the cost of justice in a colony whose administrative re-
sources were already scarce.10
In the end, the councillors never did ban advocates, attorneys, or prac-
titioners from the colony.11 Thus Canada differs from French Caribbean 
colonies such as Martinique and Saint Domingue, where royal ordinances 
and colonial decrees explicitly prohibited advocates and attorneys from 
even making the transatlantic journey.12 In fact, Canadian authorities 
explicitly recognized the profession of the attorney in 1693 and 1732.13 
Furthermore, the claim that there were no lawyers in New France fails 
to account for change over time. Although advocates, attorneys, and 
practitioners may have been scarce or even absent in 1678, this changed 
with time. By 1740, one-third of claimants hired someone who identified 
himself as an attorney or legal practitioner to represent them before the 
Québec Provost Court.14 
This chapter, finally, dispels the myth that there were no lawyers in 
New France by looking beyond the official regime of licensing that oper-
ated in France, and instead at what individuals actually did in their com-
munities. While emerging literature on the legal profession sheds light on 
notaries and attorneys, I focus on the Ancien Régime’s lowest-ranking 
representatives: legal practitioners (praticiens de droit).15 Trial records, no-
tarial records, and sacramental records reveal that at least seventy-six men 
in early Canada identified as professional, but informally-trained legal 
practitioners before 1764, the first full year of British rule. Although these 
lowest-ranking representatives lacked formal training, they professed pro-
ficiency in legal practice and were paid for their services. The names of 
these seventy-six men present further evidence weighing against the claim 
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that lawyers emerged in Canada only with the British Regime. Perhaps the 
history of early Canadian legal practitioners has been underwritten be-
cause many did not settle or die in the colony. Telling their full life stories 
will require conducting research beyond Canada, whether in the former 
French Empire or elsewhere. Attorneys and legal practitioners are worth 
studying because they facilitated access to justice for the ordinary people 
of early Canada.
The Hierarchy of Ancien Régime Legal 
Representatives
We must first seek to understand what the Sovereign Council members 
meant when they referred to the three categories of legal representatives: 
barristers, attorneys, and practitioners. The Ancien Régime lexicography 
(or dictionary-writing) movement provides an introduction to this ques-
tion.16 Precursors to encyclopedias, Ancien Régime dictionaries described 
the fundamental elements of various fields of study.17 Although more 
encyclopedic than modern dictionaries, Ancien Régime dictionaries are 
by no means exhaustive.18 Other sources, such as Jean Imbert’s Institutes 
de practique en matiere civile et criminelle (1547), Laurent Bouchel’s 
Bibliothéque [sic] ou Thrésor du droict français (1615), and Pierre Jacques 
Brillon’s Dictionnaire des arrests, ou Jurisprudence des Parlemens de 
France, et autres tribunaux (1711), more closely resemble textbooks, pro-
viding more comprehensive explorations of Ancien Régime jurisprudence 
and legal practice.19 Lexicographers, in contrast, intended their works 
either as starting points for novices, or as reference manuals for experts. 
Claude-Joseph de Ferrière, for instance, described his dictionary as a “key 
to law and to practice.”20 His dictionary, therefore, offers an entry point 
into historical debates surrounding the practice of law in early Canada. 
This is not to say that dictionaries should be viewed uncritically. 
Lexicographers claimed to describe rather than to prescribe; to explain 
rather than critique; to inform rather than reform.21 However, it is in their 
descriptions of the way “the world was” that we can see their biases and, in 
turn, learn much about the hierarchy of legal representatives in the Ancien 
Régime. The subjectivities of dictionaries make them rich historical 
1198 | Practising Law in the “Lawyerless” Colony of New France
sources—whether for understanding society, norms, or legal institutions 
and procedures.22 
I analyze three dictionaries, all of which were widely circulated and 
frequently reprinted. Containing entries on law as well as many other 
fields of study, Le Dictionnaire universel françois et latin covers the wid-
est breadth of material. Ten editions printed between 1704 and 1771 re-
flect the dictionary’s popularity as a general reference source.23 Although 
this dictionary reached the most general audience, it still excluded the 
largely illiterate public. Because this dictionary synthesized three pre-
decessors, Ancien Régime historians prefer it to other general dictionar-
ies.24 It emerged out of a fraught political conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants. When the dictionary’s first editor, Abbot Antoine Furetière, 
died, the Protestant Henri Basnage de Bauval revised the religious entries 
and republished the dictionary in the Netherlands. Incensed by the chan-
ges, certain French Jesuits sought to reclaim the dictionary, restoring the 
religious entries to fall back in line with Catholicism. For the most part 
Jesuit authors retained anonymity, but historians know that Robert Simon 
and Etienne Souciet took leading roles in the first and second editions, re-
spectively. Many laypeople also collaborated.25 The first two editions of the 
dictionary were published in the French town of Trévoux, in the province 
of Ain, near Lyon.26 The dictionary thus became colloquially known as the 
Dictionnaire de Trévoux and is the only dictionary of the period to bear 
the name of a place.27 This dictionary reveals how lettered non-specialists 
understood the hierarchy of Ancien Régime legal representatives.
A more specialized legal dictionary, Claude-Joseph de Ferrière’s 
Dictionnaire de droit et de pratique was published eleven times between 
1734 and 1787.28 The son of an advocate in the Parlement of Paris, Claude-
Joseph was a jurist and legal scholar.29 From such a highly-educated mem-
ber of the legal profession, we might expect a bias against lower-ranking 
members. Intending a more specialized audience than did the authors of 
the Trévoux dictionary, de Ferrière wrote for both the law student and 
the seasoned advocate.30 When de Ferrière died in 1747, Antoine-Gaspard 
Boucher d’Argis took over editing duties. D’Argis also collaborated with 
the century’s two most famous encyclopedists, Denis Diderot and Jean 
le Rond d’Alembert, on over four thousand entries concerning jurispru-
dence. The dictionary attained an even more encyclopedic quality.31 
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Finally, I consult one dictionary that postdates the French regime in 
Canada, Joseph-Nicolas Guyot’s Répertoire universel et raisonné de juris-
prudence civile, criminelle, canonique et bénéficiale, which was first pub-
lished between 1775 and 1783 and republished in 1784–85. Like Boucher 
d’Argis, Guyot participated in the encyclopedia movement, for instance 
publishing the Encyclopédie méthodique in 1782. Although published af-
ter the British Conquest, the dictionary still signals an Ancien Régime 
barrister’s subjective views of attorneys and practitioners, as Guyot be-
came a barrister in 1748 and gained his professional experience during the 
Ancien Régime period.32
When seeking to understand the rise of the early Canadian legal 
profession, it makes most sense to consult the editions that appeared as 
closely as possible to 1740, when the number of litigants who hired pro-
fessionals to represent them at the Québec Provost Court rose to one in 
three.33 Therefore, I rely on the fifth edition of the Dictionnaire de Trévoux 
(1740), the third edition of de Ferrière’s Dictionnaire de droit et de pra-
tique (1749), and the first edition of Guyot’s Répertoire universel et raisonné 
(1775–1783).34 
In the highly stratified society of France during the Ancien Régime 
France, the practice of law was a very attractive—if not always success-
ful—means of social mobility. Of course, in an absolutist regime, the king 
claimed a position at the very top of society’s pyramid-like structure. He 
granted privileges, or private legal agreements, to various subjects. Justice 
emanated from him; judges and magistrates merely administered justice 
in his name. Below judges and magistrates, the highest-ranking legal rep-
resentatives (advocates) could hope to gain honour, dignity, and personal 
nobility as a result of their profession.35 Attorneys occupied the next rank 
down, enjoying comparatively less honour and dignity.36 Practitioners 
enjoyed very little status, thus occupying the bottom rung of the hier-
archy.37 A close reading of the dictionaries demonstrates that as we move 
down the status ladder, levels of education, social prestige, and political 
power diminish. 
Advocates studied law (droit) at university. De Ferrière writes, “in or-
der to become an Advocate, one must have obtained a Bachelor’s degree 
in Letters and a License in a Faculty of Law.”38 In response to corrupt law 
faculties that sold licenses to students, Parisian advocates in 1693 further 
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required that any aspiring advocate complete an apprenticeship (stage) of 
two years and obtain the approval of six senior advocates before beginning 
legal practice.39
Following the medieval Bologna law school model, French universi-
ties initially taught only Roman and canon law.40 This began to change 
with the Edict of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in April 1679, which required 
the appointment of professors specializing in French ordinances and cus-
toms. This edict required law students to complete five hours of training in 
French customs each week during the third year of study.41 
Among legal representatives, barristers claimed exclusive expertise in 
law, which the Dictionnaire de Trévoux defined as a “a principal of that 
which is just and unjust.”42 We might think of this as substantive, as op-
posed to procedural, law. Like English barristers, French advocates did not 
interact directly with clients.43 Rather, a prospective client first approached 
an attorney, who in turn consulted with an advocate for substantive legal 
advice if necessary.44 Advocates wrote legal briefs and made oral argu-
ments in court.45 They claimed the exclusive right to orally argue certain 
kinds of cases, such as appeals, civil requests, royal cases, and questions 
of the state.46
By operating in the domain of “high law,” in the language of Shelley 
Gavigan (chapter 10 of this volume), advocates enjoyed social prestige. 
The elite sub-stratum of the Third Estate, Parisian advocates were united 
in their desire to achieve upward social mobility through the practice of 
law.47 Ancien Régime lexicographers, similarly, esteemed individuals who 
had been educated at law schools. Guyot adulated the excellence of the 
“profession of the Advocate.” “In order to merit such a distinguished title,” 
he confidently declared, “one must have talents and qualities which do not 
at all belong to common men.”48 De Ferrière similarly praised barristers. 
He warned that young men should not pursue the demanding profession 
of the advocate unless they knew themselves to be full of genius, probity, 
and honesty.49
Throughout the Ancien Régime period, advocates successfully resisted 
venality, or the sale of public offices.50 In this way, advocates differed from 
attorneys, who needed to either purchase or inherit a venal office before 
being able to practice law.51 Under the venal system, the crown monetized 
the total value of each office. A buyer advanced a partial sum of money 
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to the king in exchange for an office, which was a form of immovable 
property that could be bequeathed, sold, or even rented out. Three main 
advantages accompanied the purchase of an office: 1) the right to perform 
specific governmental functions in the name of the king; 2) a promise by 
the king to make a payment of 1 percent to 12 percent of the value of the 
buyer’s initial investment if the office-holder ever chose to sell the office; 
and 3) privileges such as tax exemptions, honour, and dignity. The latter, 
in particular, led to elevated social status.52
Integral to the Ancien Régime socio-economic system, venality was 
well-established by the sixteenth century.53 The number of offices for sale 
ballooned under the reign of King Louis XIV, as the king found himself 
embroiled in war and desperate for revenue.54 Near the end of the eight-
eenth century, the price of offices skyrocketed.55 Although revolutionaries 
abolished offices in 1789, the French state today continues to sell some 
public offices, such as those of notary and process-server.56 Ancien Régime 
French aristocrats abhorred venality since it jeopardized a social system 
in which blood and birth determined status.57 Historians today appreci-
ate the opportunities for social mobility that venality offered to those not 
lucky enough to be born into the nobility.58 As royal officers, neverthe-
less, attorneys had a duty to represent the French state and were subject 
to discipline if they failed to do so. The sale of offices to individuals who 
became attorneys meant they never could enjoy the degree of political au-
tonomy that advocates did.59
In a country with a highly censored press, furthermore, legal briefs 
(mémoires and factums) produced by advocates were one of the few forms 
of printed material to evade censorship laws.60 Advocates not only submit-
ted briefs to the court but circulated them widely, contributing to the birth 
of a public sphere where opposition to monarchical absolutism could be 
challenged. High-profile lawsuits or causes célèbres soon became as popu-
lar as novels.61 In this way, law courts “were the only part of a free people’s 
education furnished by the old regime.”62 Beginning in 1730, advocates 
increasingly saw themselves as the spokespersons of the public, becom-
ing the vanguard of reform in the two decades leading up to the French 
Revolution.63
While the three lexicographers explained the superior status of ad-
vocates, they made clear that attorneys did not enjoy the same prestige.64 
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Claire Dolan finds in her study of attorneys in the South of France that 
like advocates, this class of legal representatives used their legal practice 
as a source of economic and social mobility.65 However, attorneys occu-
pied significantly lower social positions than advocates. A myriad of ritual 
acts reflected this professional distinction. For instance, legal procedure 
required attorneys to bend one knee in court while a barrister was speak-
ing.66 An edict of 1549 forbade wives of attorneys from wearing the velvet 
hoods that signified the status of an advocate’s wife.67 Although an attor-
ney traditionally wore a black robe to distinguish himself from laypeople, 
he tended to own only one. Extremely worn, it had often been passed down 
from office-holder to office-holder.68
Unlike an advocate, an attorney had not necessarily studied law at a 
university. Guyot explained that “because of his rank, the attorney is not 
at all obliged to study law.”69 Nevertheless, the state required a profession-
al attorney to be at least twenty-five years old and to have trained with 
a more senior professional attorney for at least ten years.70 An aspiring 
attorney could therefore begin his training at the age of fifteen. 
While an advocate specialized in law, an attorney specialized in prac-
tice. Ancien Régime lexicographers distinguished law (droit) from legal 
practice (pratique). The title of Claude-Joseph de Ferrière’s Dictionnaire 
de droit et de pratique implies this distinction, as does the following 
definition:
PRACTICE. In Palace terms, the science of preparing a 
trial according to the forms prescribed by Ordinance, the 
Customs of the country, & relevant regulations. In this way 
[Practice] is opposed to Law. An attorney must know prac-
tice well, and a Barrister the law.71
With an emphasis on legal forms, this excerpt demonstrates that an attor-
ney specialized in legal procedure, while a barrister excelled in knowing 
legal substance or jurisprudence. 
De Ferrière, likewise, described attorneys as “masters of procedure,” 
tasked with guiding barristers on all the legal formalities that differed from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.72 Under a regulatory arrêt of the Parlement de 
Paris, the state forbade attorneys from making oral arguments in appeal 
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cases and other comparable cases of high law. Attorneys could only defend 
parties in civil cases where the legal question hinged more around fact and 
procedure than around jurisprudence.73 Similarly, the state forbade attor-
neys from arguing about the guilt or innocence of the accused in criminal 
trials.74 However, the state required attorneys to intervene if a procedural 
question arose during a criminal trial.75  
Some lexicographers derided attorneys as manipulative and conniv-
ing. For instance, Guyot wrote,
[T]he Advocate, who necessarily holds honour and public 
esteem in light of his work, would almost never make use 
of the chicaneries and subtleties characteristic of the At-
torney’s science. For their profit and for the ruin of their 
parties, Attorneys assiduously multiply acts and make trials 
last eternally.76
Of course, as an advocate Guyot had an interest in elevating his profes-
sional rank. But culturally, he was not alone in ridiculing attorneys for 
their purported chicanery, as the 1678 Sovereign Council quotation 
demonstrates. Guyot may have been trying to differentiate himself from 
members of other, purportedly dishonest, members of his profession. De 
Ferrière, likewise, warned that attorneys must remember their lower rank 
within the legal profession: “[An Attorney] must never forget that his 
function does not at all extend to that which belongs to Advocates. His 
share is ample enough that he should content himself with it.”77 
The lower rank of attorneys helps explain why early Canadian author-
ities ultimately tolerated the growth of the legal profession’s lower branch-
es.78 If they were simply paper-pushers, they would be unlikely to disrupt 
the colony’s order. Of course, even procedure is political, but more subtly 
so than substantive law. Perhaps it was precisely through masquerading 
as masters of procedure that attorneys proliferated, despite the regime’s 
initial antipathy towards them. In France, attorneys continued to buy and 
sell offices until the Revolution, at which time they refashioned themselves 
as avoués.79 
French categories illuminate the social and professional significance 
of the terms advocate, attorney, and practitioner, but these categories did 
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not apply precisely in Canada because the king prohibited the sale of venal 
offices in the colony. Nor could French office-holding attorneys import 
their offices (which were forms of immovable property) to the colony.80 It 
is not entirely clear what process replaced the purchase or importation of 
an attorney’s office. Perhaps attorneys and legal practitioners claimed their 
professional titles in much the same way that individuals in New France 
claimed noble status: by acting in a way that made their rank believable to 
the people around them. Perhaps, like the esquires (écuyers) and knights 
(chevaliers) who carried around folders of the various legal acts evincing 
their noble status, attorneys and practitioners clutched these valuable pa-
pers as they moved through their daily lives.81 
Since attorneys and practitioners in New France did not hold offices, 
the king did not pay them or hold them accountable for representing his 
interests. Rather, ordinary members of the public paid attorneys and prac-
titioners in New France to represent their interests.82 In this way, the col-
ony may have been a sort of laboratory for a new, liberal conception of the 
profession, based not on status or allegiance to a monarch, but on merit 
and performance in a market economy.83
In France, office-holding attorneys received pay from clients for their 
work, unless they chose to work without compensation for friends or 
family.84 Using a legal device called a procuration, clients and family mem-
bers could grant an attorney power to act on their behalf in all legal affairs, 
or only in one particular legal matter.85 The Dictionnaire de Trévoux ex-
plained that the procuration, “by which one gives charge to someone or 
something . . . makes it as valid, as if one were doing it in person.”86 A good 
translation for procuration, therefore, is power of attorney agreement.
Ordinary members of the public could also empower amateurs to act 
on their behalf, whether in courts of law or in commercial transactions. 
Lacking legal training, a one-time attorney was simply a person who, by 
virtue of a power of attorney agreement, acted on behalf of another, usual-
ly a friend or family member. Parties could orally agree on a power of 
attorney but often agreed in writing. A power of attorney could extend 
for an unlimited or a limited time period, whether the duration of a per-
son’s absence or of a particular legal dispute.87 Although not office-holding 
attorneys, ordinary members of the public who held power of attorney 
agreements performed legal work by representing others in legal disputes. 
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By looking beyond venal office-holding as a marker of legal representa-
tion, we can see that in the colony of New France, a mixture of paid and 
unpaid, trained and untrained individuals did the work of representing 
others at law. 
Ancien Régime lexicographers observed, perhaps with some surprise, 
that “even women” could act as attorneys.88 In the colonial setting of New 
France, power of attorney agreements were an early form of women’s 
empowerment.89 Following the Custom of Paris, the law in New France 
typically deprived a married woman of independent legal capacity, es-
sentially treating her as a minor. With a power of attorney agreement, 
however, a married woman could temporarily escape these limitations.90 
Exceptionally mobile, men from the town of Québec might sojourn for 
months or even years at a time. Men travelled east to Louisbourg and 
across the Atlantic Ocean to France, west to the fur trading Great Lakes 
region, or south to Louisiana and the French Caribbean. In such instan-
ces, men had the option to empower another person to act on their behalf 
in commerce and at law.91
For the period 1700 to 1765 in the town of Québec and its environs, 
265 power of attorney agreements with women survive.92  Procuratrices 
generally represented their husbands, but 20 percent represented their 
sons, brothers, or even fathers. On rare occasions, men entered into power 
of attorney agreements with women outside their families.93 Usually 
members of the bourgeoisie, procuratrices performed a variety of legal 
and commercial tasks, such as recovering debts, buying and selling real 
estate, executing wills, and (should it become necessary) representing the 
absentee in a dispute before a court of law.94 Although not paid directly, 
procuratrices benefited from power of attorney agreements, which in the 
patriarch’s absence allowed these women to control the family’s enter-
prise, worldly assets, and legal affairs.  
The lexicographer de Ferrière claimed that one-time attorneys were 
especially prevalent in the colonies, which he labeled “subaltern jurisdic-
tions.”95 Because they lacked formal legal training, one-time attorneys 
were less well-equipped than advocates to challenge the monarchy. This 
further explains why early Canadian authorities tolerated amateur attor-
neys while successfully preventing the growth of a vibrant community of 
advocates. 
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Legal practitioners occupied the lowest rank of the legal profession.96 
Unlike one-time attorneys, legal practitioners were trained, but informal-
ly. The Dictionnaire de Trévoux explained that a practitioner, “knows style 
and usage, the forms, procedures and regulations of the court [and] knows 
how to draft a contract, to prepare a trial for judgment.”97 De Ferrière and 
Guyot provided almost identical definitions. Through frequenting legal 
spaces, practitioners acquired enough familiarity with legal style, usage, 
procedure, forms, and regulations to claim professional legal knowledge.98 
Advocate-lexicographers deemed practitioners capable of preparing legal 
papers such as acts and summons.99 Practitioners faced no explicit re-
quirement to obtain a license or even train under another practitioner 
for a certain period of time. Many regulations forbade practitioners from 
signing civil requests and legal briefs. Barristers claimed exclusive owner-
ship over these duties.100 The law on the books forbade practitioners from 
acting at law in the name of clients.101 
Because of their lowly status, practitioners stood to gain from ven-
turing outside of continental France to its newly claimed colonies, where 
formally trained legal professionals were scarce. In general, the state ap-
pointed only highly-educated men as judges. Under the Ordinance of 
April 1667, practitioners could only step in to judge a case if a jurisdiction 
lacked both advocates and office-holding attorneys.102 As Miranda Spieler 
remarks, “under the monarchy the colonies were extensions of France in 
a legal sense but governed by protocols distinct from those that applied to 
domestic territory.”103 Advancing in the legal profession might therefore 
mean crossing the Atlantic Ocean. Far from the metropole with its rigid 
on-the-books distinctions among advocates, attorneys, and practitioners, 
early Canada provided some men with opportunities to achieve upward 
social mobility through the practice of law.
Early Canadian Legal Practitioners
Legal professionals in colonial Canada indeed followed a different proto-
col from that of France. Advocates occasionally ventured to the colony to 
assume senior judicial positions, but for the most part they did not repre-
sent clients, either by writing legal briefs or orally arguing cases.104 Louis-
Guillaume Verrier, for instance, studied law in Paris, worked as a barrister 
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in the Parlement of Paris beginning in 1712, and left for Canada in 1728 
when an opportunity arose to join the Superior Council.105 As one of the 
only advocates in the colony, Verrier offered free lectures on the basics of 
French jurisprudence to colonial officials and members of the Superior 
Council, who did not necessarily possess a deep knowledge of the law.106 
Québec archives provide a promising means to learn much more about 
legal practitioners. Not only is this the group of Ancien Régime legal rep-
resentatives that historians understand least well, but they are also a more 
discrete group than attorneys. Whereas a search for the word procureur 
will mix in instances of the king’s attorney, the fiscal attorney, commercial 
attorneys, and one-time attorneys, the term praticien de droit clearly refers 
to a professional legal representative. First, Pistard digitally catalogues re-
cords held in the Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec (“BAnQ”). 
First-instance tribunals exercising jurisdiction over towns and seigneuries 
created records that eventually ended up in BAnQ’s TL group. The rec-
ords of  appellate tribunals are found in BAnQ’s TP group. During a given 
legal proceeding, court clerks collected petitions and summons. If a case 
reached the trial stage, they transcribed oral arguments and testimony. 
Generally, judges did not issue reasoned judgments but rather ordinances 
and decrees. In an absolutist regime, judges were less motivated by justi-
fying their opinion than they were by resolving a particular legal dispute. 
BAnQ archivists have meticulously catalogued the primary sources, in-
cluding the names of professional attorneys and legal practitioners who 
appear in the record. We can therefore identify the legal representatives 
who, some historians have argued, did not “exist” at all in this time period.
Second, notarial records preserve the names of attorneys and practi-
tioners. In both their private and professional lives, attorneys and practi-
tioners visited notaries to record contracts such as marriages, land sales, 
and power of attorney agreements. In fact, a notarial act was “among the 
most common forms of the written word that early modern urban popu-
lations came into contact with.”107 Notaries did not represent clients in 
litigation but did review, verify, and record legal agreements. In an era 
before credit reporting agencies existed, notaries wielded power because 
they provided potential lenders with information on the creditworthi-
ness of potential borrowers.108 The state charged notaries with the task of 
record-keeping, while private clients paid them.109 In this way, notaries 
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mediated relations between state and society, between literate king and his 
often illiterate subjects.110 Notaries kept contracts within their own office 
(étude), but today the province of Québec holds their papers as part of 
the public record. Archivists initially organized this collection of papers 
according to the notary who recorded the act, not according to the parties 
to the contract. This can make research in notarial records cumbersome, 
for unless one happens to know the name of the notary who recorded the 
marriage of Jean and Marie, one cannot easily find their marriage con-
tract. To address this problem, the group Société de recherche historique 
Archiv-Histo created a database called Parchemin, which organizes no-
tarial records between 1626 and 1801 by the names of the parties. The 
Parchemin database includes various identifiers which the original record 
uses to describe the parties. Hence, by simply searching for the term prat-
icien de droit, we can uncover more names to counter the myth that there 
were no lawyers in early Canada.
Third, church records provide a glimpse into the social lives of at-
torneys and practitioners. In a heavily Catholic society, clergy recorded 
life events such as births, marriages, and deaths. The names of attorneys 
and practitioners appear when they were involved in baptisms (as parents 
or godparents), marriages, and deaths. Although produced as religious 
records, these documents are also rich sources for social historians. The 
Programme de recherche en démographie historique (PRDH), initiated 
by the Université de Montréal, indexes Catholic parish records of bap-
tism, marriage, and burial between 1621–1849. In using this catalogue, 
of course, we must take into consideration what groups it excludes. First, 
it generally excludes non-Catholics who did not participate in the sacra-
ments, although PRDH has recently added Protestant marriages for this 
entire period. Second, the catalogue excludes any individual who did 
not stay in the colony long enough to partake in such ceremonies. We 
may tend to imagine societies of long ago as being rather stationary, but 
Atlantic literature demonstrates that the early Canadian population was 
indeed quite mobile.111 Legal practitioners itinerated not only throughout 
the French Atlantic world, but also dabbled in various occupations within 
the legal profession, as discussed below.   
Together, all of these archives provide evidence weighing against 
the argument that professional legal representatives arose only with the 
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British regime. As French lexicographers instructed their readers, the law 
forbade lowly practitioners from performing the functions of advocates or 
office-holding attorneys. In early Canada, however, men who identified as 
legal practitioners frequently entered into power of attorney agreements, 
gave clients legal advice, and represented them in court when civil dis-
putes arose.112 
The humblest of legal representatives, practitioners were also the least 
threatening to an absolutist regime, which helps to explain their growth as 
a community in a colony whose administrators had initially expressed an-
tipathy towards legal representatives. The appended table (8.1) presents the 
names of seventy-six men who identified as practitioners of law well before 
the end of the Seven Years’ War. Their names, along with the denotation 
“praticien de droit,” appear in records held either in Pistard, Parchemin, or 
PRDH. These seventy-six names alone present powerful evidence to rebut 
the claim that there were no lawyers in New France. Widening the lens of 
inquiry illuminates a longer, more francophone history of the practice of 
law in Canada.
One of the most striking features of this group is their permeability 
among ranks and roles. Ancien Régime lexicographers distinguished at-
torneys from practitioners in terms of their social rank and day-to-day 
tasks, but Québec’s archival sources demonstrate a different reality. In the 
absence of venal offices, the distinctions between attorneys and practition-
ers blurred. When a practitioner entered into a power of attorney agree-
ment, he became known as the attorney of that person. Although not an 
office-holding attorney, the practitioner differed from a one-time attorney 
in that he was a repeat player. In the 1740s, when the number of litigants 
hiring a legal representative grew rapidly, men like Jacques Nouette de 
la Poufellerie, Pierre Poirier, and Jean-Claude Panet frequently entered 
the record as “praticien, son procureur.”113 Court clerks identified them as 
practitioners, sometimes also specifying whose attorney they were at that 
time. As shown in the appended table below, at least twenty legal practi-
tioners at some point bore the title of attorney not by buying a royal office, 
but by entering into a power of attorney agreement with an ordinary per-
son in New France.
As in early Louisiana, where anyone with a smattering of legal know-
ledge might flex their skills to practise legal representation, individuals 
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in early Canada also floated among different kinds of legal roles.114 For 
instance, notaries (notaires), process-servers (huissiers), and court clerks 
(greffiers) at times put themselves forward as practitioners. Pierre Cabzie 
even acted as a judge in Montréal in 1703, yet still identified three years 
later as a practitioner. This permeability complicates the hierarchy that 
Ancien Régime lexicographers dictated.
Although Ancien Régime lexicographers purported to describe clear 
delineations among advocates, attorneys, and practitioners, they did not 
acknowledge gradations among legal practitioners. In the absence of a 
rigid line between attorneys and legal practitioners, the colony developed 
distinctions among legal practitioners. While some men merely called 
themselves practitioners, others claimed the titles of senior practitioner 
(ancien praticien) or master practitioner (maître praticien). As Table 8.1 
shows, at least eight men were designated senior practitioners. Because 
the title “master practitioner” appeared only once in this search, this was 
probably the highest rank.115 Ancien Régime protocol dictated that the 
most experienced practitioners could fill the roles of even higher legal 
officials.116 For instance, the senior practitioner Jean-Baptiste Adhémar 
of Montréal (who was also a notary) acted as a substitute for the Royal 
Prosecutor in a 1743 criminal trial.117 Similarly, the senior practitioner of 
the town of Québec, Christophe-Hilarion Dulaurent, rendered a judg-
ment in a 1750 civil dispute between Germain Chalifou and Jean-Baptiste 
Savard, two inhabitants of the seigneurie Notre-Dame-des-Anges.118 Early 
Canada provided an escape from certain Ancien Régime rigidities, but not 
without recreating its own distinct hierarchy of legal representatives. The 
importance of rank and status persisted, even in the colony.119  
Practitioners did not enjoy the elite status of colonial administrators 
or magistrates, but practising law helped them secure a social rank above 
the general population. In a largely illiterate society, legal practitioners’ 
literacy alone distinguished them from most inhabitants. In 1750, only 
43 percent of residents in the town of Québec could sign their names. An 
even smaller proportion of inhabitants would have been able to use writ-
ten words to communicate ideas.120 Combining written words with tech-
nical legal knowledge, practitioners wielded powerful tools. 
Neither practitioners nor attorneys generally belonged to the nobility. 
First, members of the nobility enjoyed a higher social rank. Second, the 
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crown exempted members of the nobility from taxation.121 In New France, 
the second advantage was meaningless, because the crown exempted all 
colonists from taxation.122 In France, one could prove nobility by produ-
cing a letter from the king granting noble status, by exercising a certain 
public function for a prescribed period, or simply by belonging to a family 
that had been known as noble for such a long time that no one would dare 
question it.123  
Individuals could and did claim noble status without actually possess-
ing any of these three means of proof. Because all colonists were exempt 
from taxation, however, colonial administrators had little incentive to 
clamp down on the faux-noble problem.124 In practice, consistent desig-
nation as an écuyer or chevalier sufficed to secure the social advantages of 
noble status in early Canada.125 For example, when the senior practition-
er Jean-Baptiste Decoste de Letancour’s son married in 1759, the notary 
recognized both him and his son as noble when he followed both of their 
names with the term écuyer (literally meaning esquire) in the marriage 
contract.126 This designation was rare among practitioners, but not un-
heard of.
Other practitioners probably integrated themselves into the bour-
geois class through marriage and land purchase. For instance, the prac-
titioner Pierre Panet married a daughter of the bourgeois family, Trefflet 
dit Rautot.127 The son of a bourgeois gentleman himself, the practitioner 
Jacques Bourdon bought a piece of land from his father-in-law one year 
after marrying.128
In addition to shifting upwards through social ranks, practitioners 
relocated more than one would have expected given the difficulty of trav-
el in this period. PRDH records provide a window into the geographic 
mobility of legal practitioners. At least forty-seven practitioners migrated 
to the colony from France, and no less than fifteen were from Paris. One 
practitioner even found his way to Canada from his homeland in Portugal.
An Atlantic perspective, furthermore, raises the question as to 
where these legal practitioners died. The historiography of early Canada 
has largely privileged the study of those who came and stayed, over the 
study of those who came and left. Many practitioners did marry and have 
children in the colony, signifying their rootedness there. However, lim-
iting our study of practitioners to founding families would be a mistake, 
1338 | Practising Law in the “Lawyerless” Colony of New France
because the itinerary of leaving France to settle and procreate in Québec 
was not necessarily typical of legal practitioners. At present, we can only 
determine that forty-six of seventy-six practitioners died in the colony. 
The others may have died in France, in other French colonies, or else-
where altogether. In a new setting, they might have performed different 
legal work. Gabriel Lambert, for example, refashioned himself as a notary 
and royal surveyor in Guadeloupe, where he likely died.129  
Long before the formal establishment of the Québec bar association, 
legal practitioners in the French colony along the Saint Lawrence River 
Valley represented individuals in their civil disputes. A critical examina-
tion of Ancien Régime dictionaries first disentangles the terms advocate, 
attorney, and practitioner, helping us grasp the many modalities of legal 
practice in the early modern world. The superior status of the advocate 
helps explain why colonial authorities tolerated the development of the 
legal profession’s lower branches, whose members were less well-equipped 
in terms of legal knowledge, social prestige, and political power to overtly 
challenge an absolutist regime. Second, Québec’s archives—whether trial 
records, notarial records, or parish registers—present powerful evidence 
against the claim that there were no lawyers in early Canada. In addition 
to providing the names of seventy-six men who identified as legal practi-
tioners before 1764, this chapter shows that legal practitioners were more 
mobile, both professionally and geographically, than we might expect. 
Finally, the mobility of members of this group explains why their history 
has been underwritten.
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1681 Hubert, René Huissier au Conseil 
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Unknown Unknown Unknown
1681 Roger, Guillaume Procureur 
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1699 Barette (Baret), 
Guillaume
France Unknown Yes
1699 Corda, Jérôme France
(Paris)
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1699 Rivét (Rivet 
Cavelier), Pierre
Procureur (1701), 
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1745 Esnard, Jean Unknown Unknown Yes
1745 Guillet (dit 
Chaumont), 
Nicolas-Auguste
Notaire royal et 
ancien praticien de 
la juridiction royale 
de Montréal (1745)
France Yes Yes
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(Paris)
Yes No
1748 Laurent Lortie 
Coquot, Jean-
Baptiste
Maître praticien et 
procureur fiscal 
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1752 Masson, François France Unknown Yes
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Table 8.1 (continued)
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Poursuivre son mari en justice : 
femmes mariées et coutume de 




Dans une lettre écrite en janvier 1813, Rosalie Papineau, sœur du célèbre 
chef patriote, expose clairement le dilemme auquel faisaient face les femmes 
bas-canadiennes confrontées aux difficultés financières de leur mari :
La pauvre Mme Saint-G.! [ . . . ] : voir un mari qu’elle aime 
courir à sa perte et les entraîner, elle et ses enfants, dans son 
malheur, ou bien être obligée d’en venir à des extrémités 
aussi humiliantes que l’est une action en séparation [de bi-
ens], selon moi, ça met le comble à ses maux1!
Ce court extrait est intéressant à plusieurs égards. Il situe d’abord la re-
lation du couple dans ce que Bettina Bradbury appellerait une forme de 
companionate patriarchy2. Sous la plume de Rosalie, l’amour semble en 
effet lier encore la pauvre Mme Saint-G. à son mari, en dépit des diffi-
cultés économiques. Mais cet amour conjugal est tout de même clairement 
9
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inscrit dans les rapports patriarcaux qui subordonnaient alors la femme 
à son époux. C’est bien le mari de Mme Saint-G. qui paraît entièrement 
responsable du malheur de sa femme et de ses enfants. En théorie, on le 
sait, la femme mariée ne pouvait ni s’obliger juridiquement ni poursuivre 
en justice sans le consentement de son époux. Aux yeux du droit, la dir-
ection des affaires du ménage demeurait une prérogative masculine et 
seul l’époux disposait d’une personnalité juridique pleine et entière. La 
coutume de Paris en exprimait l’idée en faisant du mari le « seigneur » de 
la communauté de biens des époux, le régime légal régissant la propriété 
conjugale au Bas-Canada. Même si ce régime se révélait plutôt avantageux 
pour la femme mariée (il lui attribuait la moitié des biens communs), le 
principe de la puissance maritale prévalait, que le couple ait vécu dans 
cette colonie ou dans une juridiction de common law à part entière. 
Depuis plusieurs années cependant, nombre de travaux ont bien 
montré que les femmes mariées, avec ou sans consentement marital, pou-
vaient être des agentes économiques très actives malgré l’incapacité jurid-
ique dont elles faisaient l’objet. Particulièrement en matière de consomma-
tion, l’épouse savait engager tacitement la responsabilité de son conjoint, 
pour peu que les dépenses fussent jugées légitimes et raisonnables3. C’est 
probablement cette latitude accordée à l’épouse que Rosalie évoque un peu 
plus loin dans la même lettre qu’elle adressait à sa cousine. La jeune sœur 
de Louis-Joseph Papineau semble en effet mettre la faute des problèmes 
financiers du couple, non pas sur le mari, mais plutôt sur « les écarts » de 
Mme Saint-G. S’il faut en croire l’épistolière, celle-ci aurait même dû en 
rougir de honte : 
[ . . . ] il n’y a plus de ressource pour elle [Mme Saint-G.]. 
Quel triste sort! Quelle affligeante perspective lorsque l’il-
lusion sera cessée! Quels remords ne l’accableront-ils pas, si 
elle est capable de rougir sur ses écarts! Et si, par malheur, 
elle ne l’était pas, quelle inquiétude ne doit pas nous donner 
une telle insouciance pour l’avenir! Dieu veuille en préserv-
er sa famille! Son père et sa mère en mourraient de chagrin, 
j’en suis sûre4.
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De quels écarts, de quelle insouciance parlait Rosalie Papineau, sinon 
des dépenses que cette épouse aurait multipliées au point de conduire 
son mari à la ruine? Il n’a pas été possible d’identifier Mme Saint-G. avec 
certitude. Nous ne connaissons donc pas les raisons exactes de la décon-
fiture de son mari ni ne savons si une action en séparation de biens fut 
finalement intentée. Mais cette critique, qui ressemble fort au stéréotype 
de l’épouse dépensière, en dit long sur ce que pouvait penser une jeune 
femme de l’élite canadienne-française au début du XIXe siècle. Rosalie 
semble implicitement reconnaître l’autonomie des femmes mariées de la 
bourgeoisie en matière de consommation et, du même souffle, les soucis 
qu’une épouse « insouciante » pouvait causer à son mari5! En évoquant la 
possibilité d’un recours en séparation de biens, elle soulignait aussi que 
la justice demeurait une alternative pour ces épouses, aussi déshonorante 
cette solution fût-elle. Mais, du même coup, elle imposait à ses congénères 
une morale sévère qui semble bien avoir relevé, du moins en partie, de la 
position subordonnée de la femme durant le mariage. 
Mais était-ce bien le cas? Qu’en était-il vraiment pour les épouses 
bas-canadiennes au début du XIXe siècle? Ce témoignage évocateur 
soulève évidemment plusieurs questions dont certaines ont été abondam-
ment traitées dans l’historiographie. Pour la société préindustrielle, le rôle 
des femmes mariées dans l’économie domestique ne fait plus beaucoup 
de mystère, qu’il s’agisse d’économie informelle, de consommation ou 
encore du travail exercé conjointement avec le mari ou de façon indépen-
dante6. Les travaux scientifiques ont également bien mis en évidence l’im-
portance de la classe sociale et de la race (ou l’identité ethnoculturelle) 
pour expliquer la diversité de l’expérience des femmes. Face au patriarcat, 
qui imprégnait les institutions et les mentalités de multiples façons, les 
femmes n’étaient évidemment pas toutes égales. C’est d’ailleurs cette di-
versité d’expériences et les différents degrés de l’empowerment des femmes 
qui me semblent ressortir de l’historiographie plus récente. La difficulté 
demeure de savoir comment réconcilier l’agency des femmes mariées et la 
chape du patriarcat, comment contrebalancer l’autonomie individuelle et 
les contraintes sociojuridiques. C’est ce qui explique le succès de la notion 
de « négociation » qui inspire tant de travaux depuis quelque temps7.
Gardant à l’esprit ces considérations, j’ai étudié plus spécifiquement le 
recours en séparation de biens qu’évoque Rosalie Papineau dans sa lettre. 
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Selon le droit français en vigueur au Bas-Canada, l’épouse pouvait exercer 
un certain contrôle sur la gestion maritale de l’avoir domestique. Une fois 
autorisée par le juge, la femme mariée avait en effet la possibilité de pour-
suivre son mari en justice en cas de mauvaise administration financière. 
Un jugement favorable lui octroyait alors le pouvoir de gérer elle-même les 
biens et les revenus qui lui appartenaient8. Sans équivalent en common law, 
une telle action en justice, uniquement réservée à l’épouse, avait de quoi 
paraître subversif aux yeux des élites masculines, même pour la France 
d’Ancien Régime9. Dans le contexte bas-canadien du début du XIXe siècle, 
cette option était susceptible de déconcerter davantage encore les maris 
d’origine britannique. Quelques-uns d’entre eux, les immigrants tout par-
ticulièrement, étaient peu au fait du droit civil français et des modalités 
de la propriété conjugale. Comme Evelyn Kolish et Bettina Bradbury l’ont 
déjà souligné, certains marchands britanniques étaient hostiles à l’univers 
juridique du droit civil d’origine française10. En plus de jeter l’opprobre 
sur le mari, voire sur la famille entière, la séparation de biens était sus-
ceptible d’inquiéter les créanciers du ménage anxieux de se faire payer. Or, 
comme on le verra, la pratique judiciaire montréalaise s’est chargée d’en 
faire un instrument le plus souvent au service des maris, sans pour autant 
bafouer le droit des créanciers. Avec l’aide d’un avocat, plus d’un chef de 
ménage en déconfiture a pu compter sur la nouvelle personnalité juridique 
de son épouse pour se sortir d’un mauvais pas économique. Dans tout ce 
brouhaha judiciaire, nombre de femmes mariées semblent avoir été sinon 
négligées, du moins bien mal conseillées. 
Ce « détournement » apparent de la procédure en séparation de biens 
n’est pas entier, puisque certaines épouses ont tout de même bénéficié de 
ses avantages. Mais il permet de réfléchir sur les difficultés que ces dern-
ières rencontraient pour lier propriété et pouvoir dans une colonie britan-
nique où le droit civil français et les exigences masculines du marché ne 
faisaient pas bon ménage. Pour bien aiguiller la réflexion, il m’a semblé 
important d’étayer, dans un premier temps, le questionnement à la base 
de l’enquête. Puis, nous nous pencherons sur le recours censé protéger la 
propriété des femmes mariées en étudiant la pratique judiciaire montréal-
aise de 1795 à 1829. 
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Les femmes mariées et la propriété au regard du 
droit coutumier français
C’est sous l’angle de la propriété et du droit français que j’aimerais si-
tuer le problème de l’endettement des ménages pour les femmes mariées 
comme Mme Saint-G. Particulièrement sous la gouverne de maris défail-
lants ou fautifs, on sait que les femmes de cette époque subissaient parfois 
durement les inconvénients d’un patriarcat qui les plaçait en situation de 
vulnérabilité ou de dépendance économique. Pour les pays de common 
law, les études ayant abordé la genèse et l’impact des Married Women’s 
Property Acts du XIXe siècle sont là pour en témoigner11. Il est vrai que, 
parmi les classes possédantes recourant à la technique du trust, des 
épouses se voyaient attribuer une propriété séparée, particulièrement à 
l’occasion d’un marriage settlement. Cette opération juridique leur confé-
rait alors une certaine autonomie durant le mariage de même qu’après le 
décès de leur mari, le cas échéant12. Mais la marge de manœuvre ainsi 
acquise, du reste toute relative, ne concernait qu’une fraction des épouses 
et dépendait de la protection des tribunaux d’Equity. Dans les colonies, 
ces derniers n’étaient d’ailleurs pas toujours établis (ce qui fut le cas du 
Haut-Canada avant 1837)13. Au Bas-Canada, la situation ne se présentait 
pas de la même façon, comme on le sait. Rappelons que, sauf stipulation 
contraire à la coutume de Paris, les épouses avaient droit à la moitié des 
biens communs du ménage, présents et à venir, ce qui pouvait représenter 
une richesse non négligeable chez les marchands ou les artisans (les effets 
mobiliers étant considérés comme des biens communs). Elles disposaient 
également d’une hypothèque légale sur les biens propres de leur mari14 
afin que leur soient garantis, dès la célébration du mariage, certains droits 
comme le douaire ou les reprises matrimoniales (un concept juridique sur 
lequel nous reviendrons plus loin dans ce texte). Pour Bettina Bradbury, le 
droit parisien, repris par le Code civil du Bas-Canada, explique en bonne 
partie qu’il n’y ait pas eu au Québec de réforme juridique comparable à 
celle que connurent au XIXe siècle la plupart des juridictions de common 
law15. D’ailleurs, c’est en raison de ce droit français que Jan Noel avance 
que les femmes de la Nouvelle-France étaient en meilleure posture que 
leurs consœurs des autres colonies britanniques à la même époque (et 
même plus tard)16. On connaît cependant le désaccord que cette thèse a 
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suscité. Pour Josette Brun, la pratique notariale des couples des villes de 
Québec et de Louisbourg démontre plutôt que la puissance maritale limi-
tait sérieusement l’action des femmes mariées dans l’espace public, malgré 
les avantages matrimoniaux de la coutume de Paris17.
Demeure donc toujours ouverte la question du pouvoir réel des 
femmes mariées sur la richesse que la coutume de Paris leur garantissait. 
Cet aspect est particulièrement crucial dans les situations d’insolvabilité 
qui plaçaient plus d’un ménage à la merci de créanciers impatients. Dans 
quelle mesure la communauté de biens et les autres dispositions du droit 
français protégeaient-elles l’avoir des femmes mariées, considérant l’in-
capacité juridique dont celles-ci faisaient l’objet? Quel pouvoir les épouses 
avaient-elles, durant le mariage, sur leur part de communauté de biens ou 
sur tout autre forme de propriété que le droit français leur reconnaissait 
(leur héritage en particulier, étant donné l’égalitarisme successoral de 
la coutume de Paris qui, à cet égard aussi, différait de la common law 
anglaise)? Quelle était par ailleurs l’attitude des maris censés incarner 
l’autorité domestique (en dépit de leurs difficultés économiques)?
Plusieurs auteurs ont noté très justement qu’une partie des réponses 
à ces questions dépendait de l’identité juridique de l’épouse. Les « mar-
chandes publiques » disposaient par exemple d’une plus grande liber-
té d’action. Un peu comme pour la feme-sole trader en common law, ce 
statut permettait à la femme mariée de gérer son propre commerce de 
façon relativement autonome, quoique toujours sujette à la « puissance 
» de son mari18. De même, les futures épouses pouvaient choisir un ré-
gime de séparation de biens et disposer d’une autonomie semblable pour 
les biens qui leur étaient spécifiquement attribués au contrat de mariage. 
Mais pour déroger ainsi au régime légal de la communauté de biens, 
un tel contrat de mariage était absolument nécessaire et se devait d’être 
rédigé par un notaire préalablement à l’union. La belle étude que Bettina 
Bradbury a consacrée aux couples de la ville de Montréal indique que ce 
choix était surtout populaire chez les élites, particulièrement après 1840. 
S’apparentant à certains objectifs du marriage settlement, ce régime d’ex-
ception a d’abord eu la cote chez les époux d’origine britannique, avant 
de connaître une certaine popularité chez les classes supérieures de toute 
origine. Bettina Bradbury formule d’ailleurs l’hypothèse qu’un tel choix se 
voulait une forme de protection contre l’insolvabilité, fléau qui frappa plus 
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durement la colonie à partir de 1837. Par rapport à l’ensemble de la popu-
lation citadine toutefois, il faut comprendre que peu de futures épouses 
optèrent pour le régime de la séparation de biens, tout simplement parce 
que la pratique du contrat de mariage, seul moyen de déroger à la coutume 
de Paris, déclina au fil du temps. De telle sorte que le régime légal de la 
communauté de biens prévalait largement à Montréal chez les Canadiens 
français, tout comme chez bon nombre d’anglo-protestants ou de cath-
oliques irlandais ne disposant pas d’un contrat de mariage19. 
Si l’identité juridique des femmes mariées nous est désormais bien 
connue, il n’en va pas de même du pouvoir qu’elles ont pu effectivement 
exercer durant le mariage en vertu des droits ou des privilèges conférés 
par le droit parisien. Il est vrai que documenter l’activité de cette majorité 
silencieuse n’est pas aisé. Particulièrement pour le problème du rapport 
des femmes à la propriété, on connaît généralement mieux les stratégies 
des veuves qui accédaient à la gouverne du ménage au décès de leur époux. 
C’est surtout pour cette phase de leur vie que l’impact réel de la commu-
nauté de biens est d’ailleurs évalué par les historiennes et les historiens. 
Au décès de leur mari, les femmes récupéraient en effet le pouvoir sur la 
moitié des biens communs, en plus de certains droits spécifiques comme 
le douaire. Certes, on sait que quelques femmes mariées se sont démar-
quées par leur implication civique ou leur dynamisme dans la sphère éco-
nomique du marché20. Il est vrai aussi que l’absence du mari, soulignée 
par une historienne comme Jan Noel, permettait à certaines épouses de 
« sortir de l’ombre ». La correspondance entre mari et femme est riche 
d’enseignements à cet égard, mais elle est rare, parcellaire et réservée aux 
lettrées. Elle mériterait tout de même une analyse plus attentive des stra-
tégies économiques et financières des épouses bas-canadiennes21. Du côté 
des sources juridiques, certaines études ont mis en lumière le recours à la 
procuration générale ou spéciale que le mari absent accordait à son épouse 
afin que celle-ci puisse agir en toute légalité, de façon plus ou moins éten-
due. Une telle pratique, centrée sur l’autorisation écrite plutôt que sur le 
mandat tacite, était courante dans les pays de droit civil. Mais elle existait 
également dans les juridictions de common law, dans une mesure plus 
difficile à évaluer cependant22. Dans le contexte québécois, l’analyse des 
procurations a offert une fenêtre d’observation sur l’activité de la femme 
mariée placée aux commandes du ménage ou de l’entreprise familiale23. 
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Privilégiant les couples des classes possédantes, cet angle d’approche favo-
rise évidemment la vision plus optimiste du companionate marriage. Mais 
le principe de la puissance maritale n’en demeure pas moins réaffirmé, la 
procuration étant par définition une délégation du pouvoir marital. Du 
reste, les actes notariés ne nous disent pas toujours dans quelle mesure 
ce pouvoir a été effectivement exercé par l’épouse esseulée24. Il en va de 
même pour les droits matrimoniaux définis au contrat de mariage, un do-
cument souvent utilisé en histoire de la famille.
Malgré leurs limites, les sources judiciaires apportent un éclairage 
précieux à cet égard. Bien connues des spécialistes, elles n’ont pourt-
ant guère été mises à contribution dans la perspective envisagée ici, du 
moins pour le Québec préindustriel25. Il est vrai que plusieurs études se 
sont penchées sur l’intervention de la justice dans les conflits familiaux 
marqués par l’abus, la négligence ou l’abandon d’un mari. L’univers plus 
sombre ou plus âpre du conflit, très révélateur, éclaire particulièrement 
bien les situations difficiles des épouses tout comme certaines de leurs 
stratégies. Ce choix n’est pas sans conséquence cependant, puisque c’est 
la vision plus normative des gens de justice (et parfois des témoins) qui est 
alors mise en lumière. Certains de ces travaux ont ainsi souligné le double 
standard dont les femmes étaient l’objet, notamment pour les causes en 
séparation de corps. D’autres ont insisté sur l’attitude chevaleresque de la 
justice masculine qui, sous couvert d’assurer la « protection » des femmes 
maltraitées ou abandonnées, réaffirmait ainsi une vision patriarcale des 
rapports de genre26. L’activité des tribunaux ne se limite toutefois pas aux 
seuls dysfonctionnements du couple ou aux abus d’un mari. Le conten-
tieux ordinaire de la justice civile, moins étudié, apporte aussi un éclairage 
particulièrement utile pour la question du pouvoir domestique. Ce volet 
est évidemment moins spectaculaire en raison de la nature des causes im-
pliquées, très largement des réclamations pour dettes auxquelles s’ajoutai-
ent certains procès concernant notamment des affaires de famille27. Dans 
les affaires de nature commerciale, les femmes mariées étaient somme 
toute peu présentes devant la justice civile et elles figuraient presque tou-
jours aux côtés de leur mari, sauf pour quelques rares marchandes pub-
liques, néanmoins très actives. C’est ce qui ressort d’une étude sur l’activ-
ité judiciaire en Nouvelle-Écosse au tournant des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles28. 
C’est également ce que j’ai observé pour le district de Montréal devant la 
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juridiction supérieure de la Cour du banc du roi29. Toutefois, les femmes 
mariées agissaient aussi de leur propre chef dans les cas plus rares où elles 
poursuivaient leur mari. Or, à la lumière des dossiers judiciaires de la jur-
idiction supérieure de Montréal, ces femmes s’adressaient aux juges le plus 
souvent pour obtenir une séparation de biens. C’est dire tout l’intérêt que 
cette procédure judiciaire revêt pour mieux comprendre les rapports de 
propriété entre époux. Souvent étudiée de concert avec la séparation de 
corps, la séparation de biens a fait l’objet d’une attention plutôt distraite 
jusqu’à maintenant. Lorsque cette dernière est considérée comme telle, les 
enjeux plus strictement économiques du recours se confondent souvent 
avec les problèmes conjugaux qui caractérisent l’action en séparation de 
corps30. Cela dit, quelques auteurs ont pris la mesure plus exacte du recours 
en séparation de biens dans le contexte de la France d’Ancien Régime31. 
Leurs travaux permettront de mieux situer l’expérience bas-canadienne. 
Cette société coloniale, on le sait, se distinguait par un pluralisme culturel 
croissant qui, en partie du moins, s’est aussi répercuté dans l’administra-
tion de la justice elle-même32. C’est attentif à ce contexte particulier que 
j’ai d’abord pris la mesure d’une action judiciaire réservée aux femmes 
mariées.
L’action en séparation de biens dans le district de 
Montréal, 1795-1829
Pour Rosalie Papineau, le recours en séparation de biens demeurait la 
pire des possibilités. C’est peut-être ce qui explique que, jusqu’en 1815 du 
moins, cette action ait été peu fréquente devant la Cour du banc du roi 
de Montréal. On compte à peine deux ou trois demandes par année pour 
l’ensemble d’un district dont la population atteignait environ 150 000 per-
sonnes à la fin de la guerre anglo-américaine. Durant les années 1820, 
en revanche, les difficultés économiques que traversait le Bas-Canada 
paraissent avoir fortement contribué à augmenter la fréquence du recours 
judiciaire. Oscillant autour d’une dizaine de procès par année au début 
de la décennie 1820, la courbe dépasse la vingtaine de litiges après 1825, 
ce qui représente une augmentation bien au-delà de la croissance de la 
population (graphique 9.1)33. Dans le district de Montréal, en quelque 35 
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Figure 9.1 Distribution annuelle du nombre d’actions en séparation pour le district 
de Montréal, 1795–1829
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
ans (soit de 1795 à 1829), 250 demandes ont été reçues au tribunal. Pour la 
période allant de 1680 à 1789, Laurence Croq a retrouvé une séparation de 
biens pour 140 couples de la bourgeoisie marchande parisienne, plus sus-
ceptibles d’avoir recours à cette procédure. Julie Hardwick, qui explore les 
registres de cours de la ville de Nantes entre 1598 et 1710, dénombre quant 
à elle 106 poursuites de cette nature34. La pratique bas-canadienne semble 
donc assez vigoureuse, surtout après 1815. Dans la très grande majorité 
des cas, les demandes en séparation de biens ont été reçues favorablement 
par les magistrats (voir tableau 9.1), à l’instar de ce qu’observe Hardwick 
pour le long XVIIe siècle35.
Remarquons au passage que ce recours est nettement plus fréquent que 
la demande en séparation de corps, en France comme au Québec. Certes, 
les deux actions étaient parfois provoquées par des problèmes conjugaux 
de même nature, comme l’abandon ou la défaillance lourde du mari (al-
coolisme, « débauche », prodigalité, etc.). Mais demander une séparation 
de biens ne nécessitait pas qu’il y ait eu conflit conjugal ni faute grave de 
l’époux. Ne mettant pas fin à la cohabitation d’un point de vue légal, le 
recours était également plus facile à obtenir. Il suffisait que l’épouse soit 
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en danger de perdre ses « droits et avantages matrimoniaux » pour qu’elle 
puisse demander à la cour de mettre sa propriété à l’abri du mari et de 
ses créanciers. Dans la demande en séparation de biens que Marguerite 
Belecque dépose contre son mari en 1828, son avocat expose à la cour que 
ce dernier : 
[ . . . ] aurait mal administré les biens de la dite commu-
nauté [de biens]. Il aurait contracté diverses dettes, aurait 
fait de faux marchés, se serait exposé à des poursuites en 
conséquence desquelles ses meubles seraient sous saisie, et 
que par ces moyens les droits de la demanderesse tels que 
stipulés en son contrat de mariage, et nommément ce qu’elle 
y aurait apporté, seraient en péril36. 
Voilà, exprimée en détail, l’une des raisons donnant ouverture au recours 
selon les juristes de l’époque. Au tournant des années 1820, les avocats in-
voquent d’ailleurs plus volontiers les infortunes du mari (les poursuites ou 
les saisies dont il était l’objet) que les fautes de ce dernier, épargnant ainsi 
une partie de l’opprobre au chef de ménage. C’est peut-être ce qui explique 
aussi la plus grande fréquence du recours à partir de la fin des années 
1810 (soit près de deux fois plus que la demande en séparation de corps). 
En raison du taux de succès élevé de la procédure (tableau 9.1), quelques 
couples ont emprunté cette voie plus facile pour régler les aspects matériels 
d’une véritable séparation de fait. Catherine Anger et Louis Cavilhe ob- 
tinrent une séparation de biens le 18 juin 1798 permettant d’homologuer le 
partage de leur communauté de biens. L’un des témoins au procès déclara 
cependant que le couple s’était entendu pour mettre fin à la cohabitation 
conjugale. Les époux s’en seraient tenus à une entente à l’amiable si le 
notaire ne leur avait pas conseillé d’obtenir auparavant une séparation de 
biens devant le tribunal37. Ce cas de figure demeure toutefois l’exception. 
Le plus souvent, les difficultés financières du mari justifiaient le recours 
des femmes mariées.
Clairement, les femmes n’ont pas toujours agi de leur propre initiative. 
La collusion entre les conjoints était manifeste, peut-être plus fréquente 
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Tableau 9.1 Issues des demandes en séparation de biens, 1795–1829
NOMBRE DE PROCÈS
Abandon de la demande 8
Rejet de l’action 8
Jugement favorable 182
Mention d’un jugement non retrouvé 24
Cas inconnus 28
Total 250
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
à Montréal qu’ailleurs38. Seulement 18 des 250 demandes en séparation 
de biens ont été véritablement contestées par le mari. À aucun moment 
la contestation de ces hommes n’évoque les dépenses excessives que leur 
femme aurait accumulées pour expliquer leur ruine39. Dans les rares cas 
où l’époux se présentait en personne, celui-ci semblait satisfait de s’en 
« rapporter à justice », bel exemple de complicité ouverte ou, du moins, 
d’aveu d’impuissance du chef de ménage40. L’initiative du recours revenait 
peut-être même à l’avocat de l’épouse qui agissait aussi pour le compte du 
mari dans d’autres procès41. Les créanciers, quant à eux, n’intervenaient 
pratiquement jamais42. Peut-être parce que le tribunal viellait naturelle-
ment à leurs intérêts, comme nous allons le voir. Mais sans doute aussi 
parce que les femmes ne revendiquaient pas toujours des sommes très im-
portantes, au surcroît difficiles à récupérer lorsque le mari était insolvable 
ou mal intentionné. Au terme du procès, certaines femmes n’obtenaient 
rien ou recevaient un pécule d’une valeur à peine supérieure aux frais ju-
diciaires43. Examinons la situation de plus près.
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L’avoir des épouses bas-canadiennes sous la 
plume des hommes de loi
Dans une très forte proportion, les demanderesses étaient mariées sous 
le régime de la communauté de biens (soit dans près de neuf cas connus 
sur dix). Le jugement favorable à la séparation avait pour effet de met-
tre un terme à ce régime de propriété entre les époux. Dans le meilleur 
des scénarios, la dissolution du régime permettait à la femme mariée de 
récupérer la moitié des biens communs. Cette acceptation de la commun-
auté de biens n’était avantageuse que si les actifs demeuraient clairement 
supérieurs aux dettes. Si le bilan était déficitaire, la femme ne pouvait 
évidemment partager que les dettes. La coutume de Paris permettait alors 
à l’épouse de renoncer à la communauté de biens afin d’éviter d’être débi-
trice des créanciers du ménage. Cet avantage non négligeable ne mettait 
néanmoins pas beaucoup de beurre dans les épinards . . . 
L’examen attentif des dossiers montre que nombre de femmes n’avai-
ent sans doute pas d’autres choix que d’opter pour une renonciation à leur 
part de communauté. Seul un véritable bilan financier versé au dossier 
pourrait confirmer l’état d’insolvabilité du chef de ménage. Mais les de-
mandes en séparation de biens n’offrent pas une telle comptabilité44. Les 
pièces au dossier signalent tout de même les nombreuses dettes du mari, 
les saisies et ventes judiciaires survenues, parfois une faillite récente, ce 
que des vérifications dans la banque de données Thémis I permettent à 
l’occasion de valider. Sur cette base, on peut penser que près d’une femme 
sur deux a dû faire face aux difficultés financières du « seigneur » de la 
communauté de biens (graphique 9.2).
 Dans ces cas, l’épouse devait assurément renoncer à la commun-
auté. En contrepartie, le droit français lui permettait de réclamer sa « dot », 
en particulier les biens qu’elle avait apportés au mariage (ou leur valeur). La 
très grande majorité des femmes mariées sous le régime de la communauté 
de biens optèrent pour cette solution (renonciation et restitution de la dot, 
plutôt qu’acceptation et partage de la communauté). En fait, ces femmes 
renoncèrent à leur part de communauté bien plus souvent que l’insolvab-
ilité apparente de leur mari semble l’avoir justifié. Le tableau 9.2 montre 
qu’au moins deux épouses sur trois choisirent la renonciation, alors que 
les cas d’insolvabilité apparente du mari semblent n’avoir concerné qu’une 
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Figure 9.2 Difficultés financières des maris selon les dossiers en séparation de 
biens, 1795–1829
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
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cause sur deux tout au plus (graphique 9.2)45. Les lacunes documentaires 
des dossiers judiciaires expliquent le fort taux de cas inconnus (28,4%). 
Mais l’histoire juridique permet de penser que, le plus souvent, la renonci-
ation à la communauté de biens intervenait également dans ces cas46. C’est 
donc dire que pour une majorité écrasante de poursuivantes, leur droit à 
la moitié de la communauté de biens, si souvent invoqué dans l’historiog-
raphie, ne se matérialisa jamais. Seule restait la dot qui, contrairement à la 
part de communauté, était garantie par une hypothèque générale sur les 
biens propres du mari. 
Encore fallait-il que l’épouse ait pris soin de faire rédiger un contrat de 
mariage dans lequel était inscrite une clause dite de reprises. Cette clause 
précisait les biens ou les sommes que la future aurait droit de réclamer 
advenant une renonciation à la communauté47. Or, faute de contrat de 
mariage, ou encore faute de clause de reprises adéquate, plusieurs de ces 
femmes ne purent réclamer leur dot, en tout ou en partie. Certaines d’entre 
elles ne possédaient probablement que quelques effets personnels au mo-
ment de l’union, au mieux un trousseau bien garni. C’est peut-être pour-
quoi plusieurs s’estimèrent satisfaites du seul prononcé de la séparation de 
biens, sans songer à réclamer quoi que ce soit. Il se peut également que les 
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Tableau 9.2 Option des épouses communes en biens après un jugement favorable 
connu, 1795-1829* 
AVEC CONTRAT DE 
MARIAGE
SANS CONTRAT DE 
MARIAGE TOTAL
Renonciation 85 18 103
Acceptation 5 1 6
“Entente”** 0 2 2
Inconnu 34 10 44
Total 124 31 155
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
*Seulement 155 des 182 dossiers dont le jugement nous était connu indiquaient clairement que le couple était 
marié sous le régime de la communauté de biens.
** Certains dossiers parlent d’une entente entre les parties équivalant à un partage des biens du couple. Comme 
ces cas ne semblent pas suivre la norme juridique, ils ont été rangés dans une catégorie à part. Mais ils sont 
plutôt à verser du côté de l’acceptation de la communauté de biens.
Tableau 9.3 Décisions concernant les biens de l’épouse pour les jugements connus, 
1795–1829
NOMBRE DE PROCÈS
Jugement attribuant des biens à l’épouse 99
Jugement n’accordant aucun bien à l’épouse 29
Aucune demande de l’épouse 51
Dossier incomplet 3
Total 182
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
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frais judiciaires additionnels pour déterminer la dot aient été jugés trop 
élevés, considérant la modicité des biens apportés par l’épouse48. Chose 
certaine, une forte proportion de femmes mariées (44%) n’obtenaient rien 
au terme du procès, soit que le jugement ne leur accordait aucun bien, soit 
qu’elles n’en revendiquaient tout simplement pas (tableau 9.3). 
Précisons que ces couples n’appartenaient pourtant pas aux classes 
populaires. L’occupation du mari montre que les commerçants, les gens 
de métier et les professionnels étaient surreprésentés, même si les pro-
priétaires ruraux formaient tout de même une bonne part du contingent 
(tableau 9.4). 
On aurait donc pu s’attendre à ce que ces familles possédantes, par-
ticulièrement exposées aux rigueurs du marché, sachent faire bon usage 
des rouages du droit. Mais combien de femmes, combien d’hommes 
connaissaient le jeu subtil des reprises stipulées au contrat de mariage? Le 
problème était particulièrement criant pour les immigrants britanniques. 
Sur la cinquantaine d’épouses anglophones ayant demandé la séparation 
de biens, la majorité n’avait pas de contrat de mariage (30 sur les 52 cas 
connus). Faute d’un tel contrat, elles ne pouvaient donc espérer récupé-
rer quoi que ce soit à titre de dot. À l’exception d’Isabella Campbell, ces 
femmes renoncèrent néanmoins au régime légal de la communauté de 
biens, ce qui les condamnait à ne pouvoir rien obtenir au terme du procès. 
Dans un cas, c’est le mari lui-même qui, après avoir autorisé sa femme 
Tableau 9.4 Occupation socioprofessionnelle des maris, 1795–1829
N %
Écuyers, seigneurs et officiers civils 22 8,8%
Marchands et commerçants 85 34,0%
Professionnels 12 4,8%
Gens de métier 60 24,0%
Cultivateurs et yeomen ruraux 69 27,6%
Cas inconnus 2 0,8%
Total 250
Source: TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ
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à renoncer à la communauté de biens, signa l’acte de renonciation et le 
déposa en main propre au tribunal49! La renonciation, tout comme la sépa-
ration de biens, était pourtant un privilège réservé à la seule épouse. On l’a 
déjà souligné, la communauté de biens n’avait pas la cote chez bon nombre 
de maris britanniques. Plusieurs apprenaient trop tard qu’ils étaient sou-
mis à ce régime faute de l’avoir exclu par contrat de mariage. Certains 
profitaient donc du recours pour mettre un terme à un régime légal qui 
pouvait octroyer à l’épouse la moitié de la fortune du ménage50. Même 
lorsque les conjoints ne s’étaient pas mariés au Bas-Canada, et n’étaient 
donc probablement pas régis par la communauté de biens, le jugement 
entérinait la renonciation de l’épouse51. 
Les Canadiennes (françaises) semblent avoir été plus avisées en la 
matière. Nombre d’entre elles signaient un contrat de mariage. Les rurales, 
surtout s’il s’agissait d’un second ou d’un troisième mariage, étaient les 
plus susceptibles de récupérer leur mise initiale, bien qu’on retrouve égale-
ment de jeunes citadines dans le groupe. Sur les 99 femmes à qui le tribu-
nal octroya des biens (en argent et/ou en nature), 88 étaient Canadiennes, 
dont 61 résidaient dans l’espace rural. Seules dix épouses portant un nom 
anglophone ou germanique furent dans la même situation, dont trois avai-
ent épousé un Canadien. Si on ne tient compte que des cas où une somme 
d’argent précise fut allouée à l’épouse, la proportion de Canadiennes est 
encore plus écrasante (79/82). Un petit nombre se vit attribuer un avoir se 
chiffrant en centaines de livres auxquelles s’ajoutaient parfois des effets 
personnels et des immeubles. Isabella Campbell, la seule Britannique à 
avoir accepté la communauté de biens, récupéra la moitié d’une maison 
estimée à £700, en plus du mobilier, comme quoi le droit français pouvait 
à l’occasion bénéficier aussi aux anglophones52. Mais la médiane des som-
mes restituées se chiffrait plutôt à £97, certaines épouses n’obtenant que 
quelques livres.
On s’étonne de constater que seulement cinq Canadiennes ont ac-
cepté et partagé la communauté de biens après avoir fait procéder à un in-
ventaire de l’avoir commun. Les autres renoncèrent à la communauté sans 
recourir à l’inventaire des biens domestiques qui aurait permis de prendre 
une décision véritablement éclairée. Du reste, certains avocats conseil-
laient très mal leur cliente et semblaient plutôt désireux de régler les af-
faires de l’époux d’une façon qui ne porte pas trop atteinte aux créanciers 
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(des clients potentiels, faut-il le rappeler). Ainsi, Marguerite Gougeon se 
plaignit au tribunal que l’avocat qui la représentait en cour avait obtenu 
contre sa volonté la renonciation à la communauté de biens. Elle espérait 
pourtant l’accepter après en avoir fait dresser un inventaire. Alors que le 
mari ne s’était pas opposé à l’action de sa femme jusque-là, il en serait 
venu aux coups avec son épouse parce que celle-ci demandait au notaire de 
ne pas tenir compte de la renonciation déposée en cour contre sa volonté53. 
Il fallait une réelle détermination pour s’opposer à un mari têtu, et même 
violent, qui bénéficiait de la solidarité masculine des juges, des avocats et 
sans doute des créanciers.  
Au terme d’une procédure coûteuse, l’épouse n’obtenait donc souvent 
que la seule capacité juridique sur les biens qu’elle pourrait acquérir ul-
térieurement. Pour celles qui faisaient commerce ou qui exerçaient déjà 
un métier, l’avantage n’était sans doute pas négligeable54. L’acquisition 
d’une personnalité juridique permettait pour bon nombre d’obtenir du 
crédit. Dès le jugement, les cordons de la bourse des parents et amis se 
déliaient sans risquer de voir ce nouvel apport être dilapidé par le mari ou 
englouti par sa faillite. Nul doute que cette embellie ne profitait pas qu’à 
l’épouse. Mais pour celles qui ne pouvaient plus compter sur leur mari, 
obtenir du crédit s’avérait essentiel. La séparation de biens avait également 
pour effet d’empêcher que le mari absent, une fois de retour à la maison, 
fasse main basse sur le fruit du travail et des économies de son épouse 
industrieuse55. Après avoir été abandonnée par son mari vingt ans plus 
tôt, Victoire Ritchot fit si bien en l’absence de son époux qu’elle décida 
d’agrandir la maison qu’elle possédait au village de Pointe-aux-Trembles, 
près de Montréal. Peu préoccupée par les formalités juridiques jusque-là, 
elle décida néanmoins d’obtenir une séparation de biens « [ . . . ] sur les 
observations qu’on lui auroit faites que son mari pouvoit rentrer dans la 
moitié des augmentations qu’elle pourroit faire, même en l’absence de son 
dit mari » 56. 
Cela dit, pour bon nombre de femmes séparées de biens, l’acquisition 
d’une nouvelle personnalité juridique constituait surtout un paravent lé-
gal pour l’époux insolvable. Contrairement à Victoire Ritchot qui fit saisir 
en justice les biens de son mari absent, plusieurs de ces femmes n’appa-
raissent pour ainsi dire jamais dans les dossiers judiciaires postérieurs à 
la séparation de biens57. Parfois, certaines rachetaient une partie des biens 
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domestiques vendus en justice, ce qui profitait à l’ensemble du ménage. 
D’autres, il est vrai, usaient pleinement de leur nouveau statut juridique. 
Quelques épouses remplacèrent en effet leur mari comme associée de l’en-
treprise en difficultés financières58. C’est le cas particulièrement de Marie-
Claire Perrault, conjointe d’Austin Cuvillier. Appartenant à une famille de 
marchands, Marie-Claire n’agissait sans doute pas comme simple prête-
nom dans la société d’encanteurs établie par son mari : très active devant 
les tribunaux, elle poursuivit bon an mal an de nombreux débiteurs sous le 
nom de « Marie-Claire Cuvillier & Compagnie »59. Une fois les difficultés 
financières passées cependant, elle céda formellement la place à son mari. 
Conclusion
Ce dernier cas montre que l’action en séparation de biens pouvait devenir 
un outil précieux entre les mains d’un mari en déconfiture, pour peu que 
celui-ci ait été bien conseillé. Dotée d’une nouvelle personnalité juridique, 
l’épouse séparée de biens recouvrait le ménage d’une sorte de « voile cor-
poratif ». Elle protégeait une partie de l’avoir familial et se trouvait mieux 
placée que son mari pour obtenir un crédit particulièrement nécessaire 
en ces moments de soudure financière. Bien connue des historiens et des 
historiennes, la collusion des époux pour frauder les créanciers était un 
stratagème généralement combattu par les tribunaux, avec plus ou moins 
de succès. Mais ici, il importe de souligner que cet usage marital d’un re-
cours en principe réservé à l’épouse était pleinement légitimé par la Cour 
du banc du roi de Montréal, à une époque où la procédure de faillite et le 
droit des corporations n’existaient pas encore au Bas-Canada60. Peut-on 
parler de « détournement » du droit coutumier français? Je ne le pense pas, 
pas entièrement du moins.
Tout d’abord, certaines femmes mariées plus fortunées que d’autres, 
mais également plus familières avec le droit français, profitaient pleine-
ment de ce pouvoir et des possibilités qu’offrait la justice bas-canadienne. 
Toutes n’accédaient pas au cœur de la sphère masculine du marché com-
me Marie-Claire Perrault, mais plusieurs amélioraient vraisemblablement 
leur sort, même s’il est difficile de retracer leur parcours dans les sources 
disponibles61. Quelques épouses d’origine britannique, comme Isabella 
Campbell, semblent même avoir tiré leur épingle du jeu malgré tout. Mais 
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ces dernières agissaient plus souvent en marge d’une justice civile appli-
quant un droit qui leur était mal connu, peut-être davantage que pour 
leurs consœurs canadiennes habituées aux démarches conjointes auprès 
du notaire ou du juge62. Cela dit, Victoire Ritchot a longtemps vécu en 
l’absence de son mari sans avoir senti le besoin de se rendre au palais de 
justice. Il est évident que l’économie dite informelle ne s’embarrassait pas 
beaucoup de poursuites en justice ni même de visites chez le notaire. Il ne 
fait pas de doute que ces activités « infrajuridiques » étaient néanmoins 
régulées par des usages tout de même infléchis par le droit en vigueur, 
toujours susceptible d’être mobilisé (comme le cas de Ritchot le montre 
bien). Bien plus que la honte évoquée par Rosalie Papineau, c’est la faible 
utilité ou accessibilité du recours judiciaire qui explique le petit nombre 
de demandes en séparation de biens soumises par les femmes mariées. 
Combien d’épouses (ou leur mari) n’ont pas jugé bon saisir le tribunal 
ou, peut-être comme la pauvre Mme Saint-G., n’ont pas osé recourir à 
l’action en séparation de biens? Combien n’ont tout simplement pas pu 
s’en prévaloir, faute de ressources suffisantes ou par ignorance? 
D’ailleurs, la pratique judiciaire que j’ai étudiée ne fait pas beaucoup 
écho au témoignage de Rosalie Papineau. Certes, les femmes qui récla-
mèrent la séparation de biens semblent avoir été sans reproche. Certaines 
procédures soulignent leurs qualités et leur contribution indéfectible au 
bien-être familial, selon une formule qui visiblement se transmettait entre 
avocats. Mais la plupart des demandes ne s’embarrassaient pas de telles 
précautions stéréotypées. Il ne semble pas y avoir eu de double standard 
généralisé, sans doute parce que la demande en justice n’était pas souvent 
contestée par le mari. Le discours genré, auquel plusieurs études nous ont 
habitués, était manifestement moins pertinent dans les circonstances. 
De même, on ne retrouve pas ici, sous la plume des avocats, la vision 
chevaleresque justifiant ailleurs l’intervention du tribunal au nom de la 
protection de femmes mariées. Le portrait d’un sexe naturellement faible 
et sans défense n’est pas tellement présent dans les pièces judiciaires. 
Certes, quelques demandes exposaient la précarité de l’épouse négligée ou 
abandonnée, quitte à forcer le trait à l’occasion63. Mais, dans la très grande 
majorité de ces dossiers, on se souciait peu de décrire la situation, réelle 
ou imaginée, des femmes ou des enfants (on ne sait presque rien de ceux-
ci). Ce qui ressort surtout, c’est la volonté de neutraliser le plus possible 
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la charge subversive (à l’encontre de l’ordre patriarcal) ou déstabilisatrice 
(menaçant la sécurité contractuelle) d’un recours fondé sur le droit coutu-
mier français. Déjà, l’accès difficile à ce savoir technique jouait au détri-
ment de ceux et celles qui étaient peu familiers avec la tradition juridique 
française. Mais qui plus est, les aspects avantageux de ce droit (le régime 
de la communauté de biens ou les reprises de l’épouse) ont reçu la lecture 
la plus stricte que les juges et même les avocats pouvaient leur donner, sans 
doute à la satisfaction de l’élite marchande et masculine de Montréal. 
C’est aussi en ce sens qu’il n’est pas vraiment possible de parler de 
« détournement » de la coutume de Paris. Les études sur la France d’An-
cien Régime montrent que le recours en séparation de biens donnait égale-
ment lieu à une collusion entre époux. Elles ont de même révélé l’existence 
d’un contrôle judiciaire qui, susceptible de devenir plus strict, conférait 
aux échanges économiques et au crédit une certaine stabilité. Il n’en de-
meure pas moins qu’à partir de la fin des années 1810, la pratique judi-
ciaire montréalaise se transforme au rythme des difficultés économiques 
de la colonie. Les avocats canadiens, mais aussi leurs confrères d’origine 
britannique, s’entichent résolument de cette procédure en l’utilisant 
plus volontiers comme solution partielle à l’endettement de leurs clients. 
Dès lors, on observe une évaluation plus stricte des demandes en ce qui 
concerne la détermination de la dot de l’épouse (assimilée au seul apport 
décrit au contrat de mariage). Les notaires, chargés par la cour d’établir le 
montant des reprises, ne se montrent pas toujours très rigoureux dans leur 
appréciation. Mais les juges ne manquent pas de soustraire les sommes ré-
clamées qui apparaissent sans justification à leurs yeux. Certains notaires 
plus stricts, comme Nicolas-Benjamin Doucet64, sont visiblement sur la 
même longueur d’onde que le tribunal. Par ailleurs, plusieurs avocats ne 
jugent même pas utile de faire procéder à l’évaluation de la dot ou de la 
communauté de biens. Le stratagème apparaît clairement pour les maris 
qui souhaitaient visiblement mettre un terme au régime non désiré de la 
coutume de Paris, en forçant sa dissolution en justice. Pourtant, cet usage 
judiciaire était proscrit par les juristes : la dissolution devait se conclure 
par la restitution de la dot (le cas échéant) ou, plus rarement, par le par-
tage de la communauté de biens. Cette étape de la liquidation du régime 
matrimonial était jugée essentielle pour rendre la séparation de biens plei-
nement effective65. 
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Si, dans certains cas, des épouses ont pu jouir de l’application généreuse 
du droit, il semble cependant que leur marge de négociation se soit nette-
ment rétrécie à mesure que le temps passait. De ce point de vue, les avan-
tages de la coutume de Paris apparaissent somme toute assez limités pour 
les femmes durant le mariage, même pour celles qui se présentaient devant 
la justice pour sauver l’avoir que le droit français leur reconnaissait. Non 
seulement perdaient-elles pour la plupart leur portion de la communauté 
de biens, mais peu de femmes mariées arrivaient à récupérer une mise in-
itiale au demeurant assez modeste. On a peut-être exagéré les différences 
entre le système de droit civil et de common law, en négligeant la pratique 
judiciaire tissée au jour le jour par des juges, mais aussi par des avocats 
qui, bien que d’horizons divers, partageaient une même conception patri-
arcale et capitaliste de l’ordre des choses.
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célébration du mariage! N’ayant pas fait de contrat de mariage, c’est le régime légal de 
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51 Le jugement traduit le doute sur cette question en parlant de la communauté de biens 
« that might subsist between her and the said defendant ». Elizabeth Harvie c Robert 
Armour, juin 1819, no 353, TL19, S4, SS11, CaM, BAnQ. Cette question de droit 
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devoir passer par une action en séparation de biens. 
55 Au moins 24 cas concernent une épouse abandonnée ou délaissée par son mari, tandis 
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Introduction: Low Law and the Meanings of 
Justice
Low law, found everywhere in the lives of poor and marginalized peoples, 
has long been relegated to muted insignificance by high law, the “most 
loudly articulated account of law.”1 High law and its high justice processes 
have long ruled—in the legal academy and in courthouse corridors, cham-
bers and court rooms dusted by power, legal actors in judicial robes and 
barristers’ gowns, and litigants with money and property at stake. One 
is hard pressed to find the faces or legal struggles of the poor in these 
places. Their sites of justice are invariably less august.  Historians of low 
law courts and tribunals find justice that is unadorned, leaner, and usually 
meaner—more “No Frills” than “Whole Foods.” In the current Canadian 
context, low justice can be found in small town curling rinks and Legion 
halls, in justice of the peace courts, and in windowless urban office build-
ings, where matters such as landlord and tenant and social assistance 
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issues are adjudicated, sometimes presided over by legally trained adjudi-
cators—often not—sometimes with lawyers—often not. 
High law’s chains and claims have been rattled as Canadian legal his-
torians have begun to turn their attention to forms of low law and sites of 
low justice.2 However, myriad methodological challenges await the his-
torian of low law and justice. The people of low law, especially children, 
women, Indigenous prisoners, and even magistrates, were not people 
of wealth and have not left many words, letters, diaries, or newspaper 
articles. There are few official reports of their “small” cases. The records 
and documents are often thin and incomplete, where they exist at all. 
Historians who comb official records and government reports—police, 
immigration, hospital, asylum, Indian department records, treaty annuity 
pay lists, penitentiary registers, and so on— are thrilled when they catch a 
glimpse of someone’s name, distressed when another’s name simply drops 
off a page. Researchers often turn to newspaper accounts of legal proceed-
ings because the original records have been lost or culled.3 But even here, 
one often does not find extensive reports. Working with and between gaps 
and silences, and statistics “incomplete and interpretive as they are,”4 
legal historians piece together what we can, looking wide to find traces, 
mindful that the stories we tell are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, but rather 
interpretations of partial fragments of lives engaged, and often irreparably 
harmed, by low law and justice.
While “every day criminal justice”5 or law “for the lower orders”6 is 
self-evidently not high law, is low law best known only by what it is most 
not? Does it simply underscore the essence of high law and justice, and 
illustrate the legal and social distance from the Supreme Court down to 
the justice of the peace court or welfare tribunal? Recent historical work on 
low law rejects fixed or static notions of the meaning and sites of low law. In 
her work on  local governance in Upper Canada/Ontario, Mary Stokes has 
widened the analytical frame of high law and low law, away from an exclu-
sive focus on the “judicial” and a “restrictive vision of binary hierarchy.”7 
In his study of petty justice in nineteenth-century New Brunswick, Paul 
Craven also argues that one should not think of low law simply as law 
for the lower orders, but as “an administrative, legislative, regulatory and 
judicial whole.”8 For Craven, “high” and “low” law sites—where the power 
and privilege associated with state, class, and gender are either expressed 
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or experienced—are not silos as he demonstrates “considerable interplay” 
between them.9 In his work on borderline crime, Bradley Miller similarly 
speaks of sites of “convergence” between high law and low law.10 This ad-
vice to look at different contexts and to eschew bifurcation in favour of 
connections, convergence, and interplay is most assuredly sound.
In this chapter, I take up some of that advice. However, I am interested 
less in the lines or interplay between high and low justice, than in the 
lines and interplay between different forms of low law and justice, and 
in a different set of “lower order” accused persons. Through a study of 
a small set of nineteenth-century criminal cases from Western Canada 
involving members of the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) accused 
of criminal and disciplinary offences, I study the relationship between two 
statutorily created and ostensibly legal regimes: criminal justice and police 
discipline. 
To do this, I rely on two kinds of archival records housed in differ-
ent archives. The first, and foremost, is comprised of two different sets 
of court records, housed at the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan in 
Regina. These are court records pertaining to Hugh Richardson, who 
was appointed in 1876 as one of the first three stipendiary magistrates 
of the North-West Territories (NWT). Richardson, born in England but 
raised in what is now southern Ontario, was called to the Bar in Upper 
Canada in 1847 and practised law in Woodstock until his appointment 
as chief clerk of the Department of Justice. He received his commission 
as stipendiary magistrate for the NWT in 1876.11 During his career, he 
also served in the militia, rising to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, a title by 
which he continued to be known in the NWT. Richardson and his family 
made their home in the territorial capital of Battleford from his arrival 
on 27 September 1877 until 1883 when the capital shifted to Regina. The 
three stipendiary magistrates served ex officio as members of the Council 
of the NWT. Richardson, who has been described as “the most influential 
member”12 of the Council, played a leadership role in legislative drafting 
(territorial ordinances) and, later, as legal expert and advisor to the terri-
torial government.13 
During his time as stipendiary magistrate in the Saskatchewan 
District,14 he frequently sat in Battleford (where court was held at the 
NWMP detachment), but he also travelled widely15 to points as far west 
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as Edmonton (387 km) and Fort Saskatchewan (400 km), and to the east, 
at Prince Albert (211 km) and Fort Carlton (150 km). His court records 
show that he also travelled to the far south east of the NWT (now southern 
Manitoba) to hear cases in Fort Ellice (611 km) and Shoal Lake (647 km). 
Even before he relocated to Regina, he travelled to the southern part of the 
NWT to hold court in Qu’Appelle (454 km) in 1881 and 1882. He was one 
of the first five judges appointed to the Supreme Court of the North-West 
Territories when it was created in 188616 and when the office of stipendiary 
magistrate was eliminated.
Hugh Richardson’s court records, from his two different judicial pos-
itions in the NWT from 1876 until his retirement in 1903, yield fifteen 
members of the NWMP in the court records: twelve criminal accused 
persons, one police discipline accused, and two civil defendants.17 My pri-
mary focus in this chapter is on the criminal and police discipline cases.
The second type of archival material from which I draw includes 
NWMP records and reports: the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of 
the North-West Mounted Police,18 and the NWMP Personnel – Personnel 
Records, 1873–1904 that form part of the collection of Library and Archives 
Canada.19 Initially, I turned to these two sets of NWMP records to see if 
they contained any additional information on the NWMP accused men 
I had found in the Richardson court files. The NWMP personnel records 
provide a bit more information about the men themselves and (less fre-
quently) some additional information about the criminal charges. They 
also introduced me to the NWMP recruitment and termination process 
and to “defaulters’ sheets” on which a member’s disciplinary record was 
maintained. The NWMP used the language of “crimes” and “convictions” 
to describe these disciplinary offences and dispositions, although none 
were recorded as such in the NWMP’s annual reporting of criminal case 
returns. 
I also turned to the NWMP annual reports to see if the division 
superintendents or the commissioner himself included any reference to 
the criminal cases I had found in the court records. In the annual reports, 
I found a handful of other cases (which I discuss in the chapter) that en-
gaged the criminal and police disciplinary processes. In combination, 
these two sources yield a broader range of accused men, including those 
charged with “crimes” against police discipline as well as desertion. From 
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the annual reports, one finds that more constables and sub-constables 
were charged, punished, and imprisoned (sometimes for lengthier periods 
of time) for breaches of police discipline. As I will discuss below, five of the 
fourteen Mounted Police who appeared in Richardson’s court as criminal 
accused (and whose NWMP personnel records have survived) had experi-
enced police disciplinary processes and punishments for what the NWMP 
called disciplinary crimes.
In both legal contexts, the adjudicators before whom the accused po-
lice could find themselves were the most senior men in the NWMP, either 
their own superior officers (superintendents or inspectors) or the com-
missioner or assistant commissioner. These cases are interesting not least 
because the North-West Mounted Police force has long been synonymous 
with the face of law and justice in the early years of the NWT and re-
garded as essential to the colonial aspirations of the young Canadian state. 
Criminal prosecutions of members of the police and police discipline have 
not been at the forefront of legal historical research. And yet, they offer 
both an opportunity and a challenge to think through the lines, sites, and 
forms of law and justice, and the power relationship within and between 
“Mounted Police courts [and] the ordinary Courts of Law.”20 The ques-
tions they invite involve broad and narrow issues, including the meaning 
of legal and judicial process, and low law sites of justice and injustice. Did 
the police justices of the peace leave their “disciplinary” sensibilities at 
the door of the courtroom when they presided as justice of the peace in 
ordinary criminal matters? Was that even a reasonable prospect given that 
court sittings in the Territories were held in the police barracks? And yet, 
as I will demonstrate, the senior officers guarded the separate sphere of 
their disciplinary process; they could move back and forth with ease, but 
the quality of their internal justice was regarded as off limits. 
Stokes’s reminder of the analytical constraints imposed by “binary” 
categories is important here, because one might be too readily inclined 
to drop a heavy curtain between police disciplinary justice and (regular) 
criminal justice. But to do so would result in a study of only the “front 
of stage” parts of the unique and complex roles of the Mounted Police in 
the administration of justice in the NWT. The police disciplinary justice 
cases demonstrate instances of interrelationship and the importance of 
senior NWMP officers in both contexts. Tracking these cases allows one 
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to see how interconnected these presumptively separate systems were. I 
am interested in revisiting the lines that define military/police and civil 
justice and, aided by the insights of historians Jeffrey McNairn and Greg 
Marquis, in demonstrating that the lines between these two sites of low 
law’s justice were often messy and “blurred.”21 
In the next two sections, I introduce the legal framework of both re-
gimes, before turning to cases of members of the Mounted Police who 
were prosecuted in one or both legal contexts. Despite the formally dis-
crete processes, senior NWMP brass were, to say the least, significant and 
powerful actors in both. As I will show, these cases reveal the fluidity of 
their roles and their often close relationships with the stipendiary magis-
trate. More than a few procedural lapses occurred, and cases slipped back 
and forth between police discipline and criminal justice, often highlight-
ing the tensions between the disciplinary priorities of the NWMP and the 
procedural safeguards of the criminal law process. 
The Legal Framework of Criminal Justice in the 
North-West Territories
The acquisition of the territory of the western plains in 1870 had been a 
priority for the young Canadian state, one that eclipsed any process or 
consultation with the Indigenous peoples who lived there. However, the 
matter of the establishment of the institutions for the administration of 
justice also was not an immediate priority. The “inadequate legal system,” 
described by Peter Ward as a renovated “hand-me-down judicial sys-
tem” from the Hudson’s Bay Company, was one in which the Lieutenant-
Governor of the NWT was empowered to appoint a recorder and justices 
of the peace.22 Six justices were appointed. Neither a legislative framework 
nor new institutions for the administration of justice were created until 
1873, when John A. Macdonald’s government “hastily”23 introduced a trio 
of federal statutes to provide for the creation of the Department of the 
Interior (whose minister was to have control and management of the af-
fairs of the NWT and to act as Superintendent General of Indian Affairs), 
for the administration of justice and the creation of the NWMP, and for 
the application of Canadian criminal legislation to the Territories.24
18510 | Getting Their Man
The most important Act introduced the office of stipendiary magistrate 
as the senior judicial position in the NWT, and created the North-West 
Mounted Police,25 originally a force of three hundred men whose ranks 
rose and ebbed over the next three decades at the will of their political 
masters.26 Although the police force was established almost immediately, 
the stipendiary magistrates were not appointed until 1876, when James 
Farquharson Macleod, Matthew Ryan, and Hugh Richardson received 
their commissions. 
By the NWMP Act, 1873, a stipendiary magistrate was to be ap-
pointed “by commission” by the Governor General, to receive a yearly 
salary of $3,000 (as well as actual travel expenses), to hold office within 
the NWT “during pleasure,” with the ability to perform magisterial and 
judicial functions of a justice of the peace or two justices of the peace.27 
The stipendiary magistrate was given summary jurisdiction to “hear and 
determine . . . without the intervention of a jury,” a wide range of offences, 
including larceny, assaults, sexual assaults on young girls, and obstruction 
and assault upon judicial and other officers in the execution of their duty, 
and to sentence convicted individuals to terms of imprisonment less than 
two years.28
The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench was to play a role in respect 
of offences Parliament considered more serious: either a judge of that 
Court or two stipendiary magistrates sitting together were empowered to 
conduct trials without a jury for offences punishable by up to seven years 
imprisonment.29 Only a Manitoba Queen’s Bench judge had jurisdiction to 
try, before a jury, anyone charged with a capital offence.30
The North-West Territories Act, 187531 consolidated and amended the 
administrative institutions and legal framework of the Territories. The 
Lieutenant-Governor and Council were empowered to establish ordin-
ances (local legislation for the Territories), which were to be laid before 
Parliament but no longer required its prior approval.32
The 1875 Act limited the summary jurisdiction of the NWT stipendi-
ary magistrates through a cumbersome requirement that introduced a new 
supervisory role for the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench: a judge of the 
Manitoba Court had jurisdiction to hear both criminal and civil claims, 
with a stipendiary magistrate sitting as an associate.33 Given the expanse 
of the Territories and the difficult logistics of travel, this new requirement 
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was an onerous impediment to access to justice and one that was immedi-
ately subject to criticism. In 1877, this requirement was abandoned, and 
the NWT stipendiary magistrates again had summary jurisdiction to ad-
judicate in criminal matters and, now, in civil matters as well.34  
Beyond the judicial office of the stipendiary magistrate, the admin-
istration of justice was placed in the hands of the police. The NWMP 
Act, 1873 reposed in the NWMP extensive responsibility in relation to 
all aspects of criminal justice in the Territories. In addition to duties re-
lating to preventing crime, preserving the peace, enforcing the laws and 
ordinances of the NWT, and apprehending alleged criminal offenders, the 
NWMP were to attend upon the stipendiary magistrate and justices of the 
peace, to execute their warrants, to escort prisoners and lunatics to their 
respective places of the confinement, and to confine sentenced prisoners 
in their guardrooms.35
Significantly, senior NWMP officers also had juridical authority. The 
men who served as NWMP commissioners and officers had been military 
men, many of them born in England. They brought to the NWMP and 
to the administration of justice in the NWT their military training and 
experience. However, only three (James Farquharson Macleod, William 
M. Herchmer, and Quebec-born Sévère Gagnon) had legal training and 
were qualified as barristers.36 
By statute in 1873 and 1874, the commissioner (then George Arthur 
French, in charge of the whole force) was made, ex officio, first a justice 
of the peace and then a stipendiary magistrate. The office of assistant 
commissioner was created in 1874, and he and the superintendents (who 
would be in charge of each of the force’s geographically dispersed div-
isions, as they were established), and potentially other officers appointed 
by the commissioner, were also made justices of the peace (ex officio) by 
virtue of these statutes.37 In 1879, the assistant commissioner also became 
ex officio a stipendiary magistrate.38 As suggested above, in these early 
years, stipendiary magistrates and justices of the peace had jurisdiction 
to conduct trials for less serious criminal and regulatory (ordinance) of-
fences and to conduct preliminary criminal processes (committal hear-
ings) for more serious offences, which would be tried by a more senior 
judge or magistrate. For a brief period (1875–1877), serious criminal and 
all civil matters were required to be tried by a Manitoba Queen’s Bench 
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judge, with a stipendiary magistrate sitting as an associate. But after 1877 
and until 1886, when the judicial position of stipendiary magistrate was 
supplanted by the Supreme Court of the North-West Territories,39 the sti-
pendiary magistrates had jurisdiction to hear matters alone, or in serious 
or capital offence cases, with a justice of the peace as associate and a jury 
of six men.
In the NWT, the matters over which a justice of the peace, sitting alone 
or with another justice of the peace, had jurisdiction to preside ranged 
widely. Their jurisdiction included such matters as enforcing minor crim-
inal statutes and the penal clauses of territorial ordinances; adjudicating 
on a person’s sanity; issuing orders of alcohol interdiction; conducting 
marriages; and ordering veterinarians to inspect animals for sickness.40 
Presiding over committal hearings, justices of the peace received depos-
itions of witnesses when serious offences were alleged and also committed 
accused persons for trial before stipendiary magistrates. Justices of the 
peace conducted summary trials in less serious criminal matters, sen-
tencing those they convicted. The NWMP annual criminal case returns 
appended to the commissioners’ annual reports reveal that the police jus-
tices presided over most of the criminal cases that came before justices of 
the peace,41 including trials of accused persons they themselves had appre-
hended.42 Then, as now, “low law/low justice” judicial officers carried the 
heaviest load.
When the five-member Supreme Court of the NWT came into being 
in 1886, with full civil and criminal jurisdiction, three stipendiary magis-
trates (Macleod, Richardson, and Quebec-born lawyer and jurist Charles-
Borromée Rouleau, who had been appointed in 1883) became judges of 
the new court. The two new judges were Edward L. Wetmore and Thomas 
H. McGuire. The judges held office “during good behavior,” a more secure 
form of judicial tenure that replaced their earlier “at pleasure” appoint-
ments as stipendiary magistrates and increased the bench’s independence. 
When, with the creation of the NWT Supreme Court, the position of 
stipendiary magistrate ceased to exist,43 the commissioner (Lawrence W. 
Herchmer) and the assistant commissioner (Lawrence’s brother William) 
continued to sit as justices of the peace.44 Because no grand jury sat in the 
NWT, preliminary hearings would continue to be conducted by justices 
of the peace.45 The capacity of the commissioner, assistant commissioner, 
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and superintendents to continue to act as justices of the peace was formal-
ly clarified by statute in 1894.46
No image is more associated with Canadian law on the nineteenth-cen-
tury plains than that of the NWMP. It would be an error in interpretation 
to suggest that the NWMP were anything less than the expression and 
embodiment of law and law enforcement in the NWT. However, they also 
represented a great deal more. They were representatives of the Queen and, 
as others have noted, the “eyes and ears of the government.”47 When no 
Indian Agent was appointed initially for the Treaty Seven region, it fell to 
the NWMP to attend to the First Nations in that territory.48 They were re-
sponsible for delivering mail, patrolling the US/Canadian border, admin-
istering customs and quarantine, and providing supports and services to 
settlers and their communities. They kept an eye on European immigrant 
communities and a careful watch on the American Mormons thought to 
engage in polygamy. They policed the First Nations and provided relief to 
starving First Nations and Métis communities.49 And so on. Whether one 
describes their role as “Agents of the National Policy,”50 in which one can 
see the “first faint stirrings of the Canadian welfare state,”51 and/or as an 
expression of colonial domination, and/or as the coercive and repressive 
arm of the young Canadian state, no historian of Western Canada denies 
their importance.52
THE NORTH WEST MOUNTED POLICE ACT: THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF THE MEN OF THE NWMP
The expressions made use of by [Acting Staff Constable] 
Marshall were to the effect that the prisoner in question 
[Henry Elliott] had been punished without any proof that 
he was guilty. He said it was an imitation of Capt. Frechette’s 
mode of disposing of a case, “You are guilty! Prove yourself 
innocent.”53
J.W. Little’s statement above, in an 1878 case, recounts the assessment of 
the quality of police disciplinary justice by those on the receiving end. 
The roles of the NWMP in relation to the administration of justice and to 
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government policy, including policies in relation to Indigenous peoples, 
have been well documented.54 Less has been written about the role of the 
police in policing themselves, whether through the “conduct and disci-
pline” process or through criminal prosecution of “delinquent” members 
who had offended Canadian criminal law.55 
As well as playing important roles in the legal processes brought by 
civilians, the commissioner (and after 1875, also the assistant commission-
er, inspectors commanding NWMP posts, and stipendiary magistrates56) 
had legal authority to investigate, judge, and punish members of the force 
for disciplinary offences. Notably, NWMP superintendents of the vari-
ous divisions initially did not have this jurisdiction, although they were 
justices of the peace.57 Thus, as of 1875, the commissioner and assistant 
commissioner, as ex officio stipendiary magistrates, were two of five of the 
senior judicial officers in the Territories and thus had jurisdiction over a 
wide range of criminal and police disciplinary offences. This combination 
of judicial and disciplinary power in the hands of individual NWMP offi-
cers produced jurisdictional confusion and unusual legal peril for the men 
of the force, peril that did not end even as a more regularized court system 
developed, as the NWMP managed to keep the courts at arm’s length. 
The Richardson court records yield twelve cases that came before him 
during his tenure as magistrate and later judge in which NWMP men 
were criminally prosecuted. The NWMP personnel records of these men 
add further information about them and about the disciplinary and/or 
dismissal proceedings several of them experienced. Their cases highlight 
the prominent role of the NWMP brass in both criminal justice and po-
lice justice. A review of their criminal cases and NWMP records, together 
with the annual reports of the NWMP commanding offices, opens a win-
dow onto another dimension of both criminal law and of the force itself in 
the NWT. The criminal and disciplinary processes, considered in relation 
to each other, demonstrate a perhaps unanticipated vulnerability of the 
members of the junior ranks of the police force to charges and imprison-
ment for myriad disciplinary crimes for which, as I will demonstrate, they 
had no recourse to appeal outside the force. 
The original Act of 1873 had been silent with respect to internal gov-
ernance of the rigidly hierarchical NWMP.58 In fact, sixteen more years 
would pass before a complete set of written “Rules and Regulations” for the 
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North-West Mounted Police would be approved by Parliament.59 RCMP 
historians William Beahen and Stan Horrall suggest that the influence of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary can be seen in the disciplinary procedures, 
but there were no provisions for forms of military punishment, such as 
“imprisonment, solitary confinement, punishment drills, flogging, [or] ... 
execution in time of war.”60 
Disciplinary crimes, as they were called, ranged from disobedience, 
insubordination, and drunkenness to desertion. A log of crimes and pun-
ishments was recorded in the “defaulters’ books” for each division and 
on “defaulters’ sheets” kept in individual members’ personnel records. At 
the end of either disciplinary or criminal proceedings, NWMP offend-
ers could find themselves in front of a discharge board of officers, facing 
dismissal.
In 1874, the NWMP’s governing legislation, which came to be known 
as the “Police Act,” was amended.61 The statute’s exhaustive section 22 
listed no fewer than fifty offences for which a member of the force could 
be found in breach of discipline. This section cast a wide net, itemizing 
the expected forms of breach (disobedience, absenting oneself from duty, 
intoxication “however slight,” misappropriation of funds, making false 
statements or certificates, insubordination, and mutiny) together with less 
precisely expressed forms of breaches, such as disgraceful or scandalous 
conduct. The section also made it a disciplinary offence for a member to 
use any of the necessaries belonging to any comrade without his consent, 
to be seen in a public house when not there on duty, and to borrow money 
from another member of the force of inferior rank, among others. The list 
was extensive. The commissioner himself had the discretion to dismiss, 
suspend, demote, or fine a member who was found to have committed a 
breach of discipline. 
In 1875, Parliament scaled back the range of disciplinary offences to 
twenty-two, which ranged from immoral behaviour and intoxication to 
corruption, disobedience and insubordination, illegal or concealed pos-
session of intoxicating liquor, and evincing partisan political support.62 
Imprisonment was added as an available form of punishment. On a writ-
ten charge being preferred against a member, the commissioner, assistant 
commissioner, inspector commanding a post, or stipendiary magistrate 
was to cause that member to be brought before him. He was “then and 
19110 | Getting Their Man
there, in a summary way, to investigate the charge or charges, and on oath 
if he thinks fit, and if proved to his satisfaction . . . [to] convict the offend-
er” (my emphasis); this was clearly an inquisitorial process, with a low-
er standard of proof. Upon conviction, the offending member was liable 
to a range of punishments, including a fine not exceeding one month’s 
pay, imprisonment with hard labour, initially for a term not exceeding 
six months, or both a fine and imprisonment. The sentence imposed for 
a disciplinary “crime” was to be in addition to any punishment imposed 
for an offence under the law of the NWT. The consolidated “Police Act” of 
1879 incorporated these changes.63 
When the police legislation was revised in 1886, the disciplinary 
offences incorporated certain statutory changes made in 1882 and were 
enumerated as sub-sections (a) to (v) of section 18.64 The 1882 changes 
increased the maximum sentence of imprisonment to twelve months (s. 
18(2)). There were additional penalties for deserters (s. 24), and a dismissed 
or discharged member who neglected or refused to return his “clothing, 
arms, accoutrements and all property of the Crown in his possession” 
was also liable to be convicted of a summary conviction offence (s. 23). 
All sentences of imprisonment exceeding one month were to be reported 
to the commissioner, who could in his discretion reverse or mitigate the 
sentence. A sentence of imprisonment brought more than the pain of con-
finement: it packed a material punch as a member forfeited his pay during 
the period of imprisonment (s. 18(3)). 
After 1886, under the leadership of a new commissioner, Lawrence W. 
Herchmer, the matter of conduct and discipline within the force took on 
great importance. Herchmer assumed command of a police force that had 
doubled its numbers in less than a year: by the end of 1885, the NWMP 
was comprised of 1,039 men, distributed across twelve divisions.65 Prime 
Minister John A. Macdonald’s appointment of Herchmer was controver-
sial, as more than one senior NWMP officer in the force had thought he 
himself ought to have been elevated in place of Herchmer. The new com-
missioner had extensive history in the NWT but no history in the force. 
Herchmer became actively involved in discipline matters and developed a 
reputation as a “pitiless disciplinarian”; his approach to the scope of police 
discipline was broad and included using the disciplinary “code” to “pun-
ish men for actions that were really criminal in nature.”66 
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Herchmer was aware of public concern and politicians’ criticism of his 
expansive approach to the disciplinary process; he defended the import-
ance of discipline over criminal justice:
In the past men caught stealing, for example, have been 
charged with “disgraceful conduct” under the police regu-
lations, which is what theft is considered to be. If we cannot 
continue to do this, it will be impossible to maintain disci-
pline. In the civil courts they will be treated like civilians 
and punished like civilians with lenient sentences com-
pared to those under the police regulation. What is more, 
there could be a delay of up to two months before their case 
would be heard. It is essential . . . that punishment is prompt 
if discipline is to succeed.67 
In 1889, at Herchmer’s instance, but largely penned by Superintendent R. 
Burton Deane,68 an Order in Council established Regulations and Orders 
for the Government and Guidance of the NWMP.69 Published in the form 
of a small handbook designed to fit in a uniform pocket, this was the 
force’s first set of regulations, and every member was expected to know its 
provisions. Almost half of the regulations (twenty-one out of forty-three 
sections) were devoted to the description of the duties of each rank in 
the force (from commissioner down through twenty lower ranks to con-
stable). These new Regulations bore an indelible stamp that marked an 
unflinching commitment to hierarchy, obedience, and discipline, and to 
the severe sanction of those in the lower ranks who challenged, disobeyed, 
or deserted. This won the NWMP no popularity contests within or with-
out the ranks of the force, but once promulgated, the Regulations put all 
ranks on notice of their place in the hierarchy as well the consequences of 
their missteps. 
The new Regulations reminded members of the force that the police 
were “a preventative as well as repressive force, and the prevention of 
crime [was] of even more importance than the punishment of criminals” 
(s. 1(2)). Every member was instructed “to receive the lawful commands of 
his superior officer with deference and respect” (s. 1(13)). Constables were 
directed that “obedience [was] the first quality required of them”—“the 
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essence of discipline and the channel of advancement” (s. 25(4)). Constables 
were “always to appear properly dressed” and “gambling of any kind” was 
strictly forbidden (ss. 25(2) and (3)). The defaulters’ records contain sever-
al entries in which the crime of being improperly dressed comprised the 
disciplinary breach. 
Section 30, one of the longer sections in the 1889 Regulations, was de-
voted to “Offences and Punishments.” It incorporated s. 18 of the NWMP 
Act, 1886 (i.e., “Police Act”), and subsection 3 explained that the explicitly 
specified offences were intended to include unspecified “minor offences 
and irregularities.”
The disposition for “all first offences not of an aggravated nature” was 
to be one of “mild reproof and admonition” (s. 30(6)). Punishment was 
not to be resorted to until the offence was repeated. While imprisonment 
was clearly available as a form of punishment, the Regulations explicit-
ly directed “both fine and imprisonment” only for drunkenness on duty 
(s. 30(13)). However, by implication, imprisonment was available for all 
cases that called for “severe punishment.” If punishment involved a term 
of imprisonment, the imprisoned police found themselves in the same 
guardroom as (regular) prisoners awaiting trial or serving sentences for 
criminal convictions.70
When imprisonment was considered too severe, “confinement to bar-
racks” was authorized for a period not to exceed twenty-eight days; this 
punishment could be accompanied by a fine (s. 30(7)). When confined to 
barracks, a member was required to perform all his regular duties, and, 
at the discretion of the commanding officer, he could be required to per-
form “duties of fatigue” (s. 30(8))—unspecified, but likely meaning “hard 
labour.”
Drunkenness was described as an “unusually reprehensible offence 
in members of the force, and as such [was to be] severely dealt with” (s. 
30(11)). Subsections 30(12) – (16) were devoted to the matter of drunken-
ness and the process to be followed in dealing with an intoxicated member 
(including the provision of a twenty-four-hour “sobering up” period before 
the member was brought before the commanding officer). Presumably the 
force’s severity about alcohol was particularly intense because the NWT 
were “dry”—it was illegal to manufacture, possess, or import intoxicating 
liquor without a permit issued by the Lieutenant-Governor.71 
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As noted above, a detailed record in each defaulters’ book and indi-
vidual defaulter’s sheet was to be kept. A review of one defaulters’ book 
from the Eastend post in “B” Division (1880–82) in the southern region of 
the NWT reveals that over the period, thirty-one of fifty-six men across 
the ranks (sergeant, corporal, and constable) were found to have commit-
ted different forms of disciplinary crimes, ranging from the most minor 
(e.g., grumbling against an order of the sergeant-major; in this case, the 
grumbling was the constable’s only recorded infraction, for which he was 
admonished) to more serious  charges (some of them arguably criminal), 
such as “striking and using obscene threatening language” and breach of 
trust (“having appropriated to his own use [a] parcel addressed toward 
police with clerk [sic] which he had in his possession as troop orderly,” for 
which the Commissioner reduced this corporal’s rank to constable).72
The disciplinary offences entered in this defaulters’ book include forms 
of disobedience and insubordination (nine entries); dereliction of duty, 
including absence without permission (fifteen, including six separate en-
tries for one individual constable, with escalating sanctions culminating 
in seven days’ imprisonment at hard labour); drunkenness (five, including 
three for “drunk on duty”); making false statements and/or statements 
which were harmful to the reputation of an officer or the force (three); 
and offences that were akin to criminal offences (six). Forms of sanction 
ranged from admonishment and severe reprimands to fines combined 
with confinement to barracks, loss of pay, and imprisonment in the cells.
It is difficult to assess with confidence, without knowing more about 
the particulars of each individual and each offence, whether the punish-
ments were applied even-handedly. It does appear that being drunk on 
duty was regarded as a serious disciplinary breach (two men were reduced 
in rank and a third was fined one month’s pay and confined to camp for 
three months). However, a constable whose offence was “being asleep in 
post” was sentenced to seven days in the cells and the loss of one month’s 
pay, whereas another who made “false statements to civilians tending to 
leave a bad impression as to the workings of the force” and also falsely 
stated that “he could get illicit liquor at any time and had it every day with 
the exception of the last week” was fined only $5 and confined to barracks 
for one month.
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It appears to have been possible to avoid police discipline, judging 
from the fact that twenty-five members of the Eastend post had no entries 
in the defaulters’ book from 1879–82; however, it also appears that many 
of the men found themselves disciplined and sanctioned for some manner 
of disciplinary breach. It also bears noting that despite the force’s concern 
with intoxication, the instances of drunkenness recorded in this default-
ers’ book were rare and severely punished.
The NWMP was not modest in its claims or vision for complete 
control of their process for dealing with what were, after all, legislatively 
prescribed disciplinary offences. Though based on federally enacted legis-
lation, the force’s brass brooked no oversight or intervention of legal coun-
sel or the civil courts. Once the legislation was enacted, the “rule of law” 
had no further place in police discipline, as clearly “rule” trumped “law.”
From time to time, the commissioner’s annual report included rec-
ommendations for amendments to the “Police Act.” In his 1885 report, 
Commissioner A.G. Irvine recommended that the Act be altered to pro-
vide explicitly that “an offender convicted under the penal clauses of the 
Police Act for an offence against police discipline shall not be subject to 
any writ of habeas corpus,73 to ensure that no recourse to the civil courts 
to determine the validity of the internal process or the sentence imposed 
would be possible. Failing such a provision, Irvine insisted, “the interests 
of discipline will assuredly suffer.”74 He expanded upon his view of pro-
cedural safeguards and requisites—no lawyers, no courts:
I have already had occasion to insist that a police prisoner 
has an appeal from a sentence inflicted by his commanding 
officer to myself, and through myself, if necessary, to the 
“Minister charged with the control and management of the 
Force,” but that no other appeal is intended, or can be al-
lowed. Further, that no legal counsel can be permitted in a 
question of police discipline.75
As noted above, this view was continued, and indeed reinforced, by Irvine’s 
successor, Lawrence W. Herchmer, who maintained that the force’s disci-
plinary jurisdiction had to encompass the right to deal with the criminal 
conduct of members through police discipline. For the NWMP brass, the 
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Act, its disciplinary offences, and its process for dealing with them were 
a comprehensive code, “based in law on amendments to the police act,”76 
but administered through the exclusive discretion of the senior officers. In 
1886, however, in response to a sentence of twelve months at hard labour 
with “ball and chain” imposed on a deserter by Commissioner Herchmer 
(a form of punishment he favoured), Justice Edward Wetmore of the NWT 
Supreme Court observed that “there was no provision under the NWMP 
Act by which members could be sentenced to wear a ball and chain for 
infractions of the disciplinary code.”77 In other words, Herchmer had 
exceeded his jurisdiction in imposing a sentence that was not expressly 
authorized in the legislation. 
Years later in his memoirs, Superintendent R. Burton Deane recalled 
a conversation with his friend, North-West Supreme Court Justice David 
Lynch Scott, about the discrete sphere of police “courts”: “so long as I do 
not exceed my jurisdiction, you have no lawful right to interfere with 
me.”78 According to Deane, an initially incredulous Scott came to agree 
with him. Deane elaborated upon this issue in his 1899 annual report 
from the Macleod district:
The Mounted Police Act having created a court and clothed 
it with authority, and having defined intoxication, however 
slight, and desertion or absence without leave, as two of the 
offences with which it has power to deal, it is not to be seri-
ously contended that such a court exceeds its jurisdiction by 
proposing to deal with a deserter whenever he may chance 
to appear before it. . . .  
[T]he Northwest Mounted Police, if not a military body, are 
as nearly military as it is possible for an armed body of con-
stabulary to be; that the statute by virtue of which they exist 
enjoins and provides for the maintenance of discipline, and 
that their regulations are essentially of a military character. 
Their regulations respecting the grant of an indulgence of a 
pass, and the form of pass itself, are adapted from those in 
vogue in the British Army, and are purely matters affecting 
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the interior economy and discipline of the persons who are 
servants of the state, under the Mounted Police statute.79 
Here Deane was defending one of his own actions earlier in 1892, when 
he cancelled a short leave that he had granted to a constable with only 
seven days remaining in his term of service. Before the end of his leave, 
the constable began to celebrate prematurely by drinking and expressing 
his dissatisfaction with the force—within earshot of Deane. Rather than 
having him taken into custody and charged with the offence of intoxi-
cation, Deane simply cancelled the man’s leave and ordered him back to 
duty. The constable, believing he had already been discharged from the 
force but, clearly fearing punishment if he was wrong, fled the post. He 
retained a lawyer in Calgary to challenge Deane’s action, and his counsel 
persuaded Justice Charles-Borromée Rouleau “to stay the hand of the po-
lice permanently.”80
Deane maintained that his decision to cancel the pass fell within his 
unfettered jurisdiction. The “formidable legal argument for overturning 
Rouleau’s judgment” that was presented on appeal to the full Supreme 
Court of the NWT had been prepared by Deane himself.81 In setting aside 
Justice Rouleau’s writ of prohibition, the full Court did not go so far as 
to endorse Deane’s expansive notion of his jurisdiction; the Court sim-
ply found that the constable was still engaged as a member of the force 
when the incident occurred and thus still subject to Deane’s authority. 
According to Beahen and Horrall, “[t]he question . . . of whether the 
disciplinary system of the NWMP was subject to the authority of the civil 
courts still remained unanswered.”82 However, the constable’s initial suc-
cess in the civil(ian) court and the perceived threat it posed to the author-
ity of the NWMP had been received “like a knife at the jugular of Force 
discipline.”83 William Beahen quotes Commissioner Herchmer: “If the 
judges are to interfere in police discipline it will be the end of it, as every 
man will get a lawyer.”84
The multiple roles assigned to the commanding officer under the 
NWMP legislation for matters of alleged disciplinary breaches—to in-
vestigate, to adjudicate, and to impose punishment – assumed amplified 
importance. These men had sweeping adjudicative authority in two legal 
contexts: as justices of the peace, they presided in “civilian” criminal court; 
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as commanding officers, they had the authority, indeed the responsibility, 
to preside over disciplinary “crimes” (which could include forms of crim-
inal offences recast as disciplinary breaches) without being burdened by 
the requisite of the evidence being taken under oath, unless they saw fit. 
They had the power to impose sentences of imprisonment in both con-
texts. They likely wore their uniforms in both forms of proceedings, which 
would have been held in the police barracks.
Because they were both NWMP officers and either stipendiary magis-
trates or justices of the peace, the NWMP officers could adjudicate in 
two legal contexts—criminal justice and police justice—but they clearly 
preferred the expedited process and unfettered control they exercised in 
the disciplinary context. Senior men like Irvine, Herchmer, and Deane 
operated with an expansive notion of their jurisdiction. Confident that the 
“higher law” of police discipline permitted a regime of arbitrary justice, 
they freely and liberally “inflicted” (Irvine’s word85) severe punishments 
upon men of the lower ranks.
It is difficult to assess how scrupulous the men who were both NWMP 
officers and justices of the peace were about the differences between their 
two roles. In Constable Arthur Miles Parken’s personnel record, for in-
stance, it is not clear how Superintendent Howe thought he was presiding 
at the 23 January 1894 hearing of a “charge” (the language of police disci-
pline) that Parken did “steal take from and appropriate to his own use” a 
sum of money ($25.00), the property of another constable. The form of this 
hearing was identical to an earlier hearing of a breach of discipline charge 
brought against Parken by Superintendent Moffatt for “being drunk at the 
barracks” in August 1893, and for which he was fined $10.00. The record 
of the January 1894 proceeding reads as if it also was a disciplinary hear-
ing under the NWMP Act even though Howe signed off as “JP” (and not 
as Superintendent, his NWMP rank); however, the last page of the rec-
ord makes clear that Howe was conducting a preliminary (or committal) 
hearing into the criminal charge of larceny, as Parken was “committed 
for trial at the next court of competent jurisdiction.”86 Justice McGuire of 
the NWT Supreme Court subsequently sentenced Parken to six months’ 
imprisonment at hard labour.87
It would not have been lost on the men under their command, such 
as Parken, that their superior officers were also justices of the peace. Their 
19910 | Getting Their Man
commanding officer was ex officio a justice of the peace for the NWT, but 
he was also, indeed first and foremost, their superior officer.
Another case from “C” division in Battleford offers yet another illus-
tration: in addition to their dual judicial roles, commanding officers some-
times also acted as accusers or complainants in both discipline and crim-
inal contexts. In late October 1894, Constable Frank Kiely was charged 
with three counts of theft of jewelry, a pocket book, and articles of cloth-
ing, involving three different informants (two of whom were members 
of the NWMP). Described by Superintendent Howe as his servant, Kiely 
was brought before Howe as a justice of the peace for committal on two 
of the criminal charges. Kiely also faced a third charge that alleged theft 
of Howe’s pocket book from a locked drawer in his dressing room at his 
house. Another NWMP officer, Quebec-born and francophone Inspector 
Joseph Victor Bégin,88 sitting as a justice of the peace, presided at the com-
mittal hearing on this charge. To all three criminal charges, Kiely indi-
cated he wanted to plead guilty. When asked to elect whether to be tried 
summarily then and there by a (police) justice of the peace or to wait and 
be tried by a judge, Kiely appears not to have hesitated to elect to enter his 
plea on all three charges before a judge. On 15 June 1895 Kiely appeared 
before the NWT Supreme Court Justice Charles-Borromée Rouleau, 
who sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment at hard labour.89 Even 
though Kiely must have known that he would be held in custody in the 
NWMP guardhouse for several more months before being brought before 
a judge—in the end, he was held for almost seven months—he clearly did 
not want the police justices of the peace, including his commanding offi-
cer, determining his guilt and deciding his sentence.90 The NWMP did not 
wait for the outcome in the criminal court to direct his dismissal from the 
force, which took effect on 1 December 1894.
The NWMP’s legislation expressly contemplated that a member of the 
NWMP could be convicted and sentenced twice for the same misconduct.91 
This would prove to be Constable Robert Jones’s unhappy experience in 
1891.92 Jones, a twenty-year-old recruit, was engaged as a constable on 28 
February 1890 and posted to the division at Fort Macleod where he was 
put in charge of the saddle room; his duties included receiving the ration 
of oats and filling the horses’ nose bags. On the morning of 5 February 
1891, he was observed by the division’s head teamster placing two bags of 
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oats in a wagon owned by Thomas Craig, a rancher and former NWMP 
member. Apparently Craig had permission to haul away manure from the 
post and came every morning to do so; Superintendent S.B. Steele noted 
in his letter to the commissioner that the excuse offered was that “the oats 
were the sweepings of the saddle room.”93 Charged with larceny as a public 
servant, Jones was committed for trial and, on 17 February 1891, he was 
convicted by (former NWMP commissioner) Justice James Farquharson 
Macleod.94 Macleod sentenced Jones, along with Craig, to six months’ im-
prisonment at hard labour in the guardroom at Fort Macleod.95 Following 
his sentencing, Jones was charged under the NWMP Act with a breach of 
discipline; he was convicted on 23 February 1891 and sentenced to twelve 
months’ imprisonment at hard labour to run concurrently with Macleod’s 
sentence. Dismissal at the end of his sentence was recommended. Almost 
immediately Superintendent Steele recommended to the commissioner a 
partial remission of the twelve-month sentence to match the six months 
imposed by Macleod; Steele did not dispute the sentence, but remarked, 
“as he is young the severe lesson he has already received may have weight 
with him and as it expires in the summer it gives him more chance of get-
ting immediate employment.”96 Several months later, after the co-accused 
already had been released, the commissioner appears to have relented 
on the matter of remission. He authorized the matter to go to a Board of 
Officers97 who, prior to the expiration of Jones’s full “disciplinary” sen-
tence, directed his dismissal for “bad conduct.”98
For their part, many constables and sub-constables experienced “un-
fulfilled expectations and disenchantment:”99 “I thought it was a Civil 
Force to fill the duty of a policeman. I found it more like soldiering. I am 
not cut out to be a soldier.”100 Others expressed disgust at “the unjust and 
arbitrary system of discipline” and punishment “often meted out accord-
ing to the whim or humour of those in authority.”101 Beahen and Horrall 
also cite the case of a constable charged with insubordination, having re-
fused to obey a corporal’s order to “get on with his work,” for which he was 
sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment by his commanding officer; the 
constable apparently lost his temper and said, “Send me for the rest of my 
life. I won’t do another stroke of work.” The superintendent did not have 
jurisdiction to impose a life sentence and simply sentenced him to the 
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longest sentence he could impose, a further twelve months, for mutinous 
language.102
Over the years, collective acts of protest and resistance known as 
“bucks” (as in “bucking the system”) at the harsh conditions of life, work, 
and discipline in the Mounted Police force also occurred,103 and many in-
dividual demonstrations of resistance, often “out of desperation,”104 were 
expressed annually through desertion from the force.105 Life and work 
under the conditions in the force, and the power that came with exclusive 
jurisdiction over police justice, were too much for many members who 
must have had a sense of injustice at police justice.
BLURRED LINES AND INTERSECTING FORMS: CRIMES 
AND CONDUCT, CRIMINAL AND DISCIPLINARY JUSTICE 
One half of the NWMP men who appeared as accused persons in Hugh 
Richardson’s court (including Richard C. Wyld, the sole disciplinary 
offender) had prior personal experience of a broader notion of “crimes” 
through disciplinary proceedings under the police legislation. They were 
liable to be charged, investigated, tried, and sanctioned within two legal 
regimes: one criminal, one disciplinary. From Richardson’s court records 
over the entire period, an image emerges of a close, if occasionally con-
tested, relationship between criminal offences and disciplinary offences as 
well as between the judiciary and the NWMP brass. The cases of NMWP 
accused men found in Richardson’s records largely involved charges of 
theft, including theft of items of government property or belongings of 
other members of the NWMP (including a couple of commanding offi-
cers). Some prosecutions involved offences that were forms of breach of 
trust. In all but four cases, the accused police officers were convicted, 
either after a trial or by way of a guilty plea, and all the convicted men 
were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. While not all the personnel rec-
ords for the NWMP that appeared before Richardson in the earlier period 
(1876–1885) are available, it appears that five of the seven men who were 
convicted and sentenced by Richardson in the NWT Supreme Court were 
dismissed from the force upon their conviction (or impending conviction). 
It is difficult to understand why the remaining two, George Robinson and 
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James Ford, whose cases I discuss below, were allowed to remain on the 
force, even for a brief period. 
The cases found in Richardson’s earlier magistrate’s court records 
illustrate some of the intricacies, intimacies, and blurred lines between 
criminal and police justice. It must be acknowledged that in this first 
decade of the history of the NWT, including a newly created police force 
and administration of justice, the number of men responsible for law en-
forcement and the administration of justice was small. The relationship 
between Stipendiary Magistrate Richardson and the senior NWMP brass 
(especially in Battleford) appears to have been close.  Settlements were far-
flung, NWMP posts similarly few and far between. But, as far-flung as the 
posts and settlements were, the living conditions in the barracks (often 
little more than a couple of log cabins for quarters and a stable for horses 
and livestock) would have been stiflingly close. Battleford, where three of 
the four early cases below took place, had been chosen as the territorial 
capital in the fall of 1876. Even by territorial standards, Battleford was a 
new settlement. The year 1875 had “marked the beginning of a permanent 
settlement”; it was a “small settlement of construction workers, traders 
and Indians” then called Telegraph Flat.106 Richardson and his family 
made their home in Battleford from his arrival on 27 September 1877, until 
1883 when the territorial capital shifted to Regina.107 The importance and 
standing of the Métis community in Battleford, when Richardson arrived 
in late September 1877, emerge early on in his court records; for instance, 
Métis men Peter Ballendine and Pierre Daigneault played prominent roles 
in the cases, including as litigants, witnesses, Cree interpreters, and jurors.
Regnier Brillon: Thief and Forgiving Friend
One of the earliest files in Richardson’s stipendiary magistrate records in-
volved the 1877 prosecution of Sub-Constable Regnier Brillon, stationed 
in Battleford, on three counts of theft of firearms from other members of 
the force.108 Brillon’s undoing was his effort to turn a profit by selling the 
guns to reasonably prominent members of the Battleford community, in-
cluding James Mahoney, a local businessman, and Pierre Daignault, who 
would often serve as a Cree interpreter for the court.109 The exact process 
followed in Brillon’s case is not crystal clear. The preliminary hearing in 
Battleford, at which Superintendent James Walker, sitting as a justice of 
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the peace, committed Brillon to stand trial, took place on 27 January 1877, 
eight months before Richardson arrived in the settlement. On 5 April 1877, 
Walker forwarded all the evidence to David Laird, Lieutenant-Governor 
of the NWT, with the following covering letter:
Sir,
I have the honour by direction of Lieut-Col Macleod to en-
close you [sic] the evidence taken against Regnier Brillon 
for Theft, whom I committed to stand trial at the first com-
petent court held in this district. I also convicted him on 
the 27th day of January last for “Disobedience of Orders and 
Desertion” to six months imprisonment which he is under-
going.
I also further convicted him for theft of public property to 
two months imprisonment or to pay the sum of One hun-
dred and thirty dollars, value of the property stolen and 
costs. I do not know whether he intends to pay the money 
or undergo imprisonment. I will be greatly obliged if you 
would let me know about what date Brillon will be tried as 
the witnesses are under bond, to appear against him, and 
two of them want to go into Winnipeg on Business but are 
unable to do so not knowing when they will be required.
In the end, the witnesses were not required to testify. On 10 October 1877 
(eight months after his committal for trial), Brillon entered guilty pleas 
to all three charges before the recently-arrived Richardson and was sen-
tenced to two months’ imprisonment at hard labour on each count, to be 
served in the guardroom of the police station at Battleford. Brillon would 
have been familiar with these cells, having served six months there already 
for disobedience and desertion, as Walker described, and two months for 
theft of public property. Disciplinary and criminal sentences were served 
in the intimate setting of the NWMP guardroom. One of the witnesses for 
the prosecution at Brillon’s committal hearing was his colleague, Acting 
Shelley A.M. Gavigan204
Constable Norton H. Marshall. Brillon would only have been liberated 
from the NWMP cells for a couple of months when, in March 1878, he 
again found himself before Richardson. On this occasion, he was charged 
with a different criminal offence: of acting as an accessory to the theft 
of government property by NWMP constables Henry Elliott, Norton 
Marshall, and Patrick Balfe in the course of their desertion from the 
force.110 On this occasion, Brillon walked away from court, as Richardson 
found there was not sufficient evidence to warrant committing Brillon and 
his co-accused for trial. This was perhaps a small measure of sweet revenge 
against the prosecutor, his former commanding officer, and quite possibly 
with no hard feelings toward Marshall, his former fellow constable who 
had testified against him in 1877.
Henry R. Elliott et al.: “Disgraceful Conduct”
On 2 March 1878, Stipendiary Magistrate Richardson himself preferred 
charges under the NWMP Amendment Act, 1875 against four members of 
the NWMP. On that date, he wrote to their commanding officer, Inspector 
James Walker of the Battleford Division, alleging that these four had com-
mitted certain offences and requesting that Walker have them brought 
before him “with the least possible delay.”111 The original complaint docu-
ments do not form part of the “Elliott” file in the Richardson court rec-
ords, but three draft complaint documents convey that Richardson alleged 
that on 24 and 25 February 1878, all four members had been guilty of 
forms of “disgraceful conduct” within the meaning of the “Police Act.”
The facts giving rise to the Richardson charges of disciplinary breach-
es derived from the romantic relationship between Henry R. Elliott, a 
sub-constable of the NWMP stationed at Battleford, and Richardson’s 
daughter, Luders. Richardson forbade the relationship and forbade Elliott 
coming to their home (which he had occasion to do when he delivered the 
mail).112 On 25 February 1878, Elliott went to the Richardson home, with 
three other constables, and “in spite of parental objection took the daugh-
ter away.”113 The result was an “elopement” wedding officiated by a local 
Presbyterian minister. Somehow, Luders’ parents got her back to their 
home, which led to anguished correspondence from the groom, declaring 
he and their daughter loved each other and that they were now married. 
Richardson would have none of it.
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He appears to have contemplated a criminal charge against Elliott 
and Acting Staff Constable Norton Marshall. The court file contains a 
draft, unsigned “Information and Complaint of Hugh Richardson,” in 
Richardson’s handwriting, in which he alleged that Elliott and Marshall,
 . . . feloniously and fraudulently allured one Luders Rich-
ardson out the possession and against the will of this in-
formant, her father, she the said Luders Richardson being 
under the age of twenty-one years and having a certain con-
tingent interest in the real and personal estate of the infor-
mant, with intent [ . . . ] the said Luders Richardson to cause 
to be married to the said Elliott contrary to the statute in 
such case made and provided.114 
This extravagant charge of “abduction of an heiress” seems not to have 
resulted in any criminal process and appears to have gone no further than 
Richardson’s vexed and intemperate draft.115 He turned to the police disci-
plinary process—perhaps because it was procedurally more expeditious.
Elliott’s three colleagues (Marshall, Patrick J. Balfe, and “Davis”116) 
found themselves accused of scandalous conduct for assisting or sup-
porting Elliott in the elopement and marriage and (with respect to Balfe 
and Davis) for neglect of their duty in failing to arrest Elliott and Marshall 
when, as Richardson alleged, they had unlawfully and forcibly entered 
the Richardson home. It is clear from the court file that Superintendent 
James Walker responded almost immediately to Richardson, expressing 
his “fullest sympathy in this unfortunate affair,” and assuring Richardson 
that he would do what he could “to keep Elliott employed for a few days so 
that he may not give you any trouble.”117
When he forwarded his disciplinary charges to the inspector, 
Richardson requested that Walker fix a time—“with the least possible 
delay”—and notify a list of men named by Richardson to attend to give 
evidence. The list included the minister who had performed the wedding, 
the legality of which Richardson impugned (he alleged that Elliott had 
misrepresented that Luders was of age and that the consent of her par-
ents could not be obtained).118 Again, Walker responded immediately, 
expressed his regret at Elliott’s behaviour, assured Richardson that he 
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had had Elliott and his friends confined to barracks as soon as they had 
returned home, and advised that he would “go into this case on Monday” 
and keep Richardson informed.  
It appears that Richardson’s complaints did not proceed. Together 
with a prisoner named Ducharme, who was serving a six-month sentence 
in the guardroom,119 the four young constables fled the NWMP post on 
the night of 4 March 1878, taking with them horses, revolvers, saddles, 
and blankets. 
Becoming “deserters,” the four appear to have quickly made plans and 
arranged for provisions. Judging from the fact that two other men, David 
Hall and Regnier Brillon, were later charged with being accessories in the 
escape (for leaving word that they were heading out on a different trail, 
that is, acting as decoys), it seems that Elliott enjoyed the support of col-
leagues and friends. 
Elliott and his colleagues had been caught in the crosshairs of a police 
disciplinary process in which they had little confidence. Richardson, the 
aggrieved father and stipendiary magistrate, clearly had the ear and the 
support of their commanding officer. Richardson, and not Superintendent 
Walker, appeared to be directing the disciplinary process. And so, with 
their previously unblemished records120 about to be tarnished and an un-
certain future with the force, the young men fled before the disciplinary 
process could continue, and thus became deserters and accused thieves. 
They headed south across the plain, reportedly in the direction of the 
Cypress Hills, possibly en route to the United States. Elliott’s comrades, 
Marshall and Balfe, may have made their way across the US border; I have 
found no evidence that they ever appeared in criminal court facing crim-
inal charges or in “police court” on the disciplinary breaches alleged by 
Richardson.  Balfe’s service record contains a cryptic note that he deserted 
on 5 March 1878. 
Elliott apparently turned himself in at Fort Walsh some time in the 
summer of 1878. The court file contains a document that is identified as a 
“copy” of a “Warrant of Commitment” dated 26 August 1878 and signed 
by James F. Macleod in his capacity as stipendiary magistrate. The war-
rant stipulated that Elliott was charged with theft of “three horses and 
four saddles the property of the Government of Canada,” and directed the 
police to convey him to Battleford and “safely to keep him until he shall 
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be thence delivered by due course of law.”121 Elliott remained in custody in 
the guardroom at Battleford for three months, awaiting his trial. It is not 
clear whether the NWMP ever acted on Richardson’s disciplinary char-
ges, although this formed part of the theory of Elliott’s defence in criminal 
court. Elliott was charged with “larceny of two horses, nine blankets, four 
saddles, three revolvers, one carbine, two halters and nine blankets, the 
property of Her Majesty, the prisoner at the time being a member of the 
Mounted Police.” These charges arose from the night of the escape from 
the barracks. Elliott was tried before a jury of six men (including at least 
one Métis juror) at the police barracks in Battleford on 23 December 1878. 
His defence counsel was NWT lawyer Hayter Reed,122 who later would be 
appointed Indian Agent at Battleford and rapidly rise through the Indian 
Department.123 Superintendent Walker acted as prosecutor and served as 
the first witness for the prosecution. Hugh Richardson himself, together 
with a justice of the peace, W.J. Scott, presided at the trial of his forsaken 
son-in-law, whose alleged criminal actions flowed almost directly from 
Richardson’s invocation of the NWMP disciplinary process. 
The theory of the defence directly engaged the role played (or alleged 
to have been played) by the NWMP disciplinary process, implying that 
it had been improperly undertaken. The details of the trial come from 
an account in a local newspaper, the Saskatchewan Herald.124 Through 
Reed’s cross-examination of Walker, it appears that the defence strategy 
was organized along three lines: 1) that doubts could be raised about just 
what articles actually went missing from the NWMP barracks and stable, 
whose they were, and when they went missing; 2) that Elliott had been 
wrongfully imprisoned in March 1878 (on Richardson’s complaints under 
the NWMP Act, 1875 and therefore “was justified in using any means to 
effect his escape”); and, (3) that while in custody, Elliott “had been under-
going punishment for the very offence for which he [was] now being tried, 
by direction of the officer commanding the station as being a justice of the 
peace.” 
Richardson ruled that the issue of wrongful imprisonment was irrel-
evant and overruled the question; Reed asked that his objection to this 
ruling be noted. However, to the question as to whether Elliott had been 
punished already for the same offence, Superintendent Walker is reported 
to have answered, “He has not, I am personally positive. . . . ” However, 
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here again, the press reported that “the Court overruled this because 
it would be an admission of the prisoner’s guilt; secondly, he could not 
undergo punishment before conviction.” It is difficult to gauge with con-
fidence from the press report just what Richardson’s ruling here meant. 
One might reasonably infer that Richardson was determined to stymie 
the defence. 
Other members of the Battleford division testified, some agreeing 
with the defence counsel that Elliott’s character was “always considered 
good.” Reed is credited with making a strong address to the jury, and the 
newspaper, as Bowker also notes, reported that Richardson’s charge to the 
jury was “strongly against the Prisoner.”125 The jury was not persuaded and 
quite possibly not impressed. After five minutes of deliberation, the jury 
returned with a verdict of not guilty. It was a clear rebuke to Richardson.
The Saskatchewan Herald closed its coverage of Elliott’s trial with a 
brief reference to other charges he faced after this acquittal:
On Thursday morning Elliott was brought up before the 
Stipendiary Magistrate on the remaining charges, namely 
stealing Major Walker’s horse and aiding Descamps [sic] to 
escape. 
Major Walker asked for an enlargement, as he had discov-
ered some further evidence too recently to be available for 
the last trial, but which could easily be obtained. As the 
roads were so bad he could not fix a definite time when he 
would be ready, and the magistrate released the prisoner 
on his own recognizances in [sic] $400 to appear when and 
where required on notice.126
There are no court documents relating to these two charges in Elliott’s 
archived court file. Were they a last-ditch effort by Walker to find a way 
to convict Elliott of at least some offence? If so, even Richardson was not 
prepared to order that Elliott be held in custody for an indefinite time 
while the police organized the next round of charges. 
However, Richardson was sufficiently distressed by the jury’s verdict 
that he immediately wrote to the Deputy Minister of Justice with two 
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questions arising out of Elliott’s case. Richardson’s letter to the Deputy 
Minister is not found in the court file, but the Deputy’s response of 1 
February 1879 references the magistrate’s concerns. Richardson appears 
to have had second thoughts about his authority to release a prisoner on 
his own recognizance, as he had just done. Deputy Minister Zebulon A. 
Lash replied that while he had been unable to look into it, he “imagine[d], 
however, that you have power to do it.” The second question is revealed in 
the Deputy Minister’s reply: “I feel pretty sure . . . that you have no right 
to request a jury in a criminal case to answer certain fixed questions. They 
have a right to say guilty or not guilty without giving their reasons.”127 
Despite this unhappy correspondence, the verdict stood.
The case had clearly excited local interest, not least because of 
Richardson’s prominence in the NWT, the importance of the NWMP in 
Battleford, and possibly because of the thwarted young lovers. Luders was 
by this point likely long gone from the NWT, “safely” back with relatives 
in Ontario. It seems that in 1885, she married another man in New York 
City.128 
Despite Elliott’s legal victory and vindication by the Battleford jury, 
and the jury’s clear rebuke of Richardson, it is unlikely that he felt he had 
cause to celebrate, perhaps only a sense of relief. His marriage thwarted 
and his career as a Mountie over, Henry R. Elliott’s tumultuous relation-
ship with different forms of justice appears to have ended here. I doubt 
that he would derive any comfort from the knowledge that his experience 
vividly supports the argument of this chapter: for Elliott, the relationship 
and lines between police discipline and criminal justice were messy and 
blurred. And unfair and personal.
Richard Wyld: “Mutinous Insubordination” 
It is not clear how old Richard Wyld was when he signed on with the 
NWMP in 1877; his date of birth is listed as “unknown” in his personnel 
record.129 He may have been twenty-two years of age, but some recruits 
were as young as eighteen.130 Some parents— and the occasional magis-
trate—“saw service in the NWMP as a means for reforming the wayward 
habits of young men.”131 The recruits, who engaged for a term of three or 
five years, were almost invariably from central Canada, far from home and 
anything that resembled it. There were few comforts, little glamour, and 
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limited outlets for a happy life for these young men, for whom even the 
consumption of alcohol was both a disciplinary and a territorial offence. 
Indeed, NWMP Superintendent Sam Steele acknowledged these difficult 
conditions in his assessment of the discipline and conduct of his men in 
his 1889 Report from Fort Macleod:
I have much pleasure in reporting that the general conduct 
of the non-commissioned officersand [sic] constables is 
good. 
I am surprised that there is not more serious crime among 
the men, considering the temptations with which they are 
surrounded. There is hardly a respectable place of resort, 
such as they would be likely to visit, and none for amuse-
ment in the town. Another drawback is the fact that no rec-
reation room worthy of the name is at this post. I ampleased 
[sic] to say that one is now in the course of construction. . . . 
The majority of men who get into trouble are new recruits 
who have little experience in the country.132
In 1877, Constable Richard Charles Wyld was one such recruit. On 5 June 
1877, at Toronto, Wyld was engaged for a three-year term as a sub-con-
stable of the NWMP and stationed at Battleford.133 When Wyld applied to 
the force, the letters of reference sent to Minister of Justice Edward Blake 
were rather vague in respect of Wyld’s own merits, but rather referenced 
his father and older brother (twenty-four-year-old Robert, a member of the 
NWMP since 1874, with an unblemished record134). Britton Bath Osler, a 
rising star in the Ontario legal profession (who would later be asked by the 
Dominion Government to assist in the prosecution of Louis Riel for trea-
son), offered a one-sentence reference in which he pithily conveyed only 
that Richard Wyld was the son of a friend and expressed the belief that he 
was “a very fit and proper person for the position asked.”135 
Thus, supported by tepid letters that said little directly about him 
and nothing at all about his character, Richard Wyld was engaged by the 
NWMP and followed his older brother, Robert, into the force. They were 
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both stationed at Battleford. One wonders whether Richard Wyld realized 
when he arrived in the NWT that he would never return to his old life in 
his hometown of Dundas, Ontario.
His brother Robert served two terms with the NWMP and was pro-
moted twice over the course of his engagement, rising to the rank of cor-
poral. At the end of his time in the NWMP, his character and conduct 
during his service was described as very good. Richard’s experience, how-
ever, suggests a less perfect fit. During his three years on the force, he 
was charged with thirteen disciplinary offences by eight different superior 
officers (and in one occasion by Stipendiary Magistrate Richardson). 
On 17 September 1877, three months after his engagement and shortly 
after his arrival in the Territories, the first entry on the defaulter’s sheet in 
his personnel file was recorded. He was found to have been “absent from 
Roll Call” and “inattentive at drill”; for these first two offences, his char-
acter was listed as “good,” and for punishment he was “admonished.”136 
Two days later, he was brought up again on a charge, this time that he had 
engaged in “improper conduct while at drill.” On this occasion, his char-
acter was described as “indifferent” and he was punished with two days 
confined to barracks and admonished. By the end of September 1877, he 
was serving seven days in the cells for inattention at drill, and on October 
18, he was fined $5.00 (the equivalent of a week’s pay) for insubordinate 
conduct towards a non-commissioned officer.  
In March and May 1878, Wyld was sentenced twice by Assistant 
Commissioner Irvine to imprisonment of thirty days (on each occasion) 
in the cells at hard labour. On the first occasion he was accused of stealing 
cocoa milk out of the hospital; the second charge of breach of discipline 
was for drunkenness at Fort Walsh on 23 May 1878. 
On 2 September 1878, Wyld was admonished by Sub-Inspector John 
French, interim commanding officer of “C” Division in Battleford, for an-
other disciplinary breach “causing annoyance to Lt-Col Richardson”; once 
again the entry characterizing his character simply indicated “bad.” Later 
that month, on September 25, Wyld found himself facing another disci-
plinary matter arising from his refusal to dig potatoes when ordered to do 
so.137 One can perhaps imagine his surprise when he found himself in front 
of Richardson on the resulting charge of “mutinous insubordination” pre-
ferred against him by Sub-Inspector John French, and which French asked 
Shelley A.M. Gavigan212
Richardson to investigate. Wyld had had considerable experience with the 
disciplinary process and apparently regarded it as internal police business. 
He might well have wondered if Richardson would give him a fair hearing.
On a chilly September morning, French had ordered all available men 
at the post to go to the field and collect potatoes that were at risk of freez-
ing. Some went, some seemed to take their time, while others, such as the 
cook, continued with their other work. French said that he found Wyld in 
the barracks “dressing his hair” and gave him five minutes to be out at the 
field. Some time later, Wyld was still at the barracks and, when pressed by 
French, apparently admitted that he had disobeyed French’s order. He was 
placed under arrest and brought before Richardson on the disciplinary 
charge of mutinous insubordination. Given French’s direct involvement 
and the likelihood that he would want to give evidence in the matter, he 
may have thought it best to have Richardson conduct the investigation. As 
well, French, as a sub-inspector, may not have been considered authorized 
to conduct this investigation, but that had not inhibited him from admon-
ishing Wyld earlier in the month.
Richardson heard two witnesses in support of the charge and one wit-
ness for the defence. On the evidence, he convicted Wyld. However, he 
noted Wyld’s objection to the process. Clearly, Wyld had enough prior 
experience with the NWMP discipline to know that the commanding of-
ficer ordinarily investigated the charge. Thus, at the close of the evidence, 
when Richardson asked Wyld if he had anything to say, Wyld “objected 
that [Richardson] had no legal right to interfere in police matters. After 
conviction, [he] stated he would appeal to the Commissioner.” Richardson 
added:
On both occasions I read the law to him. He professing ig-
norance at which I felt surprised and to his exception which 
while regretting I had to try the case could not stay sentence 
but must leave him to adopt his own course.138 
Although French was not the investigator or adjudicator at this hearing, 
he was not shy about seeking to speak to the matter of sentence. He pro-
posed to read out “Wyld’s former character on the force,” but here again 
Wyld objected. Acknowledging his past offences, Wyld argued that the 
21310 | Getting Their Man
commissioner “had forgiven him and had promised the record of [his 
past offences] should be erased.” His record, of course, was not erased. 
However, Richardson noted that he disposed of the case without look-
ing at or considering the record. He sentenced Wyld to one month of im-
prisonment at hard labour.  
Leaving aside the negligible evidence of mutiny, Richardson’s expres-
sion of regret at having to try the case is at best disappointing. The offence 
in section 22 of the NWMP Act 1873 was one of “mutinous or insubordin-
ate conduct,” not “mutinous insubordinate conduct.” Wyld appears not to 
have raised an objection to the extravagant conflation in the charge against 
him. The evidentiary support for anything remotely resembling “mutin-
ous” conduct was surely wanting, while a finding of “disobeying an order” 
and thus arguably for “insubordinate conduct” was possibly warranted 
on the facts. Perhaps the one-month sentence imposed by Richardson re-
flected a form of mitigation of penalty for the inflated charge that implied 
“mutiny” when resistance, and even flouting an order, might have been at 
play. Wyld, the “Fletcher Christian” of the Battleford post, had been slow 
to rescue potatoes from the frost. When, at the expiration of his term, 
Commissioner James Farquharson Macleod was required to indicate the 
quality of Wyld’s conduct during his service, Macleod used an adjective 
frequently found in Wyld’s service record: “bad”139 and declined to find 
him entitled to a free land scrip. His NWMP service record notes that he 
died in 1906 in Wetaskiwin, Alberta. 
Given the obvious lack of fit between Richard Wyld and the NWMP, 
one might surmise that the prospect of further disgracing his (successful) 
NWMP brother and the certainty of harsh punishment for desertion were 
all that kept him in the force until the end of his term. Richard Wyld was 
likely the last NWMP member, if not the only one, to have had a stipendi-
ary magistrate who was not also an officer of the NWMP investigating 
and convicting him for a disciplinary breach. The niceties of legal analysis 
had no place in the disciplinary process, even when a legally trained jurist 
was given the reins for the process. The context itself was fertile ground, 
not for process, but for hard smacks. It was a process in which, as Acting 
Staff Constable Marshall had observed in 1878, the governing principle 
was, “You are guilty. Prove yourself innocent.”
Shelley A.M. Gavigan214
Walter Parkins’s Intimidation
The rather opaque facts that gave rise, in 1885, to the invocation of the 
criminal process against Constable Walter Douglas Parkins are matched 
by the rather opaque nature of the legal process in the case. They do of-
fer, nonetheless, another illustration of the porous line between “police 
justice” and “criminal justice,” not least because of the position of the 
NWMP officer as justice of the peace. 
On 16 May 1885, Robert McManus, a hotelkeeper at Troy,140 apparent-
ly complained to a local justice of the peace that he had been threatened 
and intimidated by Parkins and another man. No formal criminal infor-
mation was issued to initiate the proceedings—a critical misstep—but 
the file does contain a warrant issued by a lay justice of the peace, John 
W. Powers, commanding “all or any of the constables or peace officers in 
the District of Assiniboia . . . to apprehend” Parkins and the other man, 
and bring them before him to answer the charge and “to be dealt with 
according to law.” On the basis of this warrant, Parkins was arrested. The 
court file contains correspondence indicating that McManus had accused 
Parkins of “assault, housebreaking, threatening language, etc.”141  
It appears that a local lawyer was consulted on the legality of the 
warrant for arrest, no information having been sworn before Powers. In 
a letter found in the court file, W.C. Hamilton, who often acted as crown 
prosecutor in the area, wrote to Superintendent Deane in reference to 
McManus’s allegation, advising that he “had concluded on consultation 
with W Gordon a local JP to refer the matter to [Deane] as a magistrate 
and commanding officer of the force for investigation” (my emphasis).
On 20 May 1885, Deane wrote to Stipendiary Magistrate Hugh 
Richardson regarding an allegation of criminal intimidation against 
Constable Parkins that had been laid before a civilian justice of the peace. 
Deane’s letter offers an exquisite synopsis of the complicated positions, 
dubious facts, and processes he was attempting to navigate:
Sir,
I have the honour to inform you that in pursuance of an 
information supposed to be laid by Mr. Robt McManus of 
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Troy, Constable Parkins, N.W.M. Police, was on the 16th inst 
arrested by Sergt Jones, 91st Batt. Militia, under the enclosed 
warrant issued and directed to him for execution by Mr. 
John W. Powers, JP at Troy.
After arrest the prisoner was handed over to Constable Far-
rell, NWM Police, and by him brought to the Police Head-
quarters. Notwithstanding the illegality of the warrant, I 
directed the prisoner to be re-escorted to Troy on Sunday 
night for trial before Mr. Power as a matter of police disci-
pline; the following morning the prisoner was brought back 
to headquarters with a letter from Mr. Power, of which the 
enclosed is a copy. Constables Farrell and Pickering report-
ed that no investigation had been held and that an order for 
the prisoner’s discharge had not been made out.
Constable Parkins feels aggrieved that the criminal law 
should have been set in motion, and that he should not 
have been given the opportunity of answering the charge 
in question, and I therefore beg to request that you will be 
pleased to entrust me as to the proper course to be pursued, 
and I would submit for your consideration that the interests 
of the public, no less than the disciplinary interests of the 
Police force, would be best served if you consent to hear the 
case at Regina. 
I have not thought it proper to institute an inquiry under 
the Police Act until the present charges shall have been con-
clusively disposed of.
Richardson’s endorsement on the back of the warrant indicates how he 
disposed of the matter: “Trial for 26 May 85. Deft discharged Prosecutor 
not appearing.”142 The court file also contains a flurry of correspondence 
following the discharge. The hotelkeeper, McManus, complained bitterly 
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that he had been unable to come to court due to a bad case of gout, and 
that he had sent word of this, together with a medical certificate, through 
another man who was to give the message to the police. By this point, 
Parkins had been released from custody, and the court file ends here.
Parkins’s personnel record reveals a bit more of his story. He served 
almost eight years over two terms of engagement with the NWMP. His 
service record, while not unblemished, includes only four entries in the 
defaulter’s sheet. The last entry in his personnel record indicates that he 
deserted from the Division at Maple Creek on 22 April 1888, prior to pa-
pers being drawn that would direct his transfer to “H” Division in Fort 
Saskatchewan. No mention of the saga of the McManus complaint in 1885 
appears in his service record.143 
The cases of Wyld, Elliott, and Parkins, in particular, demonstrate 
the significance and ramifications of police disciplinary processes for the 
young constables. Wyld was disciplined repeatedly but was never charged 
criminally, even though he was punished for “stealing” cocoa from the 
NWMP hospital; nevertheless, there can be no doubt about the misery 
he experienced. As for Elliott, there was a direct line—arguably a caus-
al one—between Richardson’s invocation of the disciplinary offence of 
“scandalous conduct” and Elliott’s commanding officer’s response to the 
escape and alleged thefts from the NWMP stable. For his part, Parkins 
found support from his commanding officer against the flawed invocation 
of the criminal law against him. 
These three cases also demonstrate that far from being discrete 
forms of law—civil and military—the criminal and NWMP disciplinary 
processes were closely connected. The senior officers, and clearly even 
Richardson himself, moved easily between them. Not every irate father 
in the NWT could so easily command the ear of—and the process en-
gaged by—a NWMP superintendent. When given the option, Frank Kiely 
did not hesitate to choose to enter his guilty plea in front of a (civilian) 
judge, rather than his commanding officer sitting as a justice of the peace. 
Henry Elliott did not have that choice in his criminal case: Superintendent 
Walker alleged that his own horse had disappeared as well on the night 
that Elliott and his colleagues took flight from the Battleford barracks; 
and, undoubtedly, Elliott preferred to be tried by anyone other than 
Walker or Richardson. Fortunately for Elliott, a jury of six sensible men in 
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Battleford acquitted him of larceny, a verdict that neither Richardson nor 
Walker would have preferred.
On Duty:  Criminal Prosecutions for Theft, Fraud and  
Forgery ... on Duty
As we turn to the later period of Richardson’s tenure on the territorial 
bench, it is important to note, yet again, the small number of cases in 
his court: nine criminal prosecutions of NWMP men between 1888–1901, 
yielding seven convictions.144 It is also important to be attentive to the legal 
context of this set of records. On the NWT Supreme Court, Richardson 
was one of five judges on the bench. This raises methodological challenges, 
not least because it is distinctly possible that court records from the other 
judicial districts, if extant, may contain more cases involving NWMP ac-
cused. The legal process was also more formal in the Supreme Court and 
lawyers served as prosecutors (unlike the NWMP commanding officers in 
the earlier period).
The seven men whose cases I discuss in this section were charged 
criminally for misconduct either in the course of their duties or for con-
duct that brought discredit to the police force, including desertion. All the 
cases are forms of property offences, and theft figures prominently, but in 
half of these cases, the victims were the police themselves. Five men were 
charged with forms of theft, either of Her Majesty’s property that they took 
with them upon discharge or desertion145 or, often, from fellow members 
of the force.146 Two men were charged with forgery or fraud perpetrated 
on members of the public.147 The most egregious accusation of theft (really 
extortion) was against James Ford who abused his position as a member of 
the police to demand money from a Cree woman.148 
Constable George Thomas Robinson’s experience in 1888–89 demon-
strates the dim view the NWMP took of police who used the privilege of 
their office to engage in criminal activity for personal gain. Robinson, an 
eighteen-year-old Torontonian, signed up on 27 June 1887 for a five-year 
term. One of his character references, written on letterhead of The Globe 
– Toronto, was signed by John Cameron who said he knew Robinson and 
believed him “to be a young man of steady habits, good character and one 
who knows to do what is right.”149  
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In early September 1888, now stationed at Regina, Constable Robinson 
received a letter from his father, informing him that he had fallen ill and 
was an invalid. Apparently desperate to get back to Toronto, Robinson 
forged a telegram and a pass to return to Toronto, both bearing the name 
of Inspector John Cotton. Apparently, he obtained a lower fare because it 
appeared that he was travelling with the permission of the Inspector. Using 
the pass, Robinson then wrote to the Controller of the NWMP requesting 
a requisition to cover his fare to Toronto, which he asked to be deducted 
in installments from his pay. Once back in Toronto, he wrote again to the 
Controller asking for the same arrangement for his return travel at the 
end of October, after his furlough. However, Robinson appears to have 
secured other work in the East and did not return to Regina. A warrant for 
his arrest, dated 29 November 1888, was received in Toronto. After many 
procedural hurdles and possible misinformation as to his whereabouts, 
which made it difficult to effect service of the warrant for his arrest, he was 
finally located and the warrant was executed.
Robinson was returned to Regina in custody on 29 December 1888. 
An Officer’s Board Hearing had been held in Robinson’s absence earlier 
in December 1888; it had recommended that he be struck from the force 
for having “deserted on a pass in Eastern Canada.” The Commissioner 
accepted this recommendation on 15 January 1889. The NWMP records 
indicate that Robinson was sentenced to twelve months’ hard labour for 
desertion. 
The NWMP records show that the forgery charge was dismissed 
for want of evidence. However, according to Richardson’s records, on 
6 February 1889 Robinson was committed for trial by Superintendent 
Sévère Gagnon JP, on an information sworn by Inspecting Superintendent 
John Cotton that asserted that Robinson had forged a telegram in Cotton’s 
name and uttered the telegram with intent to defraud. On 4 March 1889, 
he entered a guilty plea before Richardson and was sentenced to fourteen 
days and time already served.
Then someone outside of the force, possibly John Cameron from The 
Globe, intervened on Robinson’s behalf: a memorandum in his service file 
indicates that, at the request of the Governor General, the unexpired por-
tion of Robinson’s sentence for desertion was remitted to 31 October 1889. 
It appears that he was allowed to remain in the force. Upon his release, 
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Robinson was transferred to Maple Creek, where he said he tried to make 
a go of it. To no avail. Aggrieved at his treatment at the hands of the senior 
men of the force, the young man with friends in Toronto, and possibly 
other high places, is reported to have “re-deserted” on 17 March 1890. 
Three cases from Regina demonstrate how the lower ranks in the 
NWMP also took care of their own interests. In 1894, two constables were 
charged with stealing from fellow members of the force. Constable John 
Martin was charged with stealing $1.00 from a pair of breeches in the bar-
racks room at “Depot Division” in Regina, where all new NWMP recruits 
were sent to receive their training and where troublesome men from other 
districts were sent. Martin, thirty-six years of age, was a relatively recent 
but older recruit to the NWMP; he had served as a soldier for seven years 
before his engagement on 20 October 1893 with the police.150 His career 
with the NWMP would be shorter: on two different occasions, 9 January 
1894 and 13 July 1894, he was brought up before Superintendent Gagnon 
on two separate alcohol-related discipline offences. 
Over Martin’s time at Depot Division, others in the barracks had con-
cluded that he was the stealthy thief who was lifting money from their 
clothes and boxes when no one was watching. They set up a sting oper-
ation: after they left a marked dollar bill in a pocket, Martin was caught 
trying to use it to buy a beer at the canteen. At the committal hearing on 
17 August 1894 before Superintendent Gagnon in his capacity as justice of 
the peace, Martin said that he had found the dollar on a table in the room. 
Four days later, he entered a guilty plea before Justice Hugh Richardson 
who sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment at hard labour. The day 
before Martin’s appearance in criminal court, the NWMP dismissed him 
from the force. Once again, both processes worked together.
Constable Henry George Fisher, by contrast, was just twenty-one 
years of age when he signed on with the NWMP, but he too had a similarly 
short career in the force, scarcely long enough to find his way into the 
disciplinary process (although John Martin and Richard Wyld had man-
aged this in short order). Perhaps it was the nature of his illicit activity that 
impelled him to keep a low profile, as he pilfered his way through the be-
longings of his fellow members over several months in 1894.151 Although 
one of his character references in support of his application in April 1894 
described him as a “steady reliable lad,” his career was over by December 
Shelley A.M. Gavigan220
of the same year, punctuated by a sentence of four months’ imprisonment 
at hard labour for several counts of theft to which he pleaded guilty. The 
informal exhibit list of stolen property assembled by Sergeant Major Lewis 
Hooper contained thirteen items identified by a number of Fisher’s col-
leagues: a fork, a cake of soap, a screwdriver, four pipes, several pieces of 
cutlery, a pair of drawers, and so on. As with Constable Martin, Constable 
Fisher was out of the force before he appeared in court: he was dismissed 
on 17 December 1894, in time to commence the sentence imposed by 
Richardson on 18 December.
One might have anticipated that the explicit breach of trust in the 
conduct of Constable Colin Lorne Campbell,152 resulting in his 1899 con-
viction for theft, might have been reflected in a longer sentence than that 
imposed upon the pilferers, Martin and Fisher. Campbell worked in the 
canteen at the Regina barracks. The canteen was managed by a committee 
composed of members of the force. Campbell’s regimental pay formed the 
largest part of his monthly income ($15.00), but he also received $10.00 per 
month as canteen pay. Since his duties included serving customers, he han-
dled cash. During the month of April 1899, the corporal in charge of the 
canteen, to whom Campbell reported, was hospitalized. When Campbell 
was given responsibility for running the canteen, Staff Sergeant Reginald 
Spencer Knight noticed that something was amiss: the accounts were not 
in order. After an investigation, Constable Campbell was charged with 
theft of funds ($8.00). Unlike the other accused Mounties at the barracks, 
Campbell appeared before a Regina justice of the peace, William Trant, 
not one of the NWMP justices. Trant committed him for trial on the theft 
charge and, when he appeared before Richardson in the NWT Supreme 
Court on 5 May 1899, Campbell entered a guilty plea. Richardson sen-
tenced him to two months’ imprisonment at hard labour. On 5 June 1899, 
with an otherwise spotless discipline record in the force, Campbell was 
dismissed.
Finally, in the last case in this series, a NWMP member who had 
taken advantage of the trust and good will of a man who did business 
with the police similarly found himself convicted and imprisoned. In 
1901, after a trial in the NWT Supreme Court, Constable James Cumines 
was criminally convicted by Richardson for obtaining money by false pre-
tences. Cumines was sentenced on 19 April 1901 to three months at hard 
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labour in the police guardroom.153 Cumines had persuaded a Moose Jaw 
businessman, who knew and trusted Cumines, to endorse a cheque in his 
favour, on Cumines’s assurance that he would be sending the endorsed 
cheque directly to Ottawa. It is not clear from the court file just why the 
Moose Jaw man did this. In any event, Cumines cashed the cheque him-
self. Cumines apparently had hoped against hope that his own paycheque 
would arrive in a timely way and he would be able to reimburse the man 
who had trusted him, before anyone else learned of it. With, again, an 
otherwise spotless discipline record, he was dismissed from the force in 
May before the completion of his sentence.154
Conclusion:  O-cha-nah-kis and the Bad Cop, 
Redux
I conclude with a case that directly engages themes of colonialism and 
criminal justice, as well as the relationship between forms of low law and 
low justice. I have written elsewhere about this case as an instance illustra-
tive of the relationship between Indigenous people and criminal law,155 but 
it bears revisiting in the context of the relationship between the criminal 
and disciplinary processes involving police officers.  
In early September 1889 a Cree woman named O-cha-nah-kis laid 
an information in Regina, charging NWMP Constable James Ford with 
stealing $12.00 from her.156 Ford, a twenty-six-year-old Irish immigrant, 
had a well-documented record for intoxication and violence, having twice 
been imprisoned for both disciplinary and criminal alcohol-related of-
fences.157 James Ford had signed on with the NWMP in May 1885. In his 
application he indicated that he was twenty-two, single, in good health, 
and that his religious faith was Roman Catholic; a reference letter from a 
man who said he had employed Ford for the previous two years described 
him as a “sober, industrious and hard-working young man.”158  However, 
his NWMP service record tells a different story, even including corres-
pondence from a woman claiming to be his wife. According to an early 
report, on Christmas Eve 1885, Ford was drunk at the NWMP barracks, 
discharged his rifle, and resisted the efforts of other policemen to sub-
due him. As a result, he was criminally convicted on 20 January 1885 by 
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Stipendiary Magistrate James Macleod and sentenced to three months’ 
hard labour in Regina for “shooting at peace officers in the execution of 
their duty.”159 Other disciplinary infractions netted him, at different times, 
loss of pay as well as fourteen days in the guardroom. The defaulter’s sheet 
in his personnel record indicates that in October 1886 he was again disci-
plined by his commanding office at Maple Creek for being drunk and 
causing a disturbance and, on this occasion, he was fined one month’s 
wages and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment at hard labour. 
After completing his sentence the following spring, Ford was trans-
ferred to Depot Division in Regina with, as the commanding officer 
Superintendent Sévère Gagnon put it, “awkward men and bad characters” 
from other districts.160 One can only infer that James Ford was one of the 
“bad characters” Gagnon had in mind. 
It was here some months later that Ford accosted O-cha-nah-kis and 
her family. Ford had come to a Cree camp near Regina, kicking at tents 
and calling for a woman. He paid O-cha-nah-kis $1.00 for sexual connec-
tion. She said that he came back to her tent later that evening with two 
other police officers, demanding that she return money to him that he said 
he had lost in her blanket and intimidating her and her husband with a 
show of handcuffs. Frightened, she asked her husband to give over all their 
money, which he did.
This striking case is largely the story of O-cha-nah-kis’s response to 
Ford’s mistreatment. She complained to the NWMP that the policeman 
had extorted $12.00 from her and her family.  He was charged with theft 
on an Information laid by Inspecting Superintendent John Cotton (only 
the commissioner and assistant commissioner were higher in rank to 
him).  Although her identification of him at trial was a bit shaky, Ford was 
convicted by Justice Richardson for the theft of the $12.00 and sentenced 
to one hour in gaol.
Unlike Constables Jones, Constable Kiely, and other convicted police 
thieves, Ford was not dismissed for bad conduct. It will be recalled that 
in 1891 Constable Jones was sentenced to six months for larceny and, for 
his disciplinary offence, a concurrent twelve months, of which almost 
half was remitted. For lesser forms of bad conduct, other men had been 
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in addition to disciplinary sen-
tences. Despite Commissioner Herchmer’s well-earned reputation and 
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commitment to harsh treatment of “hard cases and repeat offenders,” 
Ford’s criminal conviction for theft from the Cree woman, together with 
his record of violence and misconduct in the force, appears to have trig-
gered no further discipline charges. He was not dismissed from the force. 
Rather, and remarkably, he was allowed to buy his way out of the force. His 
application to be discharged, the second one he made in as many years, 
was granted in early November 1889; he was permitted to purchase his 
release for $50.00.161 His NWMP service record is silent with respect to the 
conviction for theft of O-cha-nah-kis’s money. 
Ford’s abuse of, and theft from, the Cree woman, including the extor-
tion and threats that accompanied it, appear not to have weighed as griev-
ously as Constable Kiely’s thefts of Her Majesty’s pistols or Superintendent 
Howe’s pocket book. There is precious little to celebrate about the facts or 
even the outcome of Ford’s case from Regina, offering as it does a graphic 
illustration of sexual exploitation of a First Nations woman, and cloaked 
as it is under the conviction for theft. But it also tells something of her 
and her response to it. O-cha-nah-kis complained to the police and to the 
Court. She stood up to the cop and, supported by one of the most senior 
officers in the force, she had him charged with stealing from her. Not a 
small thing. While the one hour in jail James Ford received as a sentence 
was insignificant, it may have been one hour longer than he ever thought 
he would spend there because of his behaviour towards O-cha-nah-kis. 
It was also the shortest sentence of imprisonment he received during the 
four years he served in the NWMP.  
I have argued in this chapter that police discipline and criminal jus-
tice were not separate and discrete spheres; so much of the administration 
of justice in the Territories and the entirety of the administration of police 
justice was vested in the North-West Mounted Police. The multiple roles, 
including juridical and adjudicative, performed by senior police officers, 
most of whom had no legal training, shaped and informed the form and 
content of justice in the NWT. Far from being isolated silos, the cases of 
Mounted Police members accused on criminal and discipline charges 
shed light on how intimately interconnected these legal sites and institu-
tional processes were. Clearly, the accused police constables had more to 
fear and worse to experience as they were marched along the blurred lines 
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from the criminal court to police “court,” where low justice could just as 
easily mean no justice at the hands of men who had boots in both places. 
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WRITING LEGAL HISTORY:  




Sex Discrimination in Canadian 




For most of Canadian history the unequal treatment of Canada’s female 
citizens was pervasive and entrenched in law. The law reflected common 
sense notions about gender and women’s roles in public and private life. 
Male legislators created laws that restricted women’s opportunities and 
choices, or imposed greater obligations on women. Nineteenth-century 
law often gave husbands control over their wives. Alternatively, some laws 
“privileged” women, such as protective labour laws that provided oppor-
tunities for women that did not exist for men. Such laws, however, were 
rooted in the belief that women were dependents, or defined women as 
mothers whose reproductive responsibilities needed to be regulated. In 
other words, these laws marginalized women in the workforce and re-
inforced unequal gender roles.
Most scholarship on women and the law in Canada is narrowly focused 
on a single jurisdiction or only addresses one form of law, such as criminal 
or family law.1 Studies are also often concerned with a particular period 
in history, such as the late nineteenth century or the period following the 
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 These studies, while invaluable, fail to 
capture the broad scope of legal reform throughout Canadian history.3 
Moreover, they underestimate the extent of those legal disabilities that 
have historically been imposed on women in Canada by ignoring the mul-
tiple intersecting legal regimes that compound discrimination over time. 
This chapter argues that there were three stages of legal reform in 
Canadian history that addressed sex discrimination in law: equal citizen-
ship, formal legal equality, and human rights law.4 Each stage of legal re-
form mirrored the evolution of the women’s movement. The first wave of 
the women’s movement, which gained prominence by the late nineteenth 
century, played a central role in lobbying for legal reforms that recognized 
fundamental rights of citizenship.5 The most notable reform was the right 
to vote, but during this period there were also changes to the law on prop-
erty, family, and work. Most of these reforms were designed to protect (i.e., 
regulate) women and children from abuse, rather than provide for equality 
under the law. Legal distinctions based on gender remained prevalent. The 
next stage of legal reform coincided with a second wave of mobilization 
within the women’s movement during the mid-twentieth century.6 These 
reforms were designed to achieve formal legal equality. By the 1980s most 
of the explicit legal distinctions based on gender were eliminated from 
statute law. Once again, however, these reforms had limits. They addressed 
only the most basic procedural forms of inequality. The last stage of legal 
reform—human rights law—signaled a shift towards substantive equality. 
Anti-discrimination statutes, in particular, became a powerful legal tool 
for women. 
The country’s complex legal system is a patchwork of municipal, 
provincial, territorial, and federal jurisdictions (including the common 
law and a civil code) divided between criminal, civil, and constitutional 
law. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify common trends over time. This 
chapter draws on a broad range of primary sources, including statutes and 
case law, as well as a comprehensive survey of the scholarship on women’s 
legal history. Federal law and the provincial law of Ontario and British 
Columbia have been prominent for establishing key precedents in legal 
reform. To be sure, the country’s federal system can make it difficult to 
identify common trends in legal reform. Women secured the right to vote 
in Manitoba in 1916, but not in Quebec until 1940. And yet the federal 
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system can also foster unity. Ontario’s pioneering human rights statute in 
1961 became a model for every other jurisdiction. In this way, there was a 
shared experience in terms of how the law was gendered in Canada.
Equal Citizenship
Women in nineteenth-century Canada were, under the law, denied even 
the most basic rights. Women did, on occasion, vote before universal suf-
frage, usually if they were property owners. But they were gradually dis-
enfranchised in the nineteenth century. Prince Edward Island, in 1832, 
was the first colony in British North America to prohibit women from 
voting, followed by New Brunswick (1836), the Canadas (1849), and Nova 
Scotia (1851).7 Because they could not vote, women were unable to become 
legislators, coroners, magistrates, or judges: this is why not a single woman 
was appointed a judge, coroner, justice of the peace, police constable, or 
police magistrate in the nineteenth century. In 1905 a Supreme Court 
judge in New Brunswick, reflecting on the role of women in society, quot-
ed a United States Supreme Court justice as saying that “[t]he paramount 
destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”8 
Family law was explicitly patriarchal. Fathers determined their chil-
dren’s education and religion. A man could disinherit his wife; children 
were his sole property; a father could consent to have his twelve-year-old 
daughter married without his wife’s consent; a husband could appoint a 
guardian for children under seven years old without the mother’s consent 
(his wife’s consent was not required after the child’s seventh birthday un-
less children were sent “beyond the seas”); fathers inherited the estates 
of all children under twenty-one years old; and a father could even ap-
point a guardian in his will for children after his death, including unborn 
children. Custody battles often favoured the father in those uncommon 
circumstances when women left their husbands.9 Only in extreme cases 
involving abuse would a judge have taken children from their father. 
Unsurprisingly, laws that dealt with marriage and divorce were premised 
on male dominance in the family. Nineteenth-century law in Upper and 
Lower Canada made it virtually impossible to divorce: the former required 
an Act of Parliament, and under the latter marriage was indissoluble until 
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death.10 Yet men had to prove only adultery on the part of their wives to 
secure a divorce, whereas a wife had to prove adultery as well as desertion 
without reason, extreme cruelty, incest, or bigamy. Judges often applied a 
cruel double standard, blaming wives for giving up too quickly if they left 
after one incident of abuse, or alternatively accusing battered wives of ac-
cepting or encouraging the abuse if they waited too long.11 As an alterna-
tive to divorce, women could seek separation and damages. When women 
did secure a divorce, they often faced ostracism and poverty.12
Nineteenth-century common law denied women basic property 
rights (in Quebec, the Civil Code codified a community property regime). 
“Marriage,” as one historian has described the legal reality for women 
under the common law in the nineteenth century, “meant civil death.”13 
A woman lost her legal status when she married, and her husband was 
assumed to control her person. Women took their husbands’ national-
ity and domicile when they married. Under the common law, a husband 
controlled his wife’s earnings and could prohibit her from working for 
wages. Husbands could legally rape their wives, confine them, and mete 
out physical punishment or “discipline.” Until the 1850s, the family farm 
belonged to the husband, including everything in the home. Canada’s 
Dominion Lands Act of 1876 also banned women from homesteading, 
which was especially problematic for women in Western Canada where 
homesteading was common.14 Without property, women could not hope 
to support themselves independent of their husbands. A lifetime of work 
on the farm did not ensure a woman any guarantee of ownership if her 
husband died. In fact, the land usually went to the son (leaving her de-
pendent on her children) and widows could lose any claim to property if 
they remarried.15 Married women had no control over property. Income 
and profits belonged to their husbands; they could not be sued, and they 
could not contract or sue another person in their name; their spouse’s con-
sent was required for them to start a business; and all personal property 
(including wages) was transferred to their husbands. In return, husbands 
were liable for their wives’ debts and contracts.16 
Minority women experienced discrimination as both women and min-
orities. British Columbia, for instance, went to extraordinary lengths to 
restrict immigration, and when Chinese women did manage to make it to 
the province, they were usually restricted to working in small restaurants, 
24511 | Sex Discrimination in Canadian Law
laundries, or fish canneries. Indigenous women worked in the province’s 
canneries, although at lower pay and for fewer hours than men. Those few 
girls who did attend school were segregated based on race. Solicitation 
laws included particular provisions for Chinese and Indigenous peoples.17 
Chinese sex workers were banned under the 1885 head tax legislation, and 
in the 1880s Parliament passed a series of laws to impose harsher sentences 
and lower evidentiary standards for Indigenous sex workers.18 Similarly, 
the 1880 federal Indian Act prohibited the owner of a house from allowing 
Indigenous sex workers on the premises and imposed harsher penalties 
for keepers of bawdy houses.19 In 1869, Indigenous women were further 
banned from voting in band elections or holding political office.20 African-
Canadian women throughout Canada struggled to find jobs other than as 
domestics.21 Retail sales work was not an option for most visible minority 
women. Jewish women found themselves unable to get hired at Eaton’s or 
Woodward’s. Women who did not come from Anglo-Celtic backgrounds 
might also find office work barred for them. In fact, white-collar work in 
general was usually off-limits to minority women, unless perhaps a segre-
gated school needed to hire a black teacher.22
Some of the earliest legal reforms to recognize women’s rights dealt 
with property, albeit they were never seriously designed to undermine 
male privilege (although they might protect women from husbands leav-
ing the family destitute). New Brunswick (1851) and Ontario (1859) grant-
ed women, in certain cases, nominal control over their wages free from 
their husbands. In 1872, Ontario introduced the country’s first Married 
Women’s Property Act, which was later adopted with similar provisions 
by other provinces. It allowed women to hold and dispose of any property 
they brought to the marriage or acquired thereafter, including any profits 
deriving from the property, as well as acquire future property for them-
selves.23 Any wages a wife earned separately from her husband belonged to 
her. At the same time, the law protected husbands from any debts arising 
from their wives’ property before marriage, and immunized husbands 
from liability for any debts incurred from his wife’s business or employ-
ment. In this way, the law “did not challenge the economic and social 
inequality central to nineteenth century marriage.”24 Moreover, women 
had few opportunities in the paid workforce. Explicit legal restrictions on 
women in occupations were admittedly rare, although British Columbia 
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(1877) and Ontario (1890) passed legislation preventing women from 
working in mines and regulated their work above ground (e.g., hours and 
meal breaks).25 Professional associations refused to certify women, most 
notably law societies. Even when they did work, women invariably earned 
less for doing the same work as men, or they were often concentrated in the 
same occupations and paid less. Women were also routinely barred from 
higher education. McGill, for instance, did not admit women until 1857. 
By 1900, only 11 percent of university and college students were women.26
Similarly, laws designed to protect women and children workers, 
which were first introduced in Ontario and Quebec in the 1880s, were 
premised on the belief that “female workers needed greater protection 
than male workers because of their presumed physical frailty and moral 
vulnerability.”27 The need for protective labour legislation was routinely 
framed in terms of women’s reproductive capabilities. These laws defined 
women as a dependent category of workers requiring state regulation.28 
In this way, although state legislation may have mitigated some of the 
harshest conditions in the workplace, it also restricted women’s access to 
the paid labour force. Protective labour laws could also go to extremes. 
Between 1912 and 1919, Saskatchewan law banned “Chinese, Japanese or 
other Oriental persons” from employing white women.29 Manitoba (1913), 
Ontario (1914), and British Columbia (1919) implemented similar meas-
ures.30 Even more extraordinary was British Columbia’s 1923 Act for the 
Protection of Women and Girls in Certain Cases. The law empowered a 
chief of municipal police, by the simple expedient of posting a certificate 
in his office, to prohibit any employer from providing lodging or hiring an 
“Indian” or white woman if the police deemed that it might undermine 
“the morals of such women and girls.”31 
Further legal reform was incremental. In 1855, the Province of 
Canada passed a statute for Canada West (Ontario) that allowed judges 
to grant women custody over children under twelve years old.32 Women 
who had committed adultery, though, were automatically denied custody. 
Nineteenth-century courts rarely provided relief for women and children 
abandoned by the father. In the early 1900s, however, many provinces 
introduced legislation for deserted wives and children. In most cases, the 
law empowered a magistrate to order a husband to provide money to his 
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wife for her basic necessities if he abandoned or severely beat her.33 But 
women who had committed adultery could not sue for maintenance. 
There were additional reforms to family law in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Several provinces introduced legislation that allowed judges to re-
move children from abusive situations. In 1917, British Columbia was the 
first province to enact legislation that provided mothers with rights and 
obligations equal to fathers for the care, custody, and education of their 
children.34 The province also set a Canadian precedent in 1921 with An Act 
Concerning the Employment of Women before and after Childbirth.35 The 
law provided mothers modest financial support and prohibited employers 
from dismissing a woman because of her absence. Meanwhile, Ontario, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and British Columbia enacted legis-
lation between 1916 and 1920 to support women raising young children 
(mothers’ allowances). Still, many of these reforms continued to margin-
alize women. Mothers’ allowances defined women as nurturers, mothers, 
and dependents. Benefits were usually discontinued when children turned 
sixteen years old.36
The women’s movement was at the forefront of many of these cam-
paigns for legal reform. The first wave of the movement, led by organiza-
tions such as the National Council of Women (including local and provin-
cial councils), the Canadian Women’s Suffrage Association, the Fondation 
nationale Saint-Jean Baptiste, and the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union, mobilized women to campaign for the right to vote and reforms 
to property laws, among other issues.37 And yet, by the early twentieth 
century, there was some hesitation among even the most prominent fem-
inists in the country to demand full equality. In 1912, for example, several 
unions recommended to the Royal Commission on Labour Conditions 
that the government establish a minimum weekly wage of $6.50 for female 
workers. The Vancouver Local Council of Women in British Columbia, 
however, suggested the minimum wage be set at $5 “‘to be fair to employ-
ers as well as the employee.’”38 Similarly, while in the 1930s the Canadian 
Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs advocated against 
low salaries for women and passed resolutions against workplace dis-
crimination based on marital status, by the late 1930s the organization 
hesitated to assert that equal treatment was a right. Rather, the organiza-
tion framed the issue as financial need.39 Moreover, women struggled to 
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gain political influence by the mid-twentieth century because few women 
were elected to public office. 
Nonetheless, the movement achieved a significant victory when 
women obtained the vote. Universal suffrage was first granted in 1916 in 
Manitoba. The franchise offered the opportunity for women to become 
more active in public life, although most provinces continued to ban 
women from serving on juries or allowed an exemption based on gender.40 
Women also gained access to additional professions. By 1926, only Quebec 
prohibited women from voting and practicing law. Organizations such as 
the Ligue des droits de la femme and l’Alliance canadienne pour le vote 
des femmes du Québec set the groundwork in the 1930s that ultimately 
secured women the right to vote in Quebec in 1940.41 And although the 
Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in 1928 that women were not eligible 
to be senators, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council overruled the 
decision and determined in 1929 that women were indeed “persons” as 
stated in the constitution.42 
Criminal law, however, appeared immune from substantial reform 
during this period. Criminal law reflected an almost obsessive need to 
regulate women’s sexuality. In 1892, for example, the Criminal Code pro-
hibited an employer or coworker with any kind of directive power from 
seducing a female employee under his direction in any factory, mill, or 
workshop. In 1900 this prohibition was extended to shops and stores, and 
to all workplaces in 1920.43 Chastity laws were introduced in the nine-
teenth century, and the practice of separately incarcerating female con-
victs became common by the 1870s. In 1910 the federal government also 
deemed it necessary to prohibit contact between female immigrants and 
male members of a ship’s crew during passage.44 It was also a crime, as of 
1918, for a woman with a venereal disease to have sex or solicit sex with a 
member of the armed forces.45
In rape trials, which were rare in nineteenth-century Canada, judges 
and juries favoured women who fit a model of chastity. Women’s sexual 
history was often a key issue at trial. Chastity was also an issue in seduc-
tion trials, which the federal Parliament criminalized in 1886. Previously, 
seduction had been a civil cause of action that permitted fathers to sue men 
who had “carnal knowledge” of their daughters. If the daughter was preg-
nant, and the man refused to marry her, the father would sue for the cost 
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of maintaining the daughter and the child (essentially “asserting parental 
property interests in the sexual behaviour of their female offspring”).46 The 
law (except in Quebec) recognized only the father’s right to sue, not that of 
the woman who had been seduced. When seduction was criminalized, a 
man who had sex with a girl between the ages of twelve and sixteen years 
old (the threshold was raised to twenty-one in 1887 if the male was over 
twenty-one) could be sent to jail for two years. Women under eighteen 
were also included if they were of previously chaste character and the act 
was committed under the promise of marriage.47
Criminal law on infanticide and abortion also targeted women. An 
1892 amendment to the Criminal Code criminalized “failing to obtain 
reasonable assistance for childbirth.” The crime carried the severe sen-
tence of life in prison if a prosecutor could prove that a woman did not 
seek assistance so the child would die.48 Procuring an abortion became 
a crime in British North America beginning in New Brunswick in 1810 
and, soon after, the other colonies. Abortion trials were uncommon in 
the nineteenth century, but, when they did go to trial, the vast majority of 
accused women were found guilty. Doctors faced severe penalties, ranging 
from ten years to life in prison. Parliament went even further and, in 1892, 
banned the sale, distribution, and advertisement of any material relating 
to contraception or abortion.49 
By the twentieth century the law touched on almost every aspect of 
women’s lives: birth (infanticide), childhood (maintenance, child custody), 
work (labour laws, professions), courtship (seduction, marriage), sexual 
relations (rape, solicitation), marriage (property), parenting (maternity 
leave, abortion, adoption, legitimacy), divorce or separation (mainten-
ance, child custody, pensions, desertion), and death (inheritance). Legal 
reforms during this period were designed to remove those legal distinc-
tions that had created a separate and lesser form of citizenship for women 
such as voting, employment, or owning property. These reforms enabled 
women to better engage in public life. Yet the law continued to reinforce 
male privilege and patriarchal power, especially in the family.
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Formal Legal Equality 
Women born in mid-twentieth century Canada faced an inadequate and 
patronizing legal regime in property, labour, family, and criminal law. 
Alberta (1928) and British Columbia (1933) passed legislation to forcibly 
sterilize people who were mentally ill. In practice, the law disproportion-
ately targeted women and Indigenous peoples.50 That the state continued 
to define women in terms of rigid gender roles in the 1960s was exempli-
fied in a 1966 publication of the federal Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, which explained that “winter weather is a limiting factor 
[for Canadian women’s political activity] as well as household duties and 
farm chores.”51
After securing key victories around the right to vote and access to 
property among other issues, new campaigns emerged demanding full 
legal equality. A new wave of feminist activism, led in part by a genera-
tion of women coming of age in the 1950s and 1960s, reinvigorated the 
movement. Organizations such as the National Council of Women had 
been advocating on issues such as equal pay since the 1920s.52 During the 
war, women’s organizations successfully lobbied to raise the basic pay for 
servicewomen to 90 percent of the male rate. Twenty-one affiliates of the 
Young Women’s Christian Association established Public Affairs commit-
tees in Ontario in 1950 to advocate for laws to ban sex discrimination. 
Margaret Hyndman, president of the Business and Professional Women’s 
Clubs, led a delegation to Premier Leslie Frost in 1951 to demand equal 
pay legislation and a prohibition on sex discrimination in employment. 
Hyndman, a lawyer, helped draft the Ontario Female Employees Fair 
Remuneration Act (1952), which was the first equal pay statute in Canada. 
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs committees outside Ontario 
also lobbied for equal pay laws.53 Meanwhile, in Ottawa, the Business 
and Professional Women’s Clubs and the National Council of Women 
convinced the federal Liberal government to implement equal pay legis-
lation covering 70,000 women working in federal jurisdiction.54 Women’s 
Institutes were also active in lobbying for equal pay.55 
A second stage of legal reforms sought to eliminate formal legal dis-
tinctions based on gender. Mothers’ allowances had already been replaced 
with a more generous federal family allowances program in 1944. In 1951, 
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Ontario and Manitoba removed their bans against women serving on juries, 
which later spread to other jurisdictions.56 New Brunswick (1964) and the 
federal government (1971) implemented policies for maternity leave.57 
Differential minimum wage laws were revoked in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick by 1970. In each jurisdic-
tion women and men were given equal legal responsibility for maintaining 
their children, and both wives and husbands were eventually permitted to 
sue for alimony or maintenance.58 
Women were no longer prohibited from voting or, in common law 
jurisdictions, from owning and controlling property if they were mar-
ried.59 By 1953, all references to race were removed from provincial elec-
toral law and, in 1960, the federal government enfranchised Indigenous 
peoples. But the sudden disappearance of a legal prohibition did not 
diminish the legacy of generations of legal discrimination. The situation 
facing Indigenous women was especially bleak. The original Indian Act 
had given the Superintendent-General the power to “stop the payment of 
the annuity and interest money of any woman having no children who 
deserts her husband and lives immorally with another man.” The 1884 
Indian Act further specified that Indigenous widows had to be of “mor-
al character” to inherit property. An especially contentious section was 
the provision that Indigenous women lost their status if they married a 
non-Indigenous man. The same did not apply to men. When women lost 
their status, they forfeited their right to live on Indigenous lands, own 
band property, inherit land or a house on a reserve, and to be buried on a 
reserve.60 And they could not regain their status, and therefore return to 
their home, if their marriage dissolved or they divorced. The Indian Act 
was rife with such discriminatory provisions: women and their children 
were involuntarily enfranchised if their husband/father was enfranchised; 
married women’s band membership was determined by their husband’s 
band; illegitimate children of Indigenous men or non-Indigenous women 
were denied status; and children lost status when they reached the age of 
twenty-one if their mothers did not have status before they were married.61
Whereas Indigenous women continued to face widespread legal dis-
abilities, there were several major reforms designed to remove distinctions 
based on gender in statute law. The 1968 federal Divorce Act, for instance, 
extended judicial divorce to jurisdictions where it had not been previously 
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available and set consistent grounds for divorce across the country. Divorce 
was permitted on the basis of adultery, homosexuality, physical and men-
tal cruelty, or marriage breakdown.62 The law streamlined the process for 
applying for a divorce and reduced costs and delays, which had been a 
particular hardship for women. The divorce rate in Canada doubled in 
the first year following the Divorce Act, and most of those flocking to the 
courts were women.63 
One of the most important developments during this period was the 
federal Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW). The RCSW 
identified a plethora of discriminatory laws in its report published in 1970. 
Some of the more blatant forms of sex discrimination that were still ram-
pant in several or all jurisdictions included prohibitions on enlisting in the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police or serving in the military and attending 
military colleges; exemptions for serving on juries; separate policies for 
women who married non-citizens, such as refusing to automatically rec-
ognize their future children’s Canadian citizenship; or requiring married 
women to have their husband’s name on their passport. There were also 
many obscure provisions in statute law that discriminated against women: 
married women could not hold a legal domicile separate from their hus-
bands; husbands were assumed to be the owner of a house under national 
housing loan regulations; federal prison legislation treated women differ-
ently in the punishment alternatives for different imputed offences and in 
the length of possible sentences; and the Canada Pension Plan had differ-
ent entitlements for men and women, as did workers’ compensation and 
unemployment insurance.
The RCSW’s study of criminal law was especially revealing. By the 
1970s the most common crimes for which women were convicted were 
theft; prostitution or keeping a bawdyhouse; abortion or attempted abor-
tion; concealing the body of a child; and child neglect. Women were dis-
proportionately convicted of narcotics, vagrancy, and attempted suicide, 
compared to other crimes.64 The Criminal Code did not consider women 
capable of committing sexual offences except incest, buggery, indecent as-
sault on another female, and gross indecency (the last was added in 1954). 
Women could not sexually assault or seduce men, or be charged for having 
illegal sex with a boy under a certain age. Only boys could seduce girls, 
and it was entirely based on age: if the boy was under eighteen years old or 
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if the girl was older than eighteen it was not an offence. The basis of several 
offences continued to rest on a woman’s “previously chaste character” up 
to twenty-one years old, while the burden was on the accused to prove 
otherwise. For instance, sexual intercourse with a girl under fourteen 
years old was criminal, but a man could be found innocent for having sex 
with a girl between fourteen and sixteen years old if he could show that 
she was not of previously chaste character. 
The RCSW submitted 167 recommendations for legislative reform. 
The federal government responded with wide-ranging reforms, most 
notably the Statute Law (Status of Women) Amendment Act, 1974. The 
legislation amended ten federal statutes dealing with immigration, the 
military, unemployment insurance, pensions, elections, and the public 
service.65 The Criminal Code was amended to recognize a spouse’s (rath-
er than a husband’s) responsibility to provide necessities of life, and the 
Citizenship Act was changed to apply equally to men and women. Other 
legal reforms followed soon thereafter.66 Women were permitted to enlist 
in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police beginning in 1974 and to enroll 
in military colleges after 1979. Vagrancy laws targeting prostitution were 
changed to solicitation in 1972. The law on solicitation applied equally to 
men and women although, in practice, women continued to be the pri-
mary targets for arrests. In 1983, Parliament repealed the section of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act that denied benefits to pregnant women.67 
In the same year, rape was removed from the Criminal Code and replaced 
with gender-neutral sexual assault provisions.68 Marital rape became a 
crime. In 1986 Parliament passed the Employment Equity Act to enhance 
women and minorities’ representation in any federally regulated industry 
with more than one hundred employees.69
There was further pressure for legal reform following Canada’s ratifi-
cation, in late 1981, of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.70 Provinces eliminated 
long-standing gendered language in statute law (from male to persons, or 
husband to spouse). Still, there were innumerable discriminatory statutes 
that managed to survive. In Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, 
women working in the civil service and at Memorial University were re-
quired to quit if they married (unless the Minister gave a special exemp-
tion); female civil servants received lower pensions, could not claim their 
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pension until they were sixty-five years old (sixty for men), and could not 
receive compensation if they were injured on the job; women were pro-
hibited from changing their name while married; unmarried girls (not 
boys) under sixteen years old were banned from employment without par-
ental consent; married women’s place of residence for elections was based 
on their husband’s; the Family Relief Act implied that being an unmarried 
female was a disability; and the Limitations of Actions Act placed married 
women in the same category as persons of unsound mind.71  
These statutory provisions were eliminated in the 1980s. By this time 
there was clearly a shift towards gender-neutral statute law. The law had 
undergone profound changes in eliminating formal legal discrimination 
against women. Yet formal legal equality as expressed in statute law was 
only the beginning. Discrimination remained a deeply embedded social 
practice.
Human Rights Law
While there were significant reforms to statute law throughout the twen-
tieth century, widespread discriminatory practices remained embedded 
in state regulations. For example, several provinces denied social assist-
ance to single women if there was evidence that they were living with a 
man. Such policies, which lasted into the 1980s, presumed that a sexual 
relationship implied an economic one.72 Daycare (including the lack there-
of), health care (including abortion), education (including textbooks), 
pensions, adoption, and many other policies were similarly gendered. 
Judge-made law could also be discriminatory. Women were routinely in-
carcerated for “immoral behaviour,” which was often a pretext for using 
“incarceration as a means to regulate the sexual and moral behaviour of 
women perceived to be ‘out of sexual control’.”73 Judges favoured men in 
property distribution during divorce proceedings. As late as 1975, the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a lifetime of labour on a farm did not 
entitle a woman to a division of assets after divorce.74 
Sex discrimination was also a pervasive social practice. Landlords re-
fused to rent to single mothers; retailers refused to allow women to breast-
feed on their premises; and gender stereotyping was commonplace in 
school textbooks. Employers justified lower wages for women on the basis 
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of unsubstantiated beliefs: women were financially supported by men or 
they only needed to support themselves; they had a lower standard of liv-
ing; they ate less; they should not spend money on luxuries such as alcohol 
or tobacco. Employers refused to hire women in certain professions and 
published advertisements for “male only” positions; women were ghetto-
ized in low-paying professions or refused promotion; separate wage scales 
were often endorsed by unions; employers imposed job requirements such 
as height and weight minimums; and women were fired when they be-
came pregnant, or married, or divorced. Sexual harassment, which the 
former editor of Chatelaine magazine described as “so common that it 
was rarely even talked about,” appeared in the form of pin-ups or graf-
fiti if not outright groping or propositions from male workers.75 Workers’ 
organizations were also exclusionary: unions routinely signed collective 
agreements that reinforced a gendered division of labour.
Beginning in the 1950s, the leading feminist organizations of the 
period, including the National Council of Women, Canadian Federation 
of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, and the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (among others) began organizing campaigns call-
ing for legislation that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. In 
1953, for instance, a delegation from the Canadian Federation of Business 
and Professional Women’s Clubs and the National Council of Women 
lobbied for a federal ban on sex discrimination as well as equal pay legis-
lation.76 The former complained that such legislation would “afford pro-
tection in matters of employment—hiring, promotion and pay—for Jews, 
Chinamen and Negros, but not for women.”77 Women’s organizations also 
joined campaigns for provincial anti-discrimination legislation. These 
campaigns, which included large delegations from numerous community 
organizations, soon convinced the premier of Ontario to introduce the 
country’s first comprehensive anti-discrimination statute in 1952—the 
Fair Employment Practices Act.78 Within a year, women’s organizations 
were presenting briefs before a Parliamentary committee demanding a 
similar statute for the federal government.79  
Several jurisdictions introduced Fair Employment and Fair 
Accommodation Practices laws in the 1950s that prohibited discrimin-
ation in employment and housing.80 These statutes were weak and poor-
ly enforced. Moreover, none of them included sex and were restricted to 
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race, religion, and ethnicity. The Canadian Federation of Business and 
Professional Women’s Clubs’ Vancouver Branch decried the federal gov-
ernment’s failure to include sex in the 1953 Canada Fair Employment 
Practices Act.81 Nonetheless, women’s organizations were successful at 
least in campaigning for equal pay laws. Eight provinces introduced equal 
pay laws in the 1950s alongside the federal government’s 1956 Female 
Employees Equal Pay Act.82 And yet, as the president of British Columbia’s 
Provincial Council of Women insisted in 1950, “equal opportunity and 
equal pay for men and women, regardless of sex, marital status, race, col-
our or creed, will not be firmly established unless vigorously promoted by 
education and legislation.”83
There were some tentative reforms over the next few years that direct-
ly addressed the problem of sex discrimination. The federal government, 
for instance, banned sex discrimination in federal contracts beginning in 
1953. Similarly, the federal Bill of Rights (1960) prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in employment. But the most significant development was the emer-
gence of a new legal regime that began with Ontario’s precedent-setting 
Human Rights Code in 1962. Although the statute did not include sex, 
Newfoundland and Labrador and British Columbia did include sex when 
they introduced their respective human rights statutes in 1969.84 Within 
eight years every other jurisdiction would do the same. 
Human rights legislation would become one of the most important 
legal innovations of the twentieth century. The Ontario model was copied 
in every jurisdiction. Human rights legislation prohibited discrimination 
in accommodation, employment, and services. Full-time human rights 
officers—civil servants working for the government—staffed the com-
mission. Human rights officers were responsible for receiving and inves-
tigating complaints. If an individual had a legitimate complaint within 
the scope of the Code, the officer would first attempt conciliation between 
the two parties. If this failed, the Commission could recommend that the 
case be sent to an independent board of inquiry appointed by the minister 
of labour to force a settlement. Perhaps the most important innovation 
contained in human rights legislation, in addition to having the govern-
ment absorb the entire cost of investigating the complaint, was that the 
commission would represent the complainant before the board of inquiry. 
Complainants thus did not have to shoulder the burden of investigating 
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and litigating the complaint, which was one of the major obstacles to 
seeking remedy through the courts. Offenders might pay a fine, offer an 
apology, reinstate an employee, or agree to a negotiated settlement.85 
Boards of inquiry were an innovative approach to human rights com-
plaints. They were more accessible to the average person, partly because 
the proceedings were more informal than a court, but also because the hu-
man rights commissions helped complainants prepare and present their 
cases. Boards of inquiry contributed to changing employers’ behaviour 
and constructing a culture of rights by raising the level of public debate 
and awareness. As one inquiry chairman noted, “its [the Human Rights 
Code] aim is to educate the public with respect to the need for tolerance as 
an essential weave in our social fabric.”86 Human rights law was premised 
on the belief that discrimination was not necessarily motivated by hatred 
or fear, but through misunderstandings, discomfort, or confusion. Formal 
inquiries offered an opportunity for people to re-assess their opinions and 
beliefs. Intent was not a factor in determining discrimination, so the ac-
cused did not need to be labelled a bigot or sexist to be found guilty. It was, 
perhaps, a subtle distinction, and yet a profound one that undoubtedly 
made it easier to conciliate conflicts. And if people refused to change, then 
boards of inquiry could force a settlement. 
At the same time, human rights laws went beyond simply respond-
ing to explicit discriminatory acts. A key pillar of human rights law was 
education. Each commission had a mandate to educate the public about 
human rights. Moreover, human rights legislation provided a forum for 
addressing grievances outside the courts and established a process that 
favoured conciliation rather than confrontation. The goal was to promote 
tolerance. The primary mandate of human rights statutes was prevention; 
punishment was a last resort. The education mandate was an enduring 
legacy of human rights law.87 In 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
that human rights legislation was quasi-constitutional and held primacy 
over other laws.88 Three years later, the court went further and affirmed 
that human rights law also prohibited systemic discrimination, such as the 
indirect effect of practices on classes of people.89 
In this way, human rights law was unlike any previous legal reform. 
And although human rights law prohibited discrimination on numer-
ous grounds, its most enduring impact was on sex discrimination. The 
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largest number of complaints received by human rights commissions in 
almost every jurisdiction in Canada until the 1990s involved discrimin-
ation against women, especially in the workplace.90 Boards of inquiry set 
legal precedents on a host of issues, from sexual harassment to arbitrary 
employment policies, and in doing so developed a corpus of human rights 
law. They became contested sites where a broad spectrum of people fought 
over the meaning of rights and equality. For example, in Foster v. British 
Columbia Forest Products (1979) and Grafe v. Sechelt Building Supplies 
(1979), boards of inquiry in British Columbia ruled that arbitrary height 
and weight requirements had the indirect effect of excluding women from 
employment.91 There were also inquiries that ruled that firing a woman 
for being pregnant was sex discrimination (H.W. v. Kroff ), as was deny-
ing a woman sick leave benefits because her illness was pregnancy-related 
(Gibbs v. Bowman).92 Another inquiry awarded a woman damages in 1975 
when a landlord refused to rent her a house because she was a single moth-
er.93 In 1984 an Ontario board of inquiry determined that sexual harass-
ment was sex discrimination.94 The Supreme Court of Canada would later 
confirm in 1989 that pregnancy and sexual harassment were forms of sex 
discrimination (and, in 1999, it extended the protection of human rights 
law to gays and lesbians).95 
The women’s movement played a critical role in the creation and en-
forcement of human rights law. Women’s organizations engaged in a wide 
array of activities such as documenting cases of discrimination; producing 
surveys or conducting research on issues such as equal pay (e.g., list-
ing specific employers’ pay scales) to initiate inquiries; identifying large 
employers who were violating the legislation and mailing letters with a 
copy of the statute; sending volunteers to individual employers to discuss 
hiring and management practices (e.g., department stores that rarely 
hired women or factories with segregated job assignments); drawing the 
media’s attention to deficiencies in the legislation, including delays and 
poorly-trained investigators; organizing and inviting investigators to con-
ferences on human rights; lobbying government departments on policy 
issues (e.g., gender stereotyping in textbooks); promoting board of inquiry 
decisions through press releases and newsletters (a common critique was 
that the government did not publicize rulings); securing federal govern-
ment funding to promote human rights in the province; and writing to the 
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Branch to support specific cases and to prod investigators to advance an 
inquiry.96 In many ways, women’s organizations were as important as the 
state in enforcing the law.
By the 1980s, human rights law in Canada had become overwhelm-
ingly associated with gender. In 1976, British Columbia’s Human Rights 
Branch compiled a survey of newspaper stories relating to human rights 
law. It examined even the smallest, most remote papers in the province 
as well as major papers across Canada. They found that, in every case, 
when the media wrote about human rights, they were most often writing 
about women’s issues.97 The largest number of complaints and boards of 
inquiry dealt with sex discrimination, and they were often successful: be-
tween 1956 and 1984, the success rate for sex discrimination complaints 
that reached boards of inquiry in Canada was 66.4 percent (and 75 per-
cent for cases involving pregnancy).98 Women used the law to extend its 
protections to women who were pregnant, unmarried, single mothers, 
or sexually harassed. Although financial penalties were often small and 
inconsequential, the process provided an affirmation of women’s legitim-
ate demands for equality. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a constitutional amendment 
introduced in 1982, was the next step in securing equality under the law. 
Every government introduced omnibus legislation to remove the final ves-
tiges of explicit discriminatory provisions in statute law (for instance, re-
quiring married women to take their husband’s name).99 It was a testament 
to the transformative potential of the new constitution that governments 
needed several years to change their laws to ensure conformity with the 
equality section. In Ontario, the threat of a constitutional challenge forced 
the government to eliminate its notorious “man in the house” policy that 
denied welfare benefits to women who were living with a man.100 
The Charter’s equality section transformed family law, criminal law, 
employment law, and a host of other statutes and policies.101 One of the 
most symbolic decisions that exemplified the transformative potential of 
this new legal regime was handed down in December 2013. The Supreme 
Court of Canada declared that the country’s solicitation laws were incon-
sistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court ruled that the 
Criminal Code provisions restricting solicitation infringed on the “rights 
of prostitutes by depriving them of security of the person in a manner 
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that is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”102 
The Bedford decision symbolized a profound shift in Canadian law and 
the emergence of a new legal regime that could be used to challenge sex 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also redefined equality since the 
implementation of the Charter, from treating people equally and accom-
modating differences to ensuring equality in practice in order to remedy 
past disadvantages. Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1999 Law deci-
sion, the equality section has been given a much broader interpretation.103 
The ruling provided judges with a litmus test for determining discrimina-
tion, which was defined as differential treatment based on an enumerated 
or analogous ground; whether or not differential treatment constitutes 
discrimination is, according to the court, based on contextual factors such 
as stereotyping, prejudice, vulnerability, or pre-existing disadvantages. 
Judges must now take into consideration how unspoken norms and prac-
tices produce inequality in the application of law. Such precedents recog-
nized the need to go beyond formal legal inequality and address systemic 
inequality in the public and private realm.  
Conclusion
Legal reform in Canada is a slow and imperfect process. The first stage of 
legal reform in Canada, which dealt with basic rights of citizenship such 
as voting or property rights, was premised on inequality and a concern 
with protecting (i.e., regulating) women. By the early twentieth century, 
the law continued to reinforce traditional gender roles in the family and 
the workplace. The second stage of legal reform was designed to guarantee 
formal legal equality. Explicitly discriminatory policies and laws, such as 
those prohibiting women from serving in the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police or requiring them to adopt their husband’s last name, were slowly 
eliminated over time. Yet even the guarantee of formal legal equality could 
not address the immense obstacles facing women in public and private life 
that were a product of centuries of legal discrimination. 
Human rights law was an attempt to go beyond formal equality and 
address systemic discrimination. Rather than focus on punishing indi-
vidual acts of discrimination, human rights statutes were designed to 
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promote a culture of rights through conciliation and education. Boards 
of inquiry established key precedents and, in doing so, created new law. 
More importantly, human rights law constituted a new form of state prac-
tice. Human rights laws could not eliminate sexism, but they could en-
deavour to eliminate the public practice of sexism. The new human rights 
legal regime replaced a legal system that explicitly discriminated against 
women with a system that banned discrimination in the private and pub-
lic spheres. At the same time, human rights law, as was the case with past 
legal reforms, was flawed. Human rights law applied to the private realm 
such as employment, services, and accommodation, but did nothing to 
address inequalities in other private spheres such as the family. The system 
was rife with delays, underfunded commissions and education programs, 
a propensity towards low monetary awards, as well as exemptions for phil-
anthropic, charitable, religious, and educational institutions. Moreover, 
human rights law has done little to address broad social problems such 
as female job ghettos, underrepresentation in business and politics, or the 
feminization of poverty. It remains, as has been the case with all legal re-
forms in Canadian history, an imperfect solution.
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Legal-Historical Writing for the 
Canadian Prairies: Past, Present, 
Future
Louis A. Knafla
The legal history of the Canadian prairies is a relatively new area of mod-
ern historical studies compared to the richer origins in British, American, 
and central Canadian legal history. Indeed, the writing of Canadian legal 
history has lagged significantly behind that of Britain and the behemoth 
to the south. The initial impetus for legal-historical writing in Canada 
was provided by the Osgoode Society, but its early volumes were almost 
exclusively on Ontario and Quebec. Well-researched and written with a 
comparative focus, the subject matter caused one critic to see it masquer-
ading as “Canadian” legal history, referring to it as “Losollah”: the London 
Ontario School Of Lumber Law And History.1 Legal-historical writing on 
the prairies coincided with a very early period in most of Canadian his-
tory where the sources were cases, statutes, and newspapers, and the ac-
count was chronological with little or no interpretative framework.2 This 
coincided, perhaps, with Canada’s alleged first legal historian, Ontario’s 
prolific Justice William Renwick Riddell (1852–1945).3 He was followed on 
the prairies by other law career writers such as Wilbur Bowker on lawyers, 
Roy St. George Stubbs on Rupert’s Land, Lewis Thomas on constitutional 
history, and D. Colwyn Williams on the North-West Territories.4 It was 
largely in the late 1960s that legal-historical writing for the prairie Canada 
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region began, and from the late 1970s it has taken off; today, specialist 
studies abound. A problem is that there are few overarching themes, or 
stimulating interpretations, as one often finds in central/eastern Canadian, 
British, and American legal history.5 The purpose of this chapter is to 
identify those areas and encourage the writers of the present future to go 
forth, flourish, and multiply. 
Three groups comprised the Canadian prairies in the late nineteenth 
century: First Nations, the Dominion government and its institutions, and 
settlers. The major outside influences were the remnants of the Hudson’s 
Bay Company’s private law regime, the interface of British colonial and 
Canadian domestic influences, the challenge of Indigenous peoples who 
inhabited the plains on the south side of the border, and that country’s 
westward movement of “manifest destiny.” Entering the twentieth century, 
the region became influenced significantly by the advent of British and 
eastern Canadian financial interests which sought to exploit its natural 
resources—namely agriculture, mining, and forestry for Britain’s colonial 
project.6 Later, the discovery of rich oil and gas fields brought the region 
into the vortex of the world economy, which impacted the relations among 
First Nations, settlers, and new immigrants as much as the landscape on 
which they resided.
This chapter will explore the ways in which these external develop-
ments and influences have been interpreted by the academic community 
in terms of the major legal-historical issues in the law and society area. The 
somewhat “closed” economy of the late nineteenth century faced continu-
ous outside social, commercial, and industrial influences related to empire 
and state-building that affected the social institutions of family, marriage, 
working conditions, and welfare in later generations. In addition, those 
socio-economic developments caused by the influences of global markets 
have led recently to an “anti-colonial” interpretation that challenges the 
“post-colonial” world which has formed the framework of most legal-his-
torical studies of the region.7 Given the multi-faceted nature of current re-
search interests, the chapter will close with a comment on where we stand 
today compared to where we were at the turn of the past century.8
Much of the past historical writing on prairie Canada has been “in-
ternal” history, that is, studies of individual institutions, events, prob-
lems, and peoples within their individual settings with slight regard to 
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external factors or influences. Many of such works began with MA theses 
or PhD dissertations, and worked their way into articles, book chapters, 
and monographs which retained this internal focus. This writing, and the 
research on which it was based, usually has been exemplary and badly 
needed for an area of the country which has often been in the backwaters 
of Canadian historiography. Since the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury, however, writers for this area have been turning increasingly to the 
wider world in order to gain a more informative perspective and compara-
tive understanding of their subject matter. Such an understanding leads us 
beyond mere factual studies of individual persons, institutions, and events 
in the imperial context towards viewing and understanding settler and 
Indigenous peoples in a global environment, and the latter as participants 
in settler society and not merely antagonists. Indeed, if the legal-historical 
record of Indigenous peoples is to be fully revealed, we need to have more 
of their own studies.
With regards to prairie Canada, two books that appeared in 2005 
reflected an impact upon an outward turn in its historiography—and, if 
not these two works in particular, others in which similar thinking took 
place in adjacent years.9 Frederick Cooper’s Colonialism in Question10 
and Chris Bayly’s Birth of the Modern World, 1780–191411 highlighted the 
role of critical, interdisciplinary scholarship in post-colonial studies that 
did not see a flat version of European “modernity,” but a version that had 
competing ideologies. Their work featured a historiographical change in 
purpose—to become familiar with the broader transnational and global 
connections which may have affected or influenced fundamentally the lo-
cal or regional story. Bayly, in particular, argued that global uniformities 
developed in the course of the nineteenth century in the state, religion, 
politics, economies, and domestic domains which became manifest in 
post-colonial societies. 
These views were enlarged by James Belich in his 2009 book 
Replenishing the Earth.12 Reshuffling the map of the Anglo world, he saw a 
non-contiguous “British West” where the transfer of “things, thoughts, and 
people” flowed more easily within such regions than without. Explosive 
colonization was followed by overlapping periods of recolonization in 
the midst of Indigenous resistance. Hence, as in prairie Canada, a settler 
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revolution took place against the resistance of Indigenous peoples which is 
best understood within this broader transcolonial context. 
The perplexing role of liberalism in the subjugation of Indigenous 
peoples was raised to the forefront by P.G. McHugh in his magisterial 
work Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law in 2004, and his chap-
ter “The Politics of Historiography and the Taxonomies of the Colonial 
Past” (2013).13 Examining the uniform manner in which much English 
common law was applied to Indigenous peoples in Anglo settler societies, 
he highlights the role of Euro-American liberal ideology – recognizing 
that the humanitarian liberalism of the mid-nineteenth century Colonial 
Office and legal officials, such as the under-studied Saxe Bannister and the 
famous James Stephen—who has been recently examined as the arche-
type of nineteenth-century thinking on the rule of law—was short-lived.14 
Their view of bestowing rights to English law on Indigenous peoples was 
overwhelmed by officials on the ground who refused to recognize them as 
citizens of a British colony. This led to uneven development across such 
colonial societies.15
McHugh’s insights highlight the “Anglo divergence” of settler col-
onialism by supporting both subjugation and its amelioration. This 
quasi-sovereignty led to fragmented geographical spaces in many British 
colonies which included the Anglo-Canadian prairies. It brought difficul-
ties to colonial administrators as well as judges. With regards to recent 
historiography in the law and society area, John McLaren’s significant 
2011 book on colonial judges, Dewigged, Bothered, and Bewildered,16 with 
its flow of judges and their controversies across the empire, makes for 
fascinating reading. What must be added for such external influences in 
prairie Canada, however, is the US borderlands which formed an equally 
close context. Also in 2011, Blanca Tovias published her study Colonialism 
on the Prairies: Blackfoot Settlement and the Cultural Transformation,17 
which details the threads of cross-country continuity that much future 
research and writing should follow.
These conflicting views led to a conundrum— the struggle between 
Liberty and Authority, in which liberty was a birthright of British settlers 
and authority gave them a contested absolute dominion over Indigenous 
people. Recently, a work that attempts to find a balance between these 
two forces within the multi-layered context of state sovereignty is Shelley 
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Gavigan’s Hunger, Horses and Government Men (2012), which is exam-
ined more fully below.18 Taken with my own recent coauthored work 
Fragile Settlements: Aboriginal Peoples, Law, and Resistance in South-West 
Australia and Prairie Canada in the long nineteenth century, the two books 
reveal through legal examples how that conundrum worked out in prac-
tice on the Canadian prairies.19 They pit local Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and civilian magistrates, who regarded Indigenous peoples as sub-
jects of the British crown, against the Department of Indian Affairs and 
other government officials, who tried to implement a Dominion policy of 
control that bordered on extermination.
Also exploring relations between settlers and Indigenous peoples, 
Lauren Benton, in A Search for Sovereignty (2010), emphasizes the creation 
of spaces of uneven sovereignty throughout European colonial empires 
which led to concepts of “quasi-sovereignty.”20 Such concepts involve the 
influence of places, spaces, and ideas on where and how colonizers and 
Indigenous peoples had to carve out customary and legal positions to han-
dle their particular problems in sharing the ground they inhabited. This is 
a rich theoretical approach for the study of places in prairie Canada, both 
geographical and spatial. The customary and legal complexities at issue 
led to pluralistic legal practices. Recognizing how such practices were de-
veloped in other Anglo settler societies would provide useful insights for 
prairie Canada, as well as showing how widespread was the very imperfect 
territorial sovereignty which most writers fear to acknowledge. Such ques-
tions of sovereignty impinge upon the livelihood of people who live on 
adjacent ground and concern the fabric of their existence. For example, a 
major element concerning human habitation on the desert-like conditions 
of prairie Canada was water. A study of the conflicts between Indigenous 
peoples and settlers over water rights on the Canadian prairies would en-
lighten us on their relationships as well as providing a useful context for 
such practices across the border.21 
Sovereignty and jurisdiction are intimately related. Mark Finnane 
has done extensive work on the limits of jurisdiction in the Australian 
colonies which can be applied to prairie Canada. His 2010 chapter “Law, 
Governance and Indigenous Peoples in Colonized Australia” explores the 
ways in which settlers, striving for jurisdictional uniformity, have tried 
unsuccessfully to assert sovereignty and jurisdiction over Indigenous 
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peoples.22 Too often, writers on prairie Canada have preferred to skate 
over such legal lumpiness. The goal here would be to study the problem 
of jurisdiction not only with respect to Indigenous peoples, but also to the 
non-Anglo immigrant settlers who have formed such a large part of prai-
rie Canadian society. There have been individual studies for Icelanders 
and Ukrainians, for example, but a larger comparative canvas might re-
veal norms and an actual taxonomy that would better explain where in-
dividual non-Anglo groups fit—noting the distinctions between the “law 
ways” of the various legal authorities.23 
Thus what is a settler colonial state? According to Lorenzo Veracini, 
who has written numerous articles since 2006 and a major book in 2010 on 
this issue (Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview), it is one where the 
settlers never went home.24 He argues that such settlers were “inherently 
trans-national and transcultural.” They faced a dialectic tension between 
the metropole and the settler colony, and their experience comprises a 
structure and not an event—as too many historians unfortunately define 
it. As Patrick Wolfe has emphasized in his study of settlers in the US, set-
tler colonialism is different from colonialism as it foreshadows the mar-
ginalization and elimination of Indigenous peoples.25 Considerable writ-
ing has been undertaken on Indigenous peoples and their interactions in 
individual settler colonial states, and how this has been interpreted by the 
courts. Drawing upon recent work, the time is appropriate for compara-
tive studies of this matter for former British colonies.26
Comparative studies may do well to be informed by the analysis of 
Edward Cavanagh, who argues that the Hudson’s Bay Company exercised 
a particular kind of sovereignty in Rupert’s Land. Using local allian-
ces to cement its home ground, passing orders and regulations to shape 
intra-company operations, and eschewing both wars against rivals and the 
christianization of First Nations people, the local governors and chief fac-
tors aimed to stay out of the geo-political limelight. The HBC extended its 
governance over indentured labour and First Nations families closely con-
nected to the forts for security and support, creating a welfare system that 
went against the preferences of the HBC’s governing London Committee 
and endowed the HBC with a “formidable authority.”27 George Colpitts, 
in his exploration of the history of the bison hunts, Pemmican Empire, 
elaborates on this system, describing Indigenous people investing in these 
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relationships in the interest of food security and the care of the elderly and 
infirm over long winters.28 The HBC thus used the relations it forged with 
Indigenous peoples and outside organizations to devise a welfare regime 
that enhanced its unique form of sovereignty until, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, circumstances launched by settlers overtook these efforts. 
For the law and society writer who sees law as the lens through which 
settler-colonial states can be studied, law must be de-centered from a doc-
trinal approach to include the study of other means by which settlers at-
tempted to eliminate Indigenous peoples over the course of time through 
government agencies, policing, courts, the church, and local societies. In 
the end, we find that the evolving structure did not accomplish what it had 
originally set out to do (assimilation), because of conflicting interactions 
within and between those institutions and Indigenous resistance. Over 
time, the isopolitical relationship between the metropole and settler lo-
cales gave way to settler self-government and an accelerated subjugation 
of Indigenous peoples and non-British migrants. However, alongside this 
Anglo-Canadian legal system were the customary laws and practices of 
non-Anglo immigrant settlers and Indigenous peoples that formed a legal 
pluralist structure within which the factors of resistance and accommo-
dation provided a moving platform of human interaction. It is the study of 
such factors that will bring the historiography of prairie Canada to a more 
robust stage and parallel the study of other Anglo-settler societies, while 
providing the means for more comparative legal-historical writing. Given 
the large body of specialized studies of an “internal” nature in prairie 
Canada, the doors are open for a wider and more meaningful interpret-
ive canvas. But above all, this canvas must include Indigenous scholars 
exploring their customary laws and legal institutions within this pluralist 
paradigm,29 lest we become bound to “white-settler scholarship.”30
As the first part of this chapter has focussed on colonial settler society 
and relations with Indigenous peoples, the second part will address the 
historiography of a few other law and society subjects in prairie Canada 
with a relevant comparative eye. The region, from its settler period to the 
end of the twentieth century, has been in many instances a thorn in the 
side of imperial and dominion governments. Prairie Canada was seldom 
seen as integral to Confederation from its very beginning with the Riel 
Resistance of 1869, when Ontario militiamen tried to impose their will on 
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the diverse peoples who occupied what became the province of Manitoba, 
until perhaps the National Energy Program of the 1980s which targeted 
revenues from the oil and gas industries centred in the West, a develop-
ment that led to an ill-fated secession movement. While space necessarily 
is limited, I will touch on some of the major areas in which the historiog-
raphy of law and society in prairie Canada could continue to flourish—
including agriculture, civil society, business and labour, towns and cities, 
crime, policing, and the courts. 
For the fur trade era itself, there is still work to be done on governance 
and the law leading up to the surrender of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
Charter in 1870. Dale Gibson has contributed yet another detailed exam-
ination of the legal history of the Red River colony.31 This follows Jack 
Bumsted’s Trials and Tribulations and a number of articles and book 
chapters cited in Gibson’s book.32 What remains for the HBC era is the 
further study of legal relations and disputes among settler, Indigenous, 
and Métis peoples in the hinterlands of the region. The fur trade era was 
steeped in imperial and economic issues, and a recent article by David 
Smith delves into the parliamentary inquiry of 1749 that launched an at-
tack on the HBC’s trade monopoly and whether it operated for private 
corporate or public interest and good.33 The issue is timeless and stretches 
into our current era. So too is the relationship between business and sci-
ence. As Ted Binnema has explored in a fascinating work, the HBC assist-
ed the royal navy with cartographic knowledge and used its monopoly to 
become a patron of science by convincing the Royal Society and govern-
ment authorities to support its studies of geomagnetism, plant and animal 
biodistribution, geology, hydrography, ethnography, and craniometry, 
along with the collection of specimens and meterological data.34
The social and economic life of the prairies after the fur trade era was 
founded on agriculture, both arable and husbandry. This essentially rural 
society depended on small towns for forms of social engagement until 
Winnipeg, and then Regina, Calgary, and Edmonton rose to urban status. 
Thus, forms of municipal government and the rise and privatization of 
public utilities and of oligarchic and monopolistic forms of business or-
ganization were crucial to the region’s development. We know that some 
small towns, such as Vulcan, were stopovers in the great westward move-
ment, the average length of residence being perhaps five years.35 As to how 
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much mobility there was across the prairies, we still do not know, nor 
have we examined its ramifications for a settler society. Understanding 
mobility is an essential task for legal historiography because people carry 
their laws and customs with them from place to place.
As for local communities, what were the legal relations within and be-
tween town councils, municipal organizations, and public utilities when 
residency was of short duration? Was the tenure of councillors, magis-
trates, and legal officials similar, and did that situation affect governance 
in its wider sense? For example, it has been demonstrated that many towns 
and their local courts were keen to prosecute and convict persons of va-
grancy who were targeted as “idle” and of “ill repute.” When such cases 
were appealed to provincial superior courts, often the convictions were 
overturned.36 We have a plethora of local histories, but to my knowledge 
no one has used them to garner the information that would provide an-
swers and insight into these questions, and few of those histories delve into 
socio-legal matters. Some of the issues have been studied in states across 
the border, and it would be interesting to find the extent of commonalty. 
Since internal and external migration was the norm, did, or how did this 
factor affect the growth of monopolistic forms of transportation, power, 
and water which were so essential to an agrarian economy? Since there 
was conflict with each of those enterprises, how did government regula-
tion and case law play out? 
Twenty years ago, John Phillip Reid, writing about law on the Overland 
Trail, said that we can best understand a society from its civil behavioural 
patterns, and thus the role of the legal historian is to research property 
law, debtor-creditor relations, and common civil transactions.37 While 
Reid’s advice has been followed to some extent in the western United 
States, it has remained fallow in prairie Canada. Indeed, I wonder if it 
will ever happen. There appears to be an insufficient number of socio-legal 
historians today to mount such intensive studies. One of the most conten-
tious areas of civil transaction, for example, concerns the law of dower. As 
we know, the province of Manitoba abolished it in 1885, the Northwest 
Territories in 1886, and the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan 
in 1905. Since we have Margaret McCallum’s study of the women’s move-
ment to restore dower and the origins of that legislation in 1917–1920,38 it 
would be fascinating to examine the case law that developed in the three 
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provinces over the course of the twentieth century and how dower has 
affected the development of family law since then. 
Two other subjects common to civil transactions concern the busi-
ness of business (bankruptcy law), and the business of labour (unions). 
For the former, we have the unique work of Thomas Telfer in his 2014 
book Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 
1867–1919.39 Using the rural and urban court records of Ontario, Telfer 
provides a thorough understanding of the legal structures involved in 
the regulation of debt and obligation while exploring the legal forms and 
changing public attitudes which were frequently contested. While we have 
a virtually complete run of civil files in Alberta and Manitoba with process 
books that identify the subject matter of the actions, such a study for the 
twentieth century would provide a kaleidoscope on the twists and turns 
of business history over challenging decades of economic rise and fall on 
the prairies.40 This would include the emergence of the strange economics 
of Social Credit in the late 1930s, followed by the impact of the federal 
Natural Energy Program in 1980 that deceased the western provinces’ 
share of oil and gas revenues and brought them into a nation-wide conflict 
that flirted with separation.
The study of the business of labour on the prairies has been some-
what moribund since the turn of this century. Apart from events of indus-
trial strife, lockouts, and strikes, the non-union aspect of human labour 
has also been missing. An entry to the subject is that of the other side of 
labour, namely unemployment. Erik Strikwerda’s fine study, The Wages of 
Relief: Cities and the Unemployed in Prairie Canada, 1929–39,41 published 
in 2013, examines the crisis of unemployment in the three prairie cities of 
Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg and brings us an interesting com-
parative study. Given the importance of the local perspective to regional 
history, such comparative studies for the second half of the century would 
rest on a vast array of sources and comprise a wonderful undertaking. 
The writing of contemporary socio-legal history also applies to the 
fields of forestry and mining, which were major industries in prairie 
Canada throughout the course of the twentieth century. For south of the 
border, Gordon Bakken has written a study of the interaction of mining 
companies and local communities at the county and state court levels 
in the western states. Many of the cases involved the law of nuisance as 
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ranchers and families took issue with the practices of mining compan-
ies.42 A study of such cases in prairie Canada would provide an interesting 
introduction to settler and community acceptance of industrial practices. 
As we know, there was major litigation between citizens and the railway 
companies, as well as grain elevator and electric power conglomerates, as 
investors from Great Britain and Eastern Canada sought to install monop-
olistic and oligarchical structures upon the natural resources of the West.43 
On another level, such a study would also test the popular thesis of Jared 
Diamond on the entitlement values of the mining industry.44 It would also 
be interesting to examine the differences between environmental practi-
ces by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.45 
The history of crime and criminal justice has been at the forefront of 
legal-historical writing on the prairies for decades, from the scholarly to 
the popular levels, and most often it has focussed on “violence” (inter-
personal killing) and not necessarily the full panoply of criminality as 
reflected in the Criminal Code of Canada. The subject has been a major in-
dustry in the western United States, one which enables western Canadians 
to have a comparable focus. Taking homicide itself, Robert Dykstra has 
reset the terms of reference for its quantitative study. The conclusion is 
that any sampled population of less than 100,000 people, or at least 
80,000, is too small for the analysis of its homicide rate to be meaning-
ful.46 Regarding “high violence,” Dykstra suggests that a figure of about 
forty homicides per 100,000 people would provide a useful cut-off point 
for defining a society with a high level of violence. The general problem is 
that most studies of violence in the West are based on population levels 
of much less than 80,000, and modern figures reveal statistically that the 
smaller the population base the higher the rate of violence—which ren-
ders such figures meaningless. Why does this happen, and does it not then 
become impossible to study places (such as judicial districts) with popu-
lations below 80,000? What is useful, however, is the ratio of violence per 
capita based on socio-economic structures. Thus ranching communities 
in the western US, adjusted for population, had five times the killings of 
farming-urban ones, and two and a half times the rate in mining areas.47 
These distinctions are critical for a meaningful understanding of violent 
crime in its socio-economic context.
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Compiling such data for the pre-modern era in the West is problematic 
due to factors such as reporting and randomness. The “academic” figures 
are also different from contemporary perceptions due to the press in the 
early period,48 and the press and movies since the 1920s. It was, in fact, the 
“dime novel” which initiated the modern view that violent crime is ram-
pant in our modern society. The statistical evidence for prairie Canada, 
however, is available thanks to the fact that policing and legal institutions 
were established at the outset. By Dykstra’s methodology, the figures of 
forty-seven murders per year per 100,000 people for Manitoba, fifty-four 
for Saskatchewan, and thirty-nine for Alberta from 1870 to 1919 suggest 
that the rate of violent crime was high (over forty being the threshold).49 
With regard to the rural/urban areas, the figures are not far from the evi-
dence of western states in the US where, for all criminal prosecutions, the 
rural area rate was four times that of the towns and cities. Moreover, for 
all indictable offences, the rate quadrupled from 1891 to 1931, confirming 
the public view.50 Thus there are similarities in the western borderlands of 
both countries, but considerable research is needed to flesh out the evi-
dence and its meaning on a topic of wide public interest.51  
The history of crime relating to the convergence of settlers and 
Indigenous peoples on the prairies begins in the 1870s. Jeffrey Monaghan 
has dived into the correspondence of North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) 
officers who planned their patrol routes to gain knowledge of Indigenous 
peoples.52 The Mounties focussed on distinguishing between good and 
bad individuals, and in doing so they contributed unknowingly to the 
anxiety of settlers whose calls for “law and order” established the colonial 
settler imagination and mentality. Settler leaders also used the “troubles” 
of the 1885 Rebellion, a Métis uprising in which most Indigenous people 
were not involved, in order to accelerate control over Indigenous com-
munities and mobility.53 Nonetheless, the records show that the Mounties 
went out of their way not to apprehend and remove individual Indigenous 
people who went beyond their reserves, or to arrest those who were cited 
by Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) officials. Instead, the Mounties, 
exercising their discretion to handle local conditions while maintaining 
a semblance of control over the Dominion policy for reserves, tended to 
allow individual chiefs to control and discipline their own men.54 The role 
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of the NWMP would diminish, however, with the rise of civilian govern-
ments and the establishment of reserves.
It was, in fact, the Conservative government of John A. Macdonald 
that established the first “industrial schools” for the Indigenous children 
of prairie Canada in 1883, even though such schools had failed in central 
Canada. Bypassing the protections of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and 
the treaties of the 1880s, the expansion of these residential schools in the 
late nineteenth century brought the deaths of thousands of Indigenous 
children, and the injury and traumatization of thousands more as Ottawa’s 
“cultural genocide” took root.55 These schools appeared to fit the para-
digm of Michel Foucault’s art of “distribution” and his theory of “circu-
lation”: dividing or partitioning good and bad people so that the latter 
could be located, controlled, and disciplined.56 For Foucault, schools were 
a place to control children through a regimented regime with surveillance, 
discipline, and punishment—a fitting description of Canada’s residential 
schools’ attempts to break Indigenous children away from their heritage.
When applied to prairie Canada in its formative years, the frontier 
with its settlers, buildings, and infrastructure could be seen as a geograph-
ical milieu where Indigenous peoples were seen as “subjectivities” which 
were thought to justify the imposition of settler colonial rule under “myths 
of liberal benevolence.”57 This was, out of interest, a hallmark of policing 
in European industrial cities.58 Yet the police, whether the NWMP or the 
later RCMP, declined to use violence against Indigenous peoples in their 
general policing activities.59 Since most of the complaints of Indigenous 
malevolence were unfounded or unsubstantiated, many patrols sent out 
to address complaints found no suspects, which probably gave rise to 
this seeming benevolence.60 Instead, the Mounties, and later local police, 
turned most of their attention to European immigrants, who swelled the 
calendars of the criminal courts,61 and Chinese immigrants in prairie 
towns62—subjects that await a full legal-historical study such as that of 
South-Asian immigrants in the US northwest.63 
Shelley Gavigan’s Hunger, Horses and Government Men addresses one 
of the most important public policy issues in Canada today: “What went 
wrong in Canadian Indian policy that led to the dismal poverty and high 
crime rates of most of today’s reserves?”64 Gavigan’s book takes on the 
issue in a well-structured and clearly written analysis of the relationship 
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between Plains First Nations and Canadian criminal law, in what is now 
Saskatchewan and Alberta. It is surprising that this is the first book-length 
legal history of the imposition of criminal law in the settlement era on the 
Indigenous peoples of the prairies. While we now have both histories and 
revisionist histories of the NWMP in the same period,65 one hopes that 
this work marks the beginning of a rich discussion of the introduction of 
criminal law and the criminalization of First Nations people. 
 Moving from reserves to the settler countryside, recent writing by 
Warren Elofson and others has highlighted the early history of ranching 
on the prairies and the difficulties ranchers faced in eeking out a subsist-
ence on a landscape they had never encountered before.66 Several law and 
society issues have surfaced from such ranching history. These include the 
widespread theft of cattle by Anglo-Canadian thieves, who ranged back 
and forth across the border, and the inability of the NWMP or RCMP 
to investigate and bring them to justice. In the end, we have instances of 
rough justice and the NWMP’s hiring of the Pinkerton Agency in Seattle, 
whose officials appeared much more adept in pursuing such criminal ac-
tivity.67 Indeed, the Canadian Pacific Railway also hired Pinkerton agents 
to investigate criminal activity on the rails. Thus a study of the Pinkertons 
on the Canadian prairies would not only be useful, but also make a very 
attractive study for a widely read book. 
Rural farmers have fared worse in historical accounts of their socio-
legal problems which ended up in the courts. It was the institutional 
practice of fencing that brought them into conflict with ranchers who, by 
contrast, had a wider view of an unencumbered landscape on the prairies 
and a strong preference for a cheap open range. Those issues, starting with 
fence law on the trans-Mississippi west,68 and the land law under which 
they were litigated, have been examined in the prairies south of the border 
but not to the north. Although Canadian historian Allan Greer has set the 
framework for such a study, it has been developed only on the US northern 
frontier.69 
Moving to the towns and urban life, it is also surprising that we 
have no solid history of crime in any of the prairie cities. The records are 
fully extant, both in terms of the official record and literary evidence. 
Historians across the common-law world, especially in England and the 
United States, have turned to criminal justice records in a quest for the 
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history of crime in the growth of urban populations. In Canada, one could 
point to no finer example than Michael Boudreau’s 2012 book on the early 
twentieth-century history of crime in Halifax, City of Order.70 Boudreau, 
drawing upon that rich legacy, meshes the social and legal aspects and 
interrogates what we will call law and crime. Not only is it time for such 
studies to be undertaken for prairie cities,71 but again there is a readership 
out there which would welcome such writing. 
An important subject of crime and criminality concerns women. Here 
we have Lesley Erickson’s superb 2011 book, Westward Bound.72 Assessing 
the legal and literary evidence from 1886–1940, Erickson sets the frame-
work for future studies into the second half of the twentieth century in 
which women’s issues—and gender and family issues in general—become 
mainstream. There is still much, however, to be examined regarding 
women and the law in the earlier period, for which Robert J. Sharpe and 
Patricia L. McMahon’s Persons Case is a hallmark of western Canadian 
historiography.73 Other areas of research interest include temperance, eu-
genics, and vice. 
Crime, of course, is only part of the law and society agenda. Equally 
important are the activities of the courts themselves. Thanks to the signifi-
cant work of Dale Brawn, we have a thorough history of the Manitoba Court 
of Queen’s Bench, as well as his historical study of the process of judicial 
appointment in Manitoba, Paths to the Bench, published in 2014.74 Brawn’s 
latter book is perhaps the most detailed analysis of court appointments in 
Canada. He has conducted an immense amount of research into the back-
grounds of the judges, and he uses that data to shed significant light on 
trends in judicial appointments. A similar work on Alberta is in progress 
with a biographical history of its federally-appointed judges from 1886 to 
2005.75 Brawn’s judicial history of a provincial high court has its equals 
in David Mittelstadt’s in-depth history of the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
published the same year, as well as Jonathan Swainger’s edited collection 
on the history of the Supreme Court of Alberta.76 All three contributions 
follow in the footsteps of Philip Girard, Jim Phillips, and Barry Cahill’s 
admirably edited book on the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.77 In addition, 
we will soon have an equivalent work on Saskatchewan with Mittelstadt’s 
current history of its Court of Appeal, which is nearing completion. We 
lack, however, that major tradition of lower-court historiography which 
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has been developed so well in England and the US, as lower, provincial-
ly-appointed courts in Canada continue to receive less attention than they 
deserve.78 A Canadian exception is Paul Craven’s superb 2014 study of 
the sessions system in nineteenth-century New Brunswick, Petty Justice, 
which can serve as a model of researching the local courts in any prai-
rie community.79 An important older work for the prairies is Graham 
Price’s massive thesis on the courts of the stipendiary magistrates of the 
Northwest Territories.80
While we have major studies of the courts, we have no studies of the 
juries before whom major cases were heard. In addition to juries them-
selves, we also need a study of the mixed anglophone-francophone juries 
(de medietate, that is, half and half) of the early period, and the role of 
women on later ones for which we have an admirable example south of the 
border.81 Grand and petty (trial) juries, along with coroners’ inquests—
which formed the backbone of the criminal justice system—remain sub-
jects in which we have a dearth of knowledge. Most of these legal records 
exist in major runs in the prairie provinces, and their archives wait for the 
researcher eager to explore them.82
An important “external” thesis has been explored recently by a young 
Canadian historian, Susan Dianne Brophy, of St Jerome’s University in 
Waterloo. A graduate of York University’s Department of Social and 
Political Thought, Brophy’s 2013 article on “Freedom, Law and the 
Colonial Project” in Law and Critique uses Marxist-informed works on 
economic development that adopt an international scope to show that 
countries thrive “in an interconnected, evolving global landscape.”83 
Her theory of UCD (Uneven and Combined Development) is taken from 
Trotsky’s theory of gaps and disparities interrupting development to cause 
a new amalgam called “combined development”—a result of Eurocentric 
dialectic forces which, being “uneven,” comprise a theory of law that chal-
lenges the legal pluralist approach.84 
The UDC of capitalism and the law provides a way to analyze the con-
nection between the local and the global, as well as between law and the 
economy. As the remnants of previous modes of production carry over 
and clash with new productive means, the laws of the past combine with 
new ones. Brophy’s idea is that law and the state are not synonymous, but 
comprise a “state of exception.”85 Law has its own dialectic facets and is 
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intrinsic, not tangential, to capitalism; its flexibility assists capitalism in 
negotiating its barriers. The effects of the rise of capitalism in post-coloni-
al and post-industrial societies on their Indigenous peoples is an allied 
subject that deserves greater attention as we move into a more globalized 
digital world.86 
Brophy, having written on Ukrainians and the colonial project,87 
UCD, and how the dialectical materialist logic is intrinsic to historical de-
velopment itself, is currently in the process of completing a thematic his-
tory of the Hudson’s Bay Company from the Proclamation of 1763 to the 
merger of 1821.88 Her interest is to examine critically the fur traders and 
incoming settlers and their relations with Indigenous peoples over time. 
Brophy’s recent and stimulating article “Reciprocity as Dispossession” 
suggests a framework for understanding the origins of Indigenous-settler 
relations in the nineteenth century.89 The HBC and other trading com-
panies exploited the labour of Indigenous peoples in various ways that 
have been “barely perceptible” to historians—an uneven and combined 
legal and economic transformation that became a major legacy of British-
North American settler colonialism. Brophy argues that the distortion of 
customary labour by factors such as credit, debt, and the “truck” economy 
led to their fragmented and inconspicuous dispossession, which later fa-
cilitated the displacement of Indigenous populations on the prairies. With 
reference to Manitoba, the Dominion’s purpose was to advance econom-
ically with the settlement of Ukrainians and the seclusion of Indigenous 
peoples on settled reserves in western Manitoba and elsewhere. Brophy’s 
anti-colonial thesis will bring an interesting counter-argument to the re-
ceived history of the HBC and the settlement of prairie Canada, all of 
which will be grist to the historian’s mill. 
Twelve years ago I wrote, in the concluding section of the introduc-
tion to Laws and Societies in the Canadian Prairie West, 1670–1940, that 
work on such various subjects as the law of intestacy, dower and divorce, 
family law in general, the end of riparian water rights, the privatization of 
public utilities, natural resources law, and consumer rights in the growth 
of a market economy—which were being researched and written about in 
the western United States—provided a rich background and context for 
the study of such subjects in prairie Canada.90 To date, apart from family 
and natural resources law, most of these subjects critical to the study of 
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law and society in the Canadian prairie provinces have not been under-
taken in that comparative context, either within or without the region. It 
is, perhaps, the historian’s conundrum that legal-historical writing often 
proceeds sloth-like—slow to adapt to the larger and ever-changing his-
toriographical landscape. As witnesses in the common-law world have 
often said, after giving little satisfactory testimony to the interrogatories 
posed in court depositions, “I can say no more.”91 
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that suggest how Quebec courts have been used in interfamilial conflict, newspaper 
records that disclose the details of bigamy cases, and penitentiary records that reveal 
the details of the lives and legal entanglements of Canada’s most marginalized people, 
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